Dist. 30, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/30/q/bon-sent-IV-d30-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what he says: *For if the devil, transfiguring himself into an angel of light, is believed to be good, this is not a pernicious error*. For it seems false to say this, since here there is an error which leads to idolatry, as if he should show himself to be Christ, and be believed and adored.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Master speaks of that error in such a way that it is not carried further, because this is not an error of law, but of fact. — Or if it is carried further, it is understood in such a way that it is not simply so, but under a condition, namely if one should adore him, if he is Christ; then there is no idolatry nor dangerous deception. But if it is carried further still, then it begins to be a danger.

### Doubt II

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *If someone heretical under the name of Augustine or Ambrose,* etc. It seems that such an error would be most dangerous: because if he receives such a heretic under the name of Augustine, then he will believe everything the heretic says to him, and so [act] against the faith, and he who believes in this way becomes a heretic, and no one is excused from such an error: therefore, etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that if that heretic, who offered himself in this way under the name of Augustine, were to proceed in preaching an error: if one were then to believe him, it would be a danger, because the error would be not only in the person, but also in the faith. Nor is one excused who assents to such a person, since he has an interior counselor, to whom he ought to turn back and whom he ought to consult. But if that person does not proceed further, but only says in general that one should follow his own sect; then there is no danger: it is true in the person, and if he preaches the truth of Augustine to him, there can be merit in assenting there.

Hence note that, in the same truth, one who assents to another according as he is a Catholic doctor merits; assenting to him as to a heretic, one demerits; assenting to him as to a philosopher, one neither merits nor demerits. Hence suppose that, just as Moses said: *In the beginning God created heaven and earth,* so too would Aristotle say it, so too would Arius; he who believed what Moses says would merit, because he would believe that Moses was inspired by the Holy Spirit, and so would believe the First Truth. He who believed what Aristotle says would neither merit nor demerit, because he would be adhering to worldly wisdom. He who believed what Arius says, thinking Arius, who was a heretic, to be a true doctor, would demerit, because his assent is founded upon heresy.

### Doubt III

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *An error of fortune does not exclude consent.* For it seems to speak badly: because it is possible that someone should consent to a woman for money alone; the reason for consenting was the money; but the principal cause not existing, the effect does not exist: therefore if she in whom one consents on account of riches is not rich, there is no consent: therefore no marriage either. — Likewise, suppose that consent were expressed under the condition of money; then if it were not given, there would be no marriage in the sight of the Church: therefore by the same reasoning, if it is not so in the heart, there is no marriage in the sight of God.

**I respond:** It must be said that an error of fortune does not exclude consent, but rather induces consent. For consent is induced by a false estimation so as to elicit true consent; and since it is not directed toward another person than this one, the consent is true, and the marriage is true.

As to what is objected, that money is the cause; it must be said that this is false, but rather it is the estimation, or hope of having money, [that is the cause].

To what is objected, if one should consent in hope of money; it must be said that it is one thing to consent in hope of money, another to consent under a condition. For he who consents in hope of money supposes riches in his estimation and absolutely elicits consent from the will, and therefore contracts marriage; but he who consents under a condition reserves his consent to himself still, and therefore there is no marriage; nor is there a likeness between this consent and that one.

### Doubt IV

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *But afterward they declared it and remained in virginity.* On the contrary: Matthew, chapter one: *He took Mary his wife and did not know her, until she brought forth her firstborn son.* From this text a twofold argument is made: first from the word *until:* therefore he knew her *afterward;* likewise from the word *firstborn,* because *first* is said with respect to *a second.* — Likewise, John chapter two: *He went down to Capharnaum, he and his mother and his brothers:* therefore he had brothers; and it is agreed that this is not said of the father: therefore of the Mother.

**I respond:** It must be said that from the aforesaid twofold expression the most base heresy of the Claudianists took its rise, who assert that the blessed Virgin was known by Joseph after the birth of Christ; but this heresy is altogether irrational, [holding] that the most blessed Mother of God, since she was the temple of God and of the Holy Spirit, should be given over to the work of the flesh. This cannot fall except into an impious and foolish soul, believing, that is, so great an indignity in the Mother of God; therefore it is erroneous and pernicious. And the Lord at his death did away with this error, when he commended her to blessed John and gave him to her as a comfort in place of a Son: for why would he have given him, if she had had sons?

As to what is objected concerning the word *until,* it must be said that it states an uncertain term, just as there: *The Lord said to my Lord: sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies* etc.; it is agreed that afterward he will sit at [his] right hand. — Likewise this name *firstborn* removes an order to what is *prior,* it does not posit an order to what is *later;* and therefore he is called firstborn because he was, according to the Law, to be offered. — And if you should object that he had some brothers; it must be said that *brothers* are there called kinsmen in the second degree, or in the third.

### Doubt V

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Committing herself to the divine disposition, she consented to carnal intercourse:* therefore it seems that she was at least corrupted in mind; which to say is blasphemy. — Likewise, he seems to contradict himself, because a little before he says: «Mary consented to the marital society, but not to carnal intercourse»: therefore he now says something false.

**I respond:** It must be said that that saying of Augustine is understood, not as though the Virgin had consented so as to know him carnally, since I never believe that she herself willed this, nor that God inspired this in her; but she consented to the conjugal society, or to the mutual power over each other's body, which was ordained to carnal intercourse, though not by a necessary ordination.

### Doubt VI

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that Jacob loved Rachel for her comely face and graceful appearance; whether he sinned. And it seems that he did, because the Master says in the text that «beauty is a less honorable cause on account of which marriage is contracted». — Likewise, favor is deceitful and beauty is vain, as is said in the last chapter of Proverbs: therefore whoever contracts marriage on account of beauty is moved by vanity: therefore if in the divine Sacraments such a cause is reprehensible, the point is evident, etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that beauty in a woman or in a man can move one to contract marriage in two ways: either as a principal cause, or as a cause inducing and attracting in a certain manner. If as a principal cause; then it is a less honorable cause, because this ought not to be the intention in marriage, but rather the procreation of children, or something similar, and this in turn is ordained to the divine service. But if as an inducing [cause]; it can be without sin, or at least without a grave one, inasmuch as beauty naturally draws the mind to love; and if such love of complacency is not very intense, it is not blameworthy. — But if someone should say that Jacob sinned venially there, this is not very improbable. — And note that there can be many inducing causes, which induce without sin, provided one does not rest in them, namely favor, beauty, riches, wages, wisdom, virtue — but virtue and character are above all to be attended to.