Dist. 29, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/29/q/bon-sent-IV-d29-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this section there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked *concerning the placement of this part.* For it seems to be badly placed here; for if coercion is an impediment of marriage, then it ought to be determined in that chapter where the impediments of marriage are treated.

**I respond:** It must be said that, because the Master here treats of marriage on the side of the *efficient* cause; and the efficient cause is consent, not just any consent, but full consent, and the fullness of consent is lacking according to the aforesaid modes: therefore he here treats of *coercion* and *error,* while below he treats of the legitimacy of persons. And because that [legitimacy] can be lacking in many ways, and consequently marriage impeded; therefore further below he treats of many impediments. And this is the reason why that treatise is separated from this one, because the ground of impeding comes from another kind of cause.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says: *By no means force her, unwilling and resisting, to be joined in her marriage* etc. Suppose that some woman consents to someone through a messenger, and before the messenger's arrival she repents and does not wish to consent — is she to be compelled? And it seems that she is: because, if she committed her power to a proxy, then what the proxy does is as ratified as if she had done it herself: therefore if the proxy and the messenger consent, however much she afterward protests, it seems that the marriage stands. — But on the contrary: suppose that, as soon as she repents, before the messenger arrives, she contracts with another; it is settled that there is a marriage, since she is not yet bound to the other: therefore the other marriage does not stand. — Likewise, marriage is not made except through mutual consent; but mutual consent is none, unless it is simultaneous either in act or in habit: therefore if she repents before he then consents, it is clear, etc.

It is asked, therefore, whether marriage can be contracted between absent parties.

**I respond:** It must be said that if someone consents to an absent party through a proxy, marriage can be made — not only betrothal contracted — provided it be established that both consent; just as in the present one person can express consent to another through an interposed person.

As for what is asked, whether, she repenting, the marriage is contracted: it must be said that in truth, if she does not repent before he consents, the matter is safe. And if she repents in her heart and protests by a sign in the sight of witnesses, by whom it can be proved — for instance by denying, or by contracting marriage with another — in truth there is no marriage, neither in the sight of God nor in the sight of the Church, because the two consents do not concur simultaneously, especially if she did what was in her power, so that the revocation of her will might reach the messenger. And this is clear, because, if as soon as she repents she were to contract with another, there would be a marriage.

As for the objection, that she gave her power to another: it must be said that it is always understood that she gives the power for this act, the consent remaining in herself, which consent is of the essence of marriage — inwardly in the sight of God and outwardly in the sight of the Church.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked about this, that he says that *unwilling and coerced persons are joined* etc. For he seems to say by this that, if she does not protest, there is a marriage. **On the contrary:** that could be from negligence; but negligence does not supply the place of consent: therefore it does not seem that there is a marriage.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to the face of the Church, presumed consent makes a marriage, namely when it is probably presumed that the consent is marital. But this can happen in three ways: in the first way, when one consents *by word;* second, when, although one does not consent by word, one nevertheless consents willingly *to the carnal act,* by seeking or rendering what is required; in the third way, when one is able to protest and has the place and the time and *does not protest,* one is presumed to consent, and therefore is not heard afterward; rather, in the sight of the Church it is held for a marriage, not on account of negligence, but on account of consent, which is believed to be inclined and voluntary simply, although at the beginning it was coerced.