Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/31/q/bon-sent-IV-d31-a2-q1
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### Article II. *In what way the goods of marriage excuse intercourse.*

Consequently, as regards the second article, inquiry is made concerning the excusing of the conjugal act through the goods of marriage. And since it may happen that one has intercourse with one's wife for the sake of fulfilling concupiscence, for the sake of avoiding fornication, and for the sake of procreating offspring; concerning this, according to these three, three [questions] are asked.

*First* it is asked, whether intercourse for the sake of offspring can be without all fault.

*Second* it is asked, whether intercourse for the sake of avoiding fornication can be without all venial sin.

*Third*, whether to have intercourse with one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is always a mortal sin.

### Question I. *Whether intercourse for the sake of offspring can be without all fault.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that it can be without all fault.

1. Augustine says, in *On the Good of Marriage*, and it is contained in the text: «Conjugal intercourse for the sake of generating offspring does not have fault».

2. Likewise, it seems so by reason: marriage is holy and good; which is evident, because it is instituted by God and confirmed by his presence at the wedding, in the second [chapter] *of John*, and approved by his answer, in the nineteenth [chapter] of Matthew; but a holy thing a man can use in a holy manner and without sin: therefore since this is chiefly for the sake of offspring, it is evident, etc.

3. Likewise, everything that God commands can be done without sin; but God commanded to procreate offspring, in the eighth [chapter] *of Genesis*, after the fall: therefore it is possible to do this without sin.

4. Likewise, no power is evil of itself, therefore we can use every power well; but the power of generating is a power given to us: therefore we can use it well. But *to use well, that is, better,* is nothing other than [to use it] toward that for which it is and according as it is [ordered] to it; and this is [the case] when a man knows his wife for the sake of offspring: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Every immoderate pleasure is a sin, because, where there is a defect of measure, there is the evil of fault; but in intercourse there is immoderate pleasure, even when one has intercourse for the sake of procreating offspring: therefore there is sin there.

2. Likewise, every pleasure in which right order is perverted is a sin; but in conjugal intercourse there is pleasure in which the soul is absorbed by the flesh, even when one has intercourse for the sake of this: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every act at which a man reasonably blushes is a sin, or has foulness — as to purge the belly: yet a man does not so reasonably blush at this, because a man ought not to blush at the *penalty*, but at the *fault* — but in conjugal intercourse, by reason or love of offspring, one blushes and would by no means do it before others: therefore it is a sin.

4. Likewise, every act in which lust reigns is a sin; but in the conjugal act, for the generating of offspring, lust reigns, because Augustine says that «propagation does not transmit sin to posterity, but lust [does]»: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, every act that is necessarily ordered to fault is a sin; but this is [the case] in intercourse by reason of offspring, because the offspring contracts sin: therefore in the conjugal act there is always sin.

6. Likewise, wherever there is a conjugal act, it is necessary that movements in the flesh precede; but the first movements are sins, at least venial: therefore intercourse for the sake of offspring is always a venial sin.

7. Likewise, if marriage excuses intercourse for the sake of the good of offspring, either it excuses from a sin that *is* [real], or from a sin that *is not*. Not from a sin that is not, nor was! If from a sin that *is* [real]: therefore there is some sin there.

Alongside this it is asked, in what measure marriage is said *to excuse intercourse*, since every ordering that is had with one's wife could also be had with another woman, and thus there would be lust and titillation and a carnal act in knowing one's wife, just as [with] another woman, or even [more].

> **Conclusion.** The conjugal act is excused through the Sacrament, and indeed from all fault, when it is done for the sake of generating offspring.

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this some have erred, saying that in the act of the generative [power] there is no fault except through excess, as in the act of the nutritive [power]. — Others have erred, saying that it is always a sin and can in no way be excused, but rather that on account of the sin the marriage is vitiated, not the vice excused; for evil joined to good vitiates it, and not conversely does good excuse the evil. — And the first indeed did not understand the *disease*, namely, in what way the generative power is infected. But the second did not understand that the Sacrament is a *remedy* and a *medicine*, which is not vitiated by the disease, but on the contrary calms the disease. — And therefore those who rightly believe, seeing the *disease* and the *remedy*, say that the conjugal act is excused through the Sacrament as a *disease* [is healed] through a *remedy*.

But if anyone wishes to consider the account of the *disease* and the *remedy*, it can be made clear thus. *First* indeed, every act in which the itching of lust so reigns that reason is absorbed, and man is made wholly flesh, is a disordered act, and an act in which, so far as depends on itself, the reign of the soul and the ordering which is in the powers of the soul is perverted; according to which ordering a certain justice is regarded, which is not only in the ordering *toward another*, but in the ordering of the powers of the soul *toward itself*. But this is [the case] in the conjugal act, as is evident by experience, and the Saints say, especially Augustine and Origen, and it is touched upon in the Gloss, on the first [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter six: *He who fornicates sins against his own body*; the Gloss: «Here the soul properly serves the body to such a degree that at the very moment and experience of this disgrace it is not permitted to a man to think or intend anything, because the submersion and absorption of lust itself subjects the mind as a captive». — And in the judgment of this disorder the *blushing* of nature contributes very much, [nature] which cannot be a liar; and it blushes at the movement of those members and at the act so much the more, the better ordered it is. And thus it is evident that that act is of itself *diseased*, because it cannot be exercised without such great disorder, as is touched upon in the same Gloss. — Behold, therefore, in what way we can see the *disease*.

The *remedy*, however, we can consider thus. For there is a certain act which bespeaks a disorder *of the mind toward God*, as to commit idolatry and to perjure; there is a certain [act] which bespeaks a disorder *of creature toward creature*, whether of one toward another, or of the same toward itself. The first is evil and diseased *in itself* and can in no way be done well, neither by divine command nor otherwise. But the second, because it does not have an essential disorder, can be ordered by divine authority, as when God commands to kill a man, when also he commands to take another's property, when also he inspires [one] to kill himself, as Samson, upon whom the Spirit of the Lord rushed, in the fourteenth [chapter] of Judges; in this manner he ordered the intercourse of Hosea with the woman who was not his wife, namely by God's command. But since this conjugal act ought not to be commanded to all, the divine disposition provided to order that disorder not by a *command*, but by a certain *statute*, and by a statute that would be a sign of that union which was ordained for the remedy of concupiscence, and thus through the Sacrament of marriage, which, because it has the character of a *medicine*, rather excuses than is vitiated; just as, when the Lord commanded the Hebrews to carry off the vessels of the Egyptians, the *carrying-off* does not make the command evil, but rather, on the contrary, the *command*, which is more powerful and higher, made the carrying-off good and meritorious, which otherwise would be culpable and evil. — The Saints, therefore, and all Catholics say that intercourse is excused from mortal fault through the Sacrament of marriage, especially when it is done for the sake of offspring.

But concerning the *manner* of excusing there is a twofold opinion: for some wished to say that it is excused from mortal fault, but not from venial, because the mortal there becomes venial. Others said, and this Augustine seems to hold, that since God gives a perfect remedy against the disease, [then] when intercourse is had for the sake of offspring, it can be without all fault; and this is more consonant with reason and with the piety of faith. — And the reasons for this are to be granted, provided however that this intention endure from beginning to end, so that the mind be not deflected toward something else; which however is very difficult.

**To the objections:**

*1. 2. 3. 4.* To that, therefore, which is objected, that there is there immoderation, disorder, blushing, and lust; it must be said that these four can be about the act of *reason*, or of *sensuality*. If about the act of *reason*, they always cause fault, because they cause evil in itself. But if they are about the act of *sensuality*, an ordering existing about the act of reason; then these pass into penalty; and so it is in the case at hand. For through the power of the Sacrament reason is ordered, so that it may will moderately and in an ordered and honorable way; nor does a man blush at that act, because he wishes to procreate children, nor does he seek [it] with a wicked will, but a chaste one. But unless the remedy of marriage intervened, then there would be disorder not only in *sensuality*, but also in *reason*; and so it would always be a sin. Hence by these four means it can be shown that the act of the generative [power] is a sin, unless it be excused.

*5.* To that which is objected, that it is the cause of sin; it must be said that it is false, because that act of itself is not the cause of anything but *offspring*, but by reason of the first transgression offspring cannot be generated without its own fault — not [the fault] of the one *generating*, because it is not on account of the fault of the one generating, but on account of the fault of the first parent that sinful offspring is born.

*6.* To that which is objected concerning the first movements, it can be said that they precede the conjugal act and are not always sins, as for instance when they arise from an ordered thought, as if Abraham should think of knowing his wife in order to obtain offspring; and then, if the flesh were moved, he would not sin.

*7.* To that which is asked last: from what sin does it excuse? it must be said that [it excuses] from a sin, not one that *is* [real], but one that would otherwise *be*, unless marriage intervened. — Hence in a different manner the Sacrament of marriage is a remedy and [so are] the other Sacraments. For this one is unto a *remedy*, because it makes [one] avoid a sin that would be incurred; but the others *free* [one] from a sin into which one has already fallen; and it furnishes a remedy in this measure, because an act of itself disordered is ordered through a divine statute.