Dist. 32, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/32/q/bon-sent-IV-d32-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER

### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning that which he says: *For in this they are equals* etc. For it seems false, because in this Sacrament is signified the joining of Christ and the Church, of God and the soul, between which there is no equality whatsoever: therefore neither is there [equality] of the husband to the wife. — Likewise, to the Ephesians, chapter five: *Let wives be subject to their husbands;* afterward he says of husbands, that *they should love them as their own bodies:* therefore, since the body is the inferior part, it is plain, etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that in matrimony there is to be considered *the distinction of the sexes,* and *the conformable joining,* and lastly *the mutual obligation.* By reason of the *two* first it signifies God and the Church, because, just as the woman needs the man, so the Church [needs] Christ; by reason of the inseparable *joining* and of conformity it signifies that joining; but by reason of *obligation* there is no signification, because God is altogether free and is bound to no one at all: yet there ought to be an obligation between husband and wife, because otherwise the inseparable union would not come about; and since the union is conformable, therefore the obligation is conformable, and therefore in this respect they are judged *equals,* because they are bound to one another conformably.

To that, then, which is objected, that the husband is superior; it must be said that this is understood as regards those acts which look to the male sex especially, namely as regards the governance of the household and the like.

### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *For such things are not to be vowed by married persons* etc.; whether he who so vows sins mortally. And that he does, it seems: because he who knowingly usurps another's property sins mortally, even if he give it in alms: therefore since such a one vowing usurps another's property, it is plain, etc. — Likewise, he who vows what is not licit, or swears it, by that very fact is a perjurer, because he swears rashly: therefore since it is not licit for a husband to be continent, his wife being unwilling; it seems that, if he should vow, he sins mortally. — Likewise, if he should swear that he would never know a woman, he would sin mortally: therefore by parity of reasoning, if he should vow it.

**I respond:** It must be said that when someone vows continence, he can vow in two ways: either *with the intention of defrauding his wife,* or *out of love of continence.* If *with the intention of defrauding his wife,* thus it is iniquitous and prohibited; and such a vow is illicit. If out of love of continence he vows without the consent of his spouse, such a vow has something of *rashness,* and something of *honorableness.* For the husband *does not have power over his own body* as regards the debt to be *rendered,* but he is of his own right as regards the debt to be *asked;* and therefore the first he cannot vow, but the second; and therefore, unless the wife consent, the vow is to be revoked as regards the *rendering* of the debt, but it stands as regards the *asking*. Whence if someone deliberately has vowed chastity, he is bound, as far as in him lies, to be continent, so that he not ask the debt; if, however, the wife asks, he ought to render it; and thus prejudice is done to no one, and there is not offered to God what is another's, but what is one's own.

And thus it is plain that this is not *altogether* another's, and the response to the objections is plain. — Yet as to what is objected concerning the oath, it is not similar: because a rash oath is simply [illicit], since one is bound to do the contrary. Whence he sins at once, when he so swears, not so, when he vows.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *But if either of them should absolve the other from his right* etc.  Suppose that a woman with her husband's consent makes a simple vow, and afterward the husband repents; whether he is bound to render her the debt. And it seems that *not:* because she renounced her own right, whence it seems that she no longer has the power of asking the debt. — But to the contrary there seems [to be] the authority of Augustine on Numbers, chapter thirty, where it is said: *But if he should contradict it* etc.; upon that Augustine says, and it is had in the text, that the husband can retract the wife's vow, to which he had consented. And *moreover,* the husband is not bound to keep continence, because, his wife having died, he could take another: therefore it seems that he can ask the debt.

**I respond:** It must be said that if the woman vows with the husband's assent, either this is by assent *in private,* or by assent which is *in the sight of the Church* or of a prelate. If by an assent which is made in the sight of *a prelate;* thus according to the form of law he cannot ask the debt, because he renounces his own right. But if he consents *in secret,* because he purposes to be continent and intends simply to renounce his own right; then the woman in the sight of God is absolved and is not bound to render the debt, if the husband has granted this out of deliberation. — But since this is not established to the Church, she will be compelled by the Church through excommunication to render the debt to the husband.

*If you ask* whether she ought to obey; it must be said that if she has not uttered a vow, she can without sin render the debt and is bound to [obey] the Church's command. But if she has uttered a vow, I believe that the husband cannot revoke her, nor is she bound to consent to him. Nor is it similar in the case of a vow of abstinence, for the reason that as regards all things the husband is preeminent over the wife, except in the law of the marriage-bed. Nevertheless the Church does not approve such a manner of vowing on account of the danger which threatens; whence it does not permit that one should vow and enter religion, unless the other likewise vow and be such a person, of whom «no suspicion can arise». But if it be done otherwise, before God one is bound to observe [the vow].

### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *Although the debt is always to be rendered to the one asking, nevertheless it is not licit to ask on any day whatever* etc. For it seems false, because, if it is not licit to ask, then one asks illicitly and unjustly; but to one asking unjustly one is not bound to render the thing, because nothing is to be rendered to him except his own right: therefore if one cannot always justly ask, therefore one is not always bound to render the debt.

**I respond:** It must be said that when it is said *it is not licit,* it is to be understood not that it deprives [it] of *justice* and equity, but that it deprives [it] of a certain *decency* and honorableness, as is plain through the following text. Yet grant that it deprive [it] of *justice;* still that argument is not valid, because to ask unjustly is twofold: either because one does not have *a right in the thing asked,* like him who asks another's property, and to such a one it is not necessary to render. Otherwise it is to ask unjustly because, although one has justice, yet one does not keep *the due manner* in asking, or it can be that it is not prohibited to *render,* but nevertheless it is prohibited sometimes to *ask.* For example: if a superior prelate should enjoin an inferior that he command nothing to a subject, yet he does not say to the subject that he should not obey; if the inferior prelate commands, the subject is bound to obey, because he is not exempt; but nevertheless the [inferior prelate] sins mortally; so it can be understood in the case at hand. Whatever be [said] of the example adduced, it is true that if someone exacts his own right inordinately, yet from this he does not give power to another of retaining what he ought to render. Whence just as the Lord only prohibited approaching a menstruous woman, and therefore this prohibition does not extend to the [other] woman; therefore she is bound to render, but he sins in asking. And thus it is to be understood what Augustine says on Leviticus, chapter fifteen, that «continence is necessarily enjoined on both», and both in Leviticus chapter twenty are commanded to be put to death, and both act against the good of offspring, as Jerome says. For to understand this is by reason of the person *asking,* who is rightly said *to approach* and to act against this, as is plain from what has been said.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *Whoever renders the debt to his wife cannot be free for prayer.* For it seems ill said, because it is said in the first [Epistle] to the Thessalonians, the last [chapter]: *Pray without ceasing;* this is a precept: therefore if he who renders the debt cannot pray, it is plain, etc. — Likewise, it seems that this is simply false, because nothing impedes prayer as does sin; but venial sin does not impede [it]; therefore neither does an act in which there is no fault. —  Likewise, an objection is raised from David, who was most devout, and yet had many wives and children. *If you say* that this is understood of that time in which one has intercourse; likewise one could say [it] of the time in which a man sleeps.

**I respond:** The Master says that this is to be understood of clerics; but nevertheless that does not fully satisfy the aforesaid objections. — And therefore it is said that when someone is said *not to be able,* the negation can deny the *power* *simply,* or the *facility;* and this manner is often [found] in Scripture. Therefore Jerome does not mean to deny the *power,* but the *facility;* whence he does not say that one cannot *pray,* but he says that one cannot *be free for prayer;* because that act greatly casts down the spiritual mind, as Augustine says, unless there be excellent and special grace, as there was in David. And therefore it is a matter of *counsel* that when someone wishes to give himself wholly to prayer, he ought to abstain from such an act. — And thus it is plain that it is not repugnant to the precept of prayer. Yet concerning that which he says, that one ought to pray without ceasing; it is to be understood that by the name of *prayer* every good act is understood according to the Gloss. Whence it says there: «He does not cease to pray who does not cease to do good».

As to what is objected, that sin aggravates the more; it must be said that this is false concerning venial sin, on account of the great foulness of the soul which is in that act; and frequently the soul is much impeded through certain foulnesses or also penal infirmities.

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