Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/30/q/bon-sent-IV-d30-a1-q1
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### Article Unique. *On the consent that fails on the part of reason.*
### Question I. *Whether erroneous consent makes marriage.*

As to the first, then, it is asked whether erroneous consent makes marriage. And that it does not, is shown:

1. Because consent follows knowledge, therefore he who consents, consents to the one of whom he thinks; but one who believes this person to be another thinks of that other one: therefore he consents to that one and not to this one: and so on.

2. Likewise, "the voluntary is that whose principle is in the one who knows the particulars": therefore the involuntary is present where there is no knowledge; but where one errs, one does not know, and so the character of the voluntary is not present there: therefore neither is marriage.

3. Likewise, what comes about through ignorance has more of the character of the involuntary than what comes about through violence; but the latter is an impediment: therefore so is the former.

4. Likewise, there is an authority which says this, as is found in Cause Twenty-Nine, Question One, throughout.

**On the contrary:**
1. Isaac believed he was blessing Esau, yet in blessing him it was Jacob who was blessed: therefore by a like argument, one who believes he is taking one woman as wife and takes another, she is his wife.

2. Likewise, Jacob believed he was knowing Rachel and knew Leah, and yet there was marriage: therefore, and so on.

3. Likewise, this is shown by reason: because one who sins through ignorance sins nonetheless and is not excused: therefore neither is marriage broken on account of error.

4. Likewise it is objected, because a peasant, believing copper to be gold, buys copper, not gold: therefore it likewise seems that a woman who believes Peter to be Martin consents to Peter.

5. Likewise, if erroneous consent is an impediment insofar as it is erroneous: then wherever there is error, there is an impediment: therefore if she believes she is contracting with a rich man and contracts with a poor one, it seems that no contracting of marriage takes place.

In connection with this it is asked which error is an impediment, and whether error as to nobility impedes marriage. For it seems that it does not, since it is an error of quality; but the Master says the opposite in the text.

> **Conclusion.** Error concerning the person impedes marriage, but not error concerning the properties of the person, unless it concerns condition.

**I respond:** It must be said that error in consent can be twofold: either error concerning the person, or error concerning the properties of the person. If it is error concerning the person, such error takes away the consent and impedes the marriage. For she who consents to someone, believing him to be another, is joined, according to the truth of her affection, to him whom she believes [him to be], and consents to him; and therefore there is no marriage there, because there is no mutual consent. But for there to be error of the person, it is necessary that a twofold person be present: one in interior regard, the other in exterior; and such error makes the consent and the will turn away from the one who appears outwardly, because all consent and will follows some knowledge. For, as Augustine says, we can love the unseen, but never the unknown. — But if it is error concerning the properties of the person, such error does not entirely take away consent; and therefore it does not entirely impede marriage, except when it is error of condition or of servitude. But why this error impedes more than another is said below.

**To the arguments:**
*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected concerning the blessing of Jacob, it must be said that it is not a like case: because the blessing is the work of God, and in truth was owed to him whom, unknowingly, he was blessing; and therefore Isaac afterward confirmed the blessing; but consent is the work of the person, as regards a judgment capable of erring; therefore it is not a like case.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that Jacob, in knowing Leah, erred, and yet there was marriage; it must be said that the marriage did not come from the intercourse; but afterward Jacob consented to her whom he had known, and again served for the first one.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that ignorance does not excuse from fault; it must be said that ignorance of law does not excuse, but nevertheless ignorance of the person and of the fact, due diligence having been employed, does excuse — as if someone should know another woman, believing he knows his own; so in the case proposed.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that one who believes he is buying gold, etc.; it must be said that it is not a like case, for a twofold reason: first, because the peasant does not think of the gold except in general, but of the copper in particular; but the woman, erring as to Peter, thinks of Martin in particular. Moreover, consent is an interior act of the will, which follows an estimation and a believing; but purchase is an exterior act, which follows an exterior contract concerning the thing. If, however, the peasant were to make mention of gold, so that mention of gold were made in the contract, and the other were to sell brass for gold; then the contract would not hold — indeed the deceiver would be bound to restitution; and to this extent it is a like case. And this is what the Master introduces as a like case in the text itself.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, as to which error is an impediment: the answer is clear from what has been said. But as to what is asked concerning nobility, it must be said that one can err about nobility in two ways, as is clear from an example. For a woman who believes that this man whom she sees is the son of the king of England can err in two ways: for either she knows the person of the king of England's son by sight or by hearing, and then she truly consents to him, because she thinks of him; and then it is error of the person, and there is no marriage. Or she does not know his person, but only thinks of his rank, and believes that this man whom she sees has that rank and nobility; and then she consents only to this man, and it is error of a property, not of substance. — As to what is therefore objected, that she believes him to be another: that is false; rather, it is another [thing she believes of him], since nobility is not a substance, but an accident.