Dist. 31, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/31/q/bon-sent-IV-d31-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that which the Master says: *For the good of offspring is called not offspring itself* etc. For it seems to be ill said, because through matrimony offspring is not begotten *holy*, but as having guilt: therefore if offspring is not the good of the Sacrament insofar as it is *offspring*, but insofar as it is *holy*; since at the beginning of its birth it is *not holy*, it ought not to be called *good*, but *evil*. — Likewise,  what is it that is said, namely that the good of offspring is called "the hope and desire by which offspring is sought, so that it may be religiously formed"? For since barren persons have this, it seems etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that offspring can be sought with a threefold intention: first, that it may be brought up for the worship of God; second, that it may succeed in the inheritance; third, that one may appear glorious in the multitude and beauty of offspring. The first is good under the account of *the good*; the second is under the account of *the indifferent*, and the third is a good *deformed* or drawn toward evil. Therefore the good of matrimony, which is a good *simply*, is to be judged that of offspring with such an intention and with such an ordering. But if it is had in the other two ways, some good is indeed had, but not as it is instituted and belongs to this Sacrament, which is instituted for procreating offspring for the divine worship.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *But where marriage is not contracted between legitimate persons, the union of such persons can be dissolved* etc. For it seems to be ill said, because there was never matrimony there, therefore there was never a union: therefore it is never dissolved, because none are dissolved except those who are united.

**I respond:** It must be said that some are united according to *truth*, some are united *in fact* and according to *appearance*. If they are *matrimonially* united, they are not dissolved, because there truly was a union and bond there; if [they are united] according to *appearance*, they are dissolved; but that *dissolving* is nothing else than to *show* that previously it was not.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *If both are not such, either she is a harlot of the husband.* For it seems to be ill said, because matrimony is a bond, which carries a relation, like likeness; but even in relatives a mutual conversion is necessary: therefore if she is not the wife, neither is he the husband: therefore if she is an adulteress, he likewise.

**I respond:** It must be said that being an adulterer is in two ways: either by reason of the *act*, or by reason of *intention*. If by reason of the *act*; then I say that if she is an adulteress, he who knows her is an adulterer. If by reason of *intention*; then I say that it can well be that one person intends to know with a marital affection, and the other with an affection of lust. And thus Augustine speaks in the matter at hand: because, if they are matrimonially joined, such that no such pact intervenes, but afterward in one, or in both, there arises an intention beyond begetting offspring; it is adultery not by reason of the kind of the *act*, but by reason of *intention*, for the reason that it works against the good of offspring; and so it is opposed to matrimony, and is not excused. — What he objects holds of adultery which is by reason of the kind of the act.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *An unformed birth does not have a soul, and therefore is punished with a money-fine*; therefore it is asked whether such a one sins mortally, and whether he is irregular. And that he does *not*, it seems: because he is not punished except only with money, not with the penalty of death: therefore it seems to be a light sin, because mortal sins in the Law were punished with the penalty of death. — Likewise, if it is a mortal sin; I ask: under what genus? But not under the genus of *homicide*: therefore if it is not homicide, concerning which it more seems [so]: it seems that it is not a mortal sin. — *On the contrary:* it seems that he sins more gravely than he who procures an abortion when the birth is already formed, because he harms more who impedes a greater good; but he impedes a greater good who impedes the procreation of the soul, than he who impedes the vegetation of the body: therefore he who procures the abortion sins more than he who separates the soul from the body. — Likewise, from this reasoning it seems that he sins more who kills an unbaptized child than he who kills a christian child, because he causes [it] to perish in soul and in body. — Likewise, the sin of him who procures an abortion is weighed either according to the quantity of the goodness of the thing which *is*, or which *is to be*. If of the thing which *is*; then no sin seems [present], because it is nothing but a certain superfluity in the womb. If of the thing which *is to be*; but a living man is to be: therefore such a one is to be judged a homicide.

**I respond:** It must be said that such a one is not to be judged a homicide as regards the *deed*, because he does not  kill, nor does anyone die before the birth is formed; yet as regards the *perverse will* he is to be judged a homicide, not by reason of *homicide*, but of *maleficium*; whence such a one is counted among the makers of maleficence, and such a crime is grave.

Therefore, as to what is objected, that it is not mortal because it is not punished with death; the reasoning is not valid, because there are many mortal [sins] which were not punished with death; yet that is the graver wickedness, when one acts against nature out of certain knowledge; for it is against the nature even of beasts, which await [their] offspring.

As to what is asked, under what genus of sin it is; it must be said that it pertains to *maleficium*.

As to what is objected, that it harms more; it must be said that the quantity of the harm is not considered according to that which *can be*, but according to that which *is*: because according to that which can be, since one man through succession can be the origin of a thousand, he who would kill one would kill a thousand, which is false; and therefore, because there is not yet a soul, there is not yet so great a good, although it *can be*: therefore he does not sin so gravely. And thus the objections are answered.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *This good is not culpable on account of that evil.* For it seems to be false to say, because in the first [Epistle] to the Corinthians, chapter five, it is said that *a little leaven corrupts the whole mass*: therefore it seems that a little evil defiles the good rather than the reverse.

**I respond:** It must be said that «evil is the corruption of the good»; therefore I say that evil can be joined to a good in two ways: either as to something *corruptible*, or insofar as something *medicinal*. If insofar as something *corruptible*, then evil defiles the good; if as something *medicinal*, then it is cured and expelled. And there is an example: because a disease joined to healthy nature vitiates and weakens it; but a disease joined to medicine does not render the medicine diseased, but rather is cured by it. And since matrimony is a *medicinal* good, therefore it is not defiled by evil, but rather cures the evil.

### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says, that *the union of a spouse cannot come about without pleasure of the flesh*; and again he says: *Pleasure of the flesh can in no way be without fault.* This seems false: because then no intercourse would happen to be without sin; and this is against Gregory, who excepts him who has intercourse for the sake of offspring or for the begetting of offspring; and yet it is a union of the flesh.

**I respond:** It must be said that force must be put on the word, because *union of the flesh* is not said [of] any conjugal act whatever, but [of] that one which is done for the pleasure of the flesh, or for its excitation, in which indeed there is always some fault.

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