Dist. 32, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/32/q/bon-sent-IV-d32-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On the obligation of spouses by comparison to time.*

Next, as to the third article, the question is asked concerning the obligation with respect to time. And about this two things are asked.

First it is asked whether during the menstrual period the woman is bound to render the debt, and whether she may seek it. Second, whether during the time of solemn days the debt may licitly be sought and paid.

### Question I. *Whether during the menstrual period the debt may be rendered and sought.*

As to the first, it is shown that during the menstrual period it cannot be *sought*.

Leviticus 15: *The man who has approached a menstruous woman shall be unclean seven days.* If you should say that this is ceremonial; *on the contrary*: Ezekiel 18: *If a man do justice* etc.; and afterward: *He has not come near a menstruous woman*, where it is reckoned among moral matters. And the Gloss on the same place: "It is commanded that men keep measure and times not only with other women, but also with their own wives."

Likewise, it seems that it ought not to be *rendered*:

1. Because not only those who do evil sin, but also those who consent: therefore he who renders sins, since he consents.

2. Likewise, a sword is not to be returned to a madman, that he may kill himself; but one who seeks the debt during the menstrual period seeks against his own welfare: therefore it is not to be rendered to him.

Likewise, it seems that it is neither to be *rendered* nor to be *sought*.

1. In Leviticus 20 it is said that both are to be put to death, namely the man and the woman; but the penalty of death was inflicted only for mortal sin: therefore each sins mortally.

2. Likewise, Jerome says that from such intercourse elephantiac and monstrous children are born: therefore each acts against the good of offspring; and if this: therefore each sins mortally.

**On the contrary:**

1. The affliction of leprosy is a greater affliction than that of the menses: therefore if because of leprosy the woman cannot deny the debt, neither [can she deny it] because of the menses.

2. Likewise, *the woman does not have power over her own body*: therefore when the husband seeks, he seeks his own; and it is just "to render to each what is his own": therefore the woman rightly renders.

3. Likewise, suppose that the husband does not know that it is the time of the menses, and the woman fears his lapse; it is asked: what ought she to do? And it is shown that [she ought] to render, because it frees his soul from death and from all fault.

4. Likewise, just as the flux of blood renders the woman unclean, so the flux of seed renders the man unclean; but the woman who seeks the debt from a man who has a seminal flux does not sin: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, if such intercourse is in some way repugnant to marriage, this is only by reason of offspring; but it is possible that such a woman is sterile, and then no deformity of offspring is feared: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> During the menstrual period, which is according to nature, it is not licit knowingly to exact the debt under [pain of] mortal [sin]; it is to be judged otherwise concerning the rendering of it.

**I respond:** It must be said that some have wished to say that at every time, whether of the menses or another, the debt ought to be *rendered*, but ought not to be *sought*. And they say that the reason for this is that *to seek* is *to act*, but *to render* is in a certain way *to be acted upon*; and the first belongs to liberty, but the second to necessity. Whence also the Lord did not command the woman *not to render*, but the man *not to approach*; and by this he did not exempt the woman from temptation, but the man is bound, so that he cannot seek this without transgression. And this the Master seems to say in the text, when he says: "And although at every time the debt is to be paid to the one seeking it, nevertheless it is not licit to seek it at every time." — But this does not seem to accord either with *reason* or with *authority*. First, not with authority, because it is against the good of offspring, as Jerome says on that passage of Isaiah 64: *All our justices are as the cloth of a menstruous woman*; he says: "Then are conceived, in the members, the condemned, the blind, the lame, the leprous, so that, because the parents were not ashamed to mingle in the bedchamber, their sin is openly manifest and openly reproved in the little ones." Likewise, Augustine on Leviticus: *To the woman* etc.: "Necessarily continence is enjoined upon each meanwhile." And again: "When he had sufficiently prohibited [it], here too he repeats it, lest perhaps in the earlier passages it might seem to have been said figuratively." And again, each is commanded to be put to death, in Leviticus 20, as is clear there: therefore each sins mortally. And again, suppose that a menstruous woman at that time seeks from the man, and this is established to the man, it seems hard to say that the man is bound to render to her to the prejudice of offspring: if therefore they are judged equal, and neither has dominion over the other against the divine statute; it does not seem that he is bound to render.

And therefore some have wished to say that she ought not to *render*, unless she presume of the man that he will fall into fornication; and if she presumes this, she ought to meet the greater danger, and she does not return to him a sword for killing, but rather for healing. — But neither does this suffice, because either the woman is *bound* or she is *not bound*. If she is *bound*, she ought to render without any presumption of danger. If she is *not bound* at that time, this is only because it is against the divine command: therefore however much she may fear the fault of the other, since a certain evil is not to be done in order to avoid an uncertain one, she ought not to render the debt to him — not because she renders

a sword to a madman, since this is not the reason — for otherwise he kills himself. Nor does she give him occasion of danger, unless she herself seeks; for it is not therefore a fault because she renders a sword to a madman, but because by acting against a precept or prohibition she puts herself out of order; and this is not on account of the *time*, but on account of the *disease*, which is against the good of offspring. Whence it would be similar concerning a woman near to childbirth, because from that act the infant is feared to be crushed and killed; or if she were laboring under an acute [illness], no one would say that she is bound for that time, not by reason of the *time*, but by reason of the *disease* or *danger*.

The third way of speaking, which seems to be more probable, is that the time of the menses is either *according to nature* or *beyond nature*. If *according to nature*, once a month; because then it is possible to generate children, and [that] through the abundance and corruption of the humor in a very bad state: therefore the precept is *moral*, that at that time [the woman] not be known. Whence if he *seeks unknowingly*, or *renders under compulsion*, he is excused; if he *knowingly and willingly seeks and renders*, he acts against the precept and sins mortally, and the man during that time does not have power over the body of the woman. — But if it is a time *contrary to nature* and an affliction *beyond nature*; then it is said that children are not generated; and then, if it lasts a long time, the debt can be *sought* and *rendered*. From these things the objections are clear.

1. For what it objects concerning leprosy is not similar, because that disease is continuous, this momentary.

2. To that which it objects, that she does not have power; it must be said that at that time she does not have it, or also that one must obey God rather than a man or a woman.

3. To that which is asked, when the man does not know; it must be said that if she believes he will desist, she ought to tell him of the infirmity, or at least to feign an infirmity; but if even then he will not desist, she ought to resist as much as she can, because, if he extorts it by force, the woman is free from fault. For otherwise, in order to avoid the fault of the man, she ought not to commit a fault herself.

4. To that which is objected concerning uncleanness, it must be said that [the reason] is not on account of uncleanness, but because such [a flux] is contrary to offspring.

5. To that which is objected concerning the sterile woman, it must be said that it is not known, as long as she has her monthly courses, whether she conceives; and therefore she is bound by the divine command, just as also others who are accustomed to conceive.

Although, however, this way spoken of *last* seems to be more probable, the *first* way of speaking is nevertheless safer and sounder, since one must stand for marriage; and it seems very hard that the woman should not render the debt to the husband urgently seeking it, when no grave and manifest infirmity appears. If you should say that she ought not [to render] without violence; it may be that the man cannot do violence to himself, and from this he falls into a worse fornication. And therefore it must be said, according to the first way, that it is otherwise in the *seeking* and in the *rendering*, as the Master says in the text, and [as] was noted at first. Whence the prohibition concerning the knowing of a menstruous woman extends [only] so that they may not *seek*, but not so that they may not *render*; and therefore [the woman] is not absolved from the temptation of rendering. And according to this the authorities speaking of this matter are to be understood. Yet the woman ought in some way to make herself difficult and to pay the debt with sorrow, lest, while she desires to be sought, she herself become guilty, as if she were seeking; whence she may resist, unless she believes she would give scandal to her husband.

From this is clear that which it objects concerning consent. For while, compelled by necessity, the woman renders, she is not said to consent, nor to return a sword to a madman, but he acts, and she suffers. Moreover, a sword is to be returned to a madman if a greater danger is thereby avoided; so in the case proposed, when danger is feared, and the man can escape the danger of fornication, or of hatred, by the rendering — into which [hatred] he would fall through refusal. — From these things the rest are clear. For it must be conceded that the debt cannot be *sought* knowingly, because this is mortal on account of the precept that the debt not be sought. — And [the argument] from leprosy is of no avail, nor [that] from the power over the body, because the use is restricted for her by that command; and the authorities adduced to the contrary are clear: for all are to be understood with respect to those *knowingly exacting*.