Dist. 30, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/30/q/bon-sent-IV-d30-a1-q3
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### Article Unique.
### Question III. *Whether a lustful consent is the cause of matrimony.*

Thirdly it is asked whether a lustful consent is the cause of matrimony, as for instance when someone consents to a woman on account of riches, or on account of beauty. And that it is not, is shown:

1. Because the matrimonial union is from God, as is clear from what is said in Matthew nineteen: *What God has joined, let not man separate*; but the union of lust is not from God — and this union, or consent, comes from lust, since it arises from disordered love: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that whose cause is evil is itself also evil; hence if the root is evil, the branch of the work is evil too; but this consent is evil: therefore it does not effect matrimony except an evil one. But matrimony is not evil, since it is a Sacrament: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a spiritual marriage, contracted with avarice intervening and a pact concerning money, is altogether broken and ought not to stand, as is clear in the case of a simoniacal bishop: therefore by the same reasoning carnal matrimony, of which [spiritual matrimony] is a sign, [ought likewise not to stand].

4. Likewise, matrimony is a sign of the union of Christ and the Church; but the Church is not united to Christ, nor Christ to the Church, except by a chaste love: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. Sacred Scripture seems to show this, since it is said expressly in Genesis twenty-nine, that Jacob consented to Rachel on account of her beauty; likewise in Deuteronomy twenty-one: *If you see a beautiful woman*, etc.

2. Likewise, this is shown by a double similitude: because he who baptizes another with the intention of gain truly baptizes; and intention is necessary for baptism, just as consent is for matrimony. Likewise, a hireling who preaches out of love of money nevertheless preaches and proclaims the true Gospel, and it must be believed on his account: therefore if lustful love does not corrupt the Gospel in the one preaching it, neither does it corrupt matrimony in the one consenting.

4. Likewise, if a chaste consent is required for matrimony, by the same reasoning charity would be required as well: therefore this Sacrament could not be perfected except by those having charity, which is not [required] in any [other] Sacrament.

> **Conclusion.** A lustful consent which lacks the intention of contracting is against the truth of this Sacrament, but one who intends to contract with the intention of lust is only against its usefulness.

**I respond:** It must be said that a lustful consent is spoken of in two ways: either because it intends lust after the manner of an end and an object, namely because such a consent seeks nothing but to extort bodily coupling, not to take a wife; and this deprives it of the intention of contracting. In another way one is called lustful because, although he consents to some woman so as to take her as a wife, nevertheless he does this not for the sake of preserving chastity, but for the sake of satisfying cupidity or lust. The first consent is against the truth of the Sacrament, the second is against its usefulness, not against its truth; and it is of that latter consent that we speak here — not the one that lacks the intention of contracting, but the one that intends to contract with the intention of lust; and this does not take away that it is matrimony. — Hence the arguments proving this are to be granted.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1, 2.* To what is objected, that matrimony is from God, and this [consent, is] from lust; it must be said that in consent there are two things, namely the substance of the consent and the evil circumstance, since [it is done] on account of money, or lust. The substance of the act is good and is from God; and this is the cause of the consent; the circumstance, however, contributes nothing to this, whence it neither helps, nor is it a cause or a co-cause. — Hence from this the following point is clear, that consent is not the cause of matrimony according to what it has of malice, but according to what it has of goodness. — As for what is said, that exterior works receive their quality from the interior [act], this is true insofar as they are works of reason, which are ordered to an end and proceed from the will itself, in that they are good through their ordination to a good end, or evil [through ordination to an evil end].

*To 3.* To what is objected concerning spiritual matrimony: it must be said that it is not alike, first, because there dignity of person and honesty are required, since one must treat the Sacraments with due propriety; second, because that Sacrament is spiritual, and the office to which one is chosen is spiritual, and the spouse is spiritual: and therefore, when it is brought about through money, it is altogether rejected. Not so in carnal matrimony, for which neither dignity of person nor a spiritual office is required; and again, grace is not given through it in the manner it is given through other Sacraments, but only the help of grace, as was seen above at the beginning [of this treatise], unless perhaps by reason of an attached blessing, which would make the seller simoniacal.

*To 4.* To the last it must be answered that it is a sign not by reason of all [the] conditions [of the thing signified], but by reason of indivisibility; hence it is not necessary that they come together out of chastity, or out of charity.

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