Dist. 34, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/34/q/bon-sent-IV-d34-a1-q2
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### Question II. *On the number and sufficiency of the impediments.*

Secondly it is asked concerning the number and sufficiency of the impediments of marriage. And that they are many, it seems:

1. Because impediments exist on account of the privation or defect of the good of marriage; but the defect of the good is an evil, and, as Dionysius says, «evil is in infinite ways, although the good is in one way»: therefore it seems that [marriage] can be impeded in infinite ways.

2. Likewise, the impediments of marriage are taken according to the accidents of persons; but, as the Philosopher holds, accidents are infinite: therefore so also [are] the impediments. The *major* is plain by running through them one by one; the *minor* is plain through the Philosopher.

3. Likewise, the impediments of marriage regard the condition of marriage, and that regards singular persons; but «singulars are infinite» and indeterminate: therefore so also [are] the impediments of marriage.

**On the contrary:** 1. Nothing impedes marriage except according to the institution of God or of the Church; but the institution of God and of the Church, as regards marriage, [consists] in determinate conditions: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it is impossible to know the law of marriage and the bond, unless those things be known which dissolve that bond; but the law of marriage is determinate for us, therefore so also [are] the impediments: therefore they are in a definite number.

3. Likewise, this same thing is proved by the fact that the Master determines concerning such matters and gives a teaching [about them]; but if they were not in a determinate number, he would not give [it]: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.** By a twofold way the number and sufficiency of the impediments is shown.

**I respond:** It must be said that this Sacrament has many impediments; but some impede from *fittingness*, and these are said to impede the *contracting*, but not to annul what is *already contracted*, as is the interdict of the Church and a festal season, because such things regard the solemnity of marriage. Some impede from *necessity*, because the Sacrament does not stand together with them; whence they are said to impede the *contracting* and to annul what is *already contracted*; because, although it were contracted *in fact*, yet in truth it was not a Sacrament nor a true marriage. — But those impediments

are contained in these verses, concerning all of which it will be treated below one by one.

*Error, condition, vow, kinship, crime,*  
*Disparity of worship, force, [holy] order, [prior] bond, [public] decency;*  
*If you be a kinsman by affinity, if perchance you be unable to have intercourse:*  
*These things when done forbid marriages, and when joined undo them.*

Concerning the sufficiency, therefore, of the impediments it must be said that an impediment comes about, or can come about, from a fourfold cause. — For from the *efficient* cause three can arise. The efficient cause is consent; and to consent there concur *reason and will*. Against the act of reason is *error*; against the act of *will* [is] *force* or violence; against the act of *both* [is] the *condition of servitude*, which impedes partly on account of the defect of liberty, partly on account of error.

From the side of the *material* cause, three: because marriage is a union voluntarily introduced, therefore it is prior [as a union] of things *naturally* disparate, and therefore those joined by [too great] proximity are unfit for marriage. But those *joined* can be [so] in three ways: by *consanguinity, affinity, [and] the justice of public decency*, which is contracted from a betrothal by words of the present [tense]; and thus there are another three impediments.

From the side of the *formal* cause, three: because marriage is a bond, in which there is a mutual power of the husband and of the wife; but the impediment against this is when one cannot give the power of one's own body. And this can be in three ways: either because he has handed [it] over to another, who is still living, and thus it is a *[prior] bond*; or because he has dedicated himself to God, and thus it is *holy order*; or because [he is bound] to God and to a prelate, and thus it is a *vow*, when one vows to enter religion, or solemn continence.

From the side of the *end* likewise three: because marriage is for the procreating of offspring for the worship of God, or at least as a remedy for decency. Against the ground of procreating, or of the remedy, is *impotence for intercourse*; against the worship of God, which consists in *faith*, is *disparity of worship*; [and against that worship] which consists in *morals*, is the *enormity of crime*. — Thus there are twelve impediments. Likewise some admit of a division, as impotence for intercourse and crime, as will better appear below.

Yet the sufficiency of these impediments could be taken otherwise. For in marriage there are considered the *persons* who are joined, and the *bond* itself, and that *by which* they are bound, and that *unto which* they are bound: that which is bound, and the bond, and that *unto which*, and that *by which*. The persons who are bound ought in some way to agree in the worship of God and in faith, but to stand apart by a natural and like bond, on account of this, that nature abhors that persons very like [one another] be associated in that act. Much, therefore, do they stand apart, when they are *disparate in worship*; much do they draw near, when they are joined by *kinship*, or by *affinity*, or by the *justice of public decency*. Nearness of *consanguinity* is from the fruit of marriage, but [that] of *affinity* from the act; the justice of public decency holds the middle between the two. And thus there are four impediments, namely disparity of worship, kinship, affinity, and the justice of public decency. — Again there is considered the *bond* itself, by which they are bound individually; and on account of this those who are bound to others cannot be joined or bound [again]. But to be bound to others is [so] in two ways: either to *God* or to a man. And to a man in two ways: either through matrimony, and thus [it is] a *[prior] bond*; or through servitude, and thus [it is] condition. But to be bound to *God* is in two ways: either through a vow, or through that which has a vow annexed, as holy order. And thus there are another four: [prior] bond, condition, vow, and order. — Thirdly, concerning marriage there is considered that *by which* it is contracted, and thus it is consent; and this regards the act of *reason*, and against this is *error*; and the act of *will*, and against this is *violence*. And thus there are two. — Fourthly there is considered the *use* of marriage, and this is impeded in two ways: either through the impossibility of using [it], and thus [it is] *impotence for intercourse*; or through abuse, and thus [it is] the *enormity of crime*. — And thus the number and sufficiency of these impediments is plain, and that they are in a determinate number, namely twelve.

**To the objections:**
1. To that, then, which is objected, that evil is in infinite ways; it must be said that Dionysius is speaking of evil, insofar as it is *in itself*, because it is a privation and non-being, and lacks end and determination. But if we speak of evil, insofar as an *act underlies* it, or by comparison to the *good* which it deprives; thus it is placed in a genus *by reduction* and has determinate species, as is plain in the vices. — Nevertheless that does not avail for the point at issue, because the impediments of marriage are not defects or evils, but also certain goods incompatible with this [marriage].

2. To that which is objected secondly by way of accidents, it must be said that [they are taken] not by way of just any accidents, such as that [someone] be white or black, but by way of

accidents which directly regard marriage as to some good; and thus they are in a determinate number.

3. To that [objection], that they are about singulars; it must be said that just as the operations of the virtues are about singulars, yet speech and knowledge are of them insofar as they are reduced to some universal — in the first way [knowledge] does not have certitude, in the second way it does — so in the matter at hand the emerging cases are many and innumerable concerning particular persons; yet all are comprehended under this generality of impediments. And thus the whole [matter] is plain.

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