Dist. 31, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/31/q/bon-sent-IV-d31-a2-q3
----------------------------------------
### Question III. *Whether to have intercourse with one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is always a mortal sin.*

Thirdly it is asked whether to have intercourse with one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is always a mortal sin. And that it is not, is shown thus.

1. Augustine says, and it is contained in the text: "Conjugal intercourse for the sake of satisfying concupiscence, yet with one's spouse, on account of fidelity to the marriage-bed has a venial fault."

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [true] *by reason*: because to take delight in conjugal intercourse for the sake of the good of marriage is not a sin: therefore neither is it [a sin] *to will to take delight*, because, if the act is good, the will of the act is also good: therefore it seems [so], etc.

3. Likewise, one who takes delight in food not for the sake of God, but for the sake of the food itself, because it is of good flavor, does not sin mortally: therefore by parity of reasoning, since conjugal delight is not mortal, if one wills to take delight, one does not sin mortally.

**On the contrary:** 1. An authority says, and it is contained in the text: "A vehement lover of his wife is an adulterer"; but one who loves his wife on account of this, that he may take delight in her, is a vehement lover: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Jerome: "The pleasures which are seized from the embraces of harlots are to be condemned in a wife."

3. Likewise, it seems [so] *by reason*: because to will to have intercourse or to seek it by delight alone is a sin even before consent: therefore when it advances into consent and act, since *a man may eat*, then, since to eat becomes mortal for the man, it will be mortal.

4. Likewise, one who has knowledge [of his wife] on account of this, that he may take delight, enjoys a creature, because he places therein the end of his rest; but "it is the highest perversity to enjoy the things to be used": therefore etc.

> **CONCLUSION.** *To know one's wife for the sake of satisfying concupiscence is venial, but mortal if it is done in such a way that the ultimate end is placed therein.*

**I respond:** It must be said that some say that one who *finally* knows his wife in order to have that wretched delight which is said to be in intercourse, sins *always mortally*, when he places it as the principal end, just as if someone were to preach for the sake of vainglory; but one who has knowledge [of his wife] for some *other principal cause*, yet as it were incidentally the delight which is therein pleases him, as is [the case] with someone who finally preaches for the sake of God, yet as it were incidentally the delight of praise pleases him; they say that he sins *venially*. For, in order that conjugal intercourse may be without any sin, it is necessary that that delight not please [him], but rather displease his reason. For it is so great that it takes away the use of reason and the spirit of prophecy for that time; and therefore it cannot then be referred to God, and therefore of it one cannot make good use *by willing* [it], but [only] *by not willing* [it]; it is not so with the other delights, whose objects of sense can be actually referred to God by reason. Whence according to these [thinkers] it is one thing to *seek* delight, another to *accept it when offered*, another to *tolerate* it. The first belongs to *mortal* sin, the second to *venial*, the third to *perfection*. — And this position, although it may seem probable, nevertheless is *too harsh*; for it is permitted to men to sport with their wives and even to take delight, and it is venial, provided nonetheless that they do so with marital affection; nor is it necessary to refer every delight to God, yet they sin venially. Nor is *enjoying a creature* always mortal, unless one places therein an end in such a way that he would do it even *if it were against God*; for then he places the ultimate end therein. Whence it is not similar with preaching, which is a privileged work.

And on account of this there is another opinion, that one who knows his wife for the sake of *final delight*, either is moved into delight with such great impetus that he knows his wife as [he would] a harlot; and this is then [the case], when he would know her [even] if she were not his wife; and then he sins mortally, because he then places therein the ultimate end, and then he truly and properly enjoys [her] and loves [her] too vehemently. — But if he wills to take delight in her because [she is his] wife, and would in no way know her if she were not his wife, then there is not *complete* disorder; and then it is a venial sin, because it is excused through the good of marriage, so that it is not mortal.

In this case they say that Augustine spoke. — Nevertheless that reasoning does not hold: *to take delight* is not evil: therefore neither is it [evil] *to will* [it]. For although *to be praised* is not evil, nevertheless *to will to be praised* is evil. — And according to these two ways the arguments proceed to the opposite sides. For those [arguments] which prove that it is mortal by the ardor of lust and by the enjoyment of a creature, proceed insofar as intercourse is done according to the impetus of pleasure. But the arguments [proceeding] to the *opposite* proceed insofar as regard is had to the Sacrament of marriage, because he knows her because [she is his] wife, nor would he take delight in her otherwise, unless she were joined [to him] in marriage.

---