Dist. 32, Art. 4, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/32/q/bon-sent-IV-d32-a4-q2
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### Question II. *Whether a marriage contracted at a forbidden time ought to be separated.*

Secondly it is asked whether a marriage contracted at a forbidden time ought to be separated. And that it should, seems [to be the case].

1. *Cause thirty-three, question four*: « It is not fitting, from Septuagesima until the Octave of Easter, and for three weeks before the feast of Saint John, and from the Advent of the Lord until after Epiphany, to celebrate nuptials; and if this has been done, let them be separated ».

2. Likewise, this seems [right] according to ancient law, which speaks thus: « A union which is established to have been contracted against the ecclesiastical rule, we judge not to be a marriage ».

3. Likewise, it seems [so] *by reason*: because in the ecclesiastical forum judgment must be made according to the statutes of the Church; therefore if the Church has decreed that nuptials are not to take place at such times, then such [nuptials], if they do take place, ought to be judged as not done: therefore they ought to be separated.

4. Likewise, someone first contracts with one woman secretly and with another openly; although the first is his wife according to the truth, nevertheless the second is judged to be his wife in the forum of the Church, because with the first he did not observe the form of the Church, as [he did] with the second: therefore if this man who celebrates nuptials does not observe the ecclesiastical form, it is clear that according to the judgment of the Church he ought to be separated.

**On the contrary:** 1. There is nothing on account of which a marriage ought to be separated, unless something be lacking which is of its substance; but of the substance of marriage there is nothing except consent and a lawful person: if therefore none of these is lacking in the case proposed, it is clear, etc.

2. Likewise, a marriage ought not to be separated as a punishment, unless there be the enormity of a crime, especially against some good of marriage; but here there is nothing of the kind: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in a certain decretal concerning a Marriage contracted against the Church's interdict it is said: « It is not fitting that on account of this alone the Sacrament of matrimony should be dissolved ».

4. Likewise, it is not marriage that is prohibited from being contracted, but nuptials from being celebrated; and this [prohibition] pertains to the wedding-feast: therefore they ought in no way to be separated on account of this.

### Conclusion

> Marriages contracted at a forbidden time cannot be separated absolutely, but only for a time as a punishment of sin.

**I respond:** It must be said that the Church separates those joined in marriage in three ways: some absolutely, as to the *bond*, showing that there was no marriage between them; and this is on account of the fact that some impediment has intervened, which is against the *substance* of marriage, whether on the side of consent or of the lawfulness of the persons; and this [impediment] is said to hinder the contracting and to *dissolve* what is already contracted. Some she separates absolutely as to time, as a punishment; and this is on account of some crime which is *against the good of marriage*. Some she separates *for a time* only, *for the doing of penance*; and this [happens] when some impediment intervenes which is not against the marriage as to its *substance* nor as to its *good*, but induces sin; and such is the ecclesiastical interdict, and it is of such a separation that the authority of the canon which the Master adduces is understood. And so it must be said that such [persons] ought not to be separated absolutely, but only for a time as a punishment of sin, because they have despised the command of the Church; and this too is done for the terror of others.

*To 2.* To that, then, which is objected secondly concerning the ecclesiastical rule, it must be said that the Church prescribes that a marriage ought to be contracted in such and such a way; and in that institution of hers she prescribes some things as *necessary*, some as *making for solemnity*; and the canon speaks of those things which the ecclesiastical rule prescribes as necessary to this Sacrament.

*To 3 and 4.* To that which is objected concerning the ecclesiastical forum, it must be said that in the ecclesiastical forum a marriage is never judged not to exist, except when in the face of the Church something is lacking which is *of the substance* of marriage; which nevertheless is not lacking according to the truth, as in a clandestine marriage, where consent cannot be proved; it is not so in the case proposed. — And thus that last [argument] is clear.

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