Dist. 31, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/31/q/bon-sent-IV-d31-a1-q3
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### Question III. *Whether these three goods are of the necessity of marriage.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning the necessity of these three goods, namely whether they are of the necessity of the Sacrament. And that the good of the *Sacrament* is of necessity [is shown]:

*Arguments for the affirmative side.*

1. Augustine says, and it is contained in the text: "The Sacrament cleaves so inseparably to the marriage bond that it seems not to be without it."

2. Likewise, it appears by reason: the good of the Sacrament consists in the account of inseparability; but inseparability is always present as a necessity: therefore either the good of the Sacrament is not a good, or it is present necessarily.

Likewise, that the good of *offspring* follows of necessity upon marriage appears thus:

3. Because Augustine says, and it is contained in the text, that "those who have procured the poisons of sterility are not spouses."

4. Likewise, it appears by reason: because marriage was instituted for this, namely for increasing and multiplying: therefore it is in vain if it lacks this end; but it cannot be altogether in vain, since it is a Sacrament: therefore etc.

Likewise, that the good of *faith* is of the necessity of the Sacrament appears thus:

5. Because Augustine says that if someone should consent to one woman so that afterwards he may take another, it is not a Sacrament; but this is on account of a defect of faith: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, it appears by reason: because it is permitted to divide a marriage for the cause of fornication; but it would not be permitted unless faith belonged to the substance: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** *(For the negative side.)*

1. That the *Sacrament* is not of the substance of marriage appears thus: because if someone contracts with a woman through words *of the present*, the marriage is contracted, and yet, when he passes over to religion, she is able to marry: therefore there was not there an inseparable bond.

2. Likewise, that neither is *faith* [of the substance] appears thus: because marriage can exist between those perpetually continent, and can exist between the incontinent, since neither can contract with another man or woman: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that *offspring* is not of necessity appears thus: because marriage exists among the sterile, as is evident; but here there is no good of offspring.

It is asked therefore: what is it that Augustine says, that "they are not spouses"? For if they first consented, the marriage was ratified; if afterwards they came together, it was consummated; but this is broken in no case, by no sin.

> **Conclusion.** The good of the *Sacrament* is of the necessity of marriage; the other two, namely *faith* and *offspring*, are in a certain manner of the being of the Sacrament, and in a certain manner only of its well-being.

**I respond:** As the Master touches upon in the text and takes from Augustine, since there are three goods of marriage, namely *faith*, *offspring*, and *the Sacrament*, one, namely *the Sacrament*, is of the *necessity* of marriage. For the Sacrament comes from the mutual obligation and the divine institution and the signification of that union; and therefore, since these are of the necessity of marriage, consequently the Sacrament also is. — But the other two goods are in a certain manner of the *being*, and in a certain manner of the *well-being*. For if we speak with respect to the *use of marriage*, thus they are of the *well-being*, since the use of marriage can exist without them, as is the case all the time; and it not only exists *without them*, but even *with their*

*opposites*. Hence the procuring of sterility and abortion and the breaking of faith do not dissolve the contracted marriage bond.

But if we speak with respect to the *contract of marriage*, which is through the matrimonial consent; thus the contract can exist *without these two goods*, as for instance among the sterile and among the continent, yet nevertheless it is not *against these things*. But then the consent is *against these things* when it is consented to under such a pact that the sterility of offspring be procured, or the wife be prostituted to another; for then it is not a consent or pact of *marriage*, but rather of *adultery*, since it directly conflicts with the institution of marriage. But the *lack* or absence of these two does not conflict: because *faith* comes from the right use of marriage; and since men can abuse it, therefore faith can be absent. Likewise *offspring* comes from the fruit of the womb; and since the sterile can be so either by nature or by art: therefore marriage can lack this good.

*(To 1.)* To that, then, which is objected, that the good of the Sacrament is not in marriage *before* carnal union; it must be said that this is false, because there is between the spouses an indissoluble bond, and it is not dissolved except by *spiritual* death, just as *after* consummation by *bodily* death. Yet it is true that the Sacrament is not there according to its *complete* and full account.

*(To argument 5, for the affirmative side.)* To that which is objected, that faith is of necessity, because he who consents in such a way that he may nevertheless marry another afterwards does not contract; it must be said that this is not only on account of a defect of *faith*, but also on account of a defect of the *Sacrament*, because he does not will to be joined to this woman perpetually, and because in the pact a condition contrary to the good of *faith* is introduced; nor is the Sacrament of marriage dissolved on account of infidelity, but the obligation of rendering the debt is dissolved.

*(Likewise to argument 4.)* To that which is objected concerning the good of offspring, that marriage was instituted for its sake; it must be said that it was not only for its sake, but also for a *remedy* and for a *sign*; and therefore, although this good is not there, the other goods can nevertheless be present. But if man had stood [in innocence], then this good would always have been present, because it would have been only for [an] *office*; and this good would not be lacking, because there would be no penalty of sterility.

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