Dist. 31, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/31/q/bon-sent-IV-d31-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the goods of matrimony.*
### Question I. *Whether matrimony is in the genus of the useful, or of the honorable.*

And that it is in the genus of the *honorable*, it seems.

1. On that passage of the first [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter seven: *Not that I may cast a snare* etc.; the Gloss: "He showed it not to be base, but commended, under the general name of the *honorable*, that which is more honorable than the honorable."

2. Likewise, this seems [to hold] by *reason*: because chastity, since it is a virtue, is in the genus of the honorable; but the conjugal act is an act of chastity, since there is a conjugal chastity, just as [there is] a widow's: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, an act which otherwise would be fornicating becomes non-fornicating through marriage; but nothing takes away the dishonor of sin except the honorable: therefore marriage etc.

4. Likewise, to keep the faith of marriage is of itself a work of justice; but such things fall in the genus of the honorable, and this is a good of matrimony: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, *On the Good of Marriage*: "Certain goods have been given by God which are to be sought for their own sake, such as wisdom, health, and friendship; but certain others [are] necessary for the sake of something else, such as teaching, food, and marriage"; but the honorable is to be sought for its own sake: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Jerome in the book *On Virgins*: "By the danger of fornication marriages are conceded, and that becomes excusable which is not to be sought for its own sake, just as to widows second wedlocks are conceded only by the danger of fornication."

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: because "the honorable is that which draws us by its own force and allures us by its dignity"; but everything such is to be sought by all; matrimony, however, is not to be sought by all: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, all right shame is concerning that which has something of dishonor, not concerning the honorable; but every person of sound mind blushes at the conjugal act: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> Matrimony, according to something of itself, is in the genus now of the *honorable*, now of the *useful*, now of the *delightful*—goods which nevertheless are mixed with their contraries.

**I respond:** It must be said that, since there is a threefold good in marriage, namely *faith* [fidelity], *offspring*, and *Sacra*-

*ment*; *faith* is that one should know one's own [spouse] and not another; this is a good of conduct, ordered of itself, and it falls in the genus of the *honorable*. — But the *good of offspring* falls in the genus of the *beneficial*; for the multiplication of offspring is conducive to the conservation of the species and the perfection of number, just as food [is conducive] to the conservation of the individual. — But the good of the *Sacrament* falls in the genus of the *delightful*, because so great is the union there, that *a man leaves father and mother, and the two are in one flesh*; whence it is enjoined upon husbands, *that they love their wives as their own bodies*. And thus it is clear, "that since there are three things in choice, as the Philosopher wills, namely the *honorable*, the *beneficial*, and the *delightful*"; in a threefold genus is the good of marriage. And these three goods would be *pure* in the state of purity and innocence; but through sin they are *mixed with their contraries*: since in that act there is a certain dishonor contracted by reason of the wickedness of lust and prurience; and therefore in the *honorable* good a certain dishonor is intermingled. There is also a certain *harm*, because a man is impeded from persistence in prayer; whence in procreating offspring for the worship of God he is impeded from then worshipping God perfectly: thus therefore to the *beneficial* good is intermingled *harm*. And also to the *delightful* [good], namely to the indivision of the Sacrament, [is intermingled] a certain *tribulation* and *distress*, because *he who is with a wife thinks on the things that are of the world, how he may please his wife, and is divided*, since *he has tribulation of the flesh of this kind*: and so the delightful good is mingled with sorrow and distress. — Since therefore it is a *good*, yet a *mixed* [one]; therefore it can be sought, and yet it is better not to be sought. Whence *he who joins a virgin does well, and he who does not join* a virgin *does better*. — The reasons showing that matrimony, according to something of itself, is in the genus of the *honorable*, are therefore to be conceded.

**To the objections:**

*1.* To that, then, which is objected, that it is to be sought for the sake of something else; it must be said that it speaks by reason of the *beneficial* good, which is there.

*2. 3. 4.* To that which is objected from Jerome, and to the reasons following, it must be resolved that it is not *purely good*, but something having an admixture; and because this good is *medicinal*, therefore the good does not become evil on account of the evil which is there, but rather cures and excuses the evil—not so that it should not be *penal* (and therefore there is there shame and tribulation)—but only so that it should not be *culpable*, as will be clear below.