Dist. 34, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/34/q/bon-sent-IV-d34-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the impediment of impotence for intercourse.*

Consequently, as to the second article, inquiry is made concerning impotence for intercourse. And concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked whether natural impotence for intercourse is an impediment to marriage. Secondly, inquiry is made concerning accidental impotence for intercourse, which is through sorcery.

### Question I. *Whether natural impotence for intercourse is an impediment to marriage.*

As to the first point, then, it is shown that natural impotence for intercourse does not impede marriage:

1. Because a true marriage is a marriage without carnal intercourse; but whenever something has its perfect being without a certain thing, it is not impeded by the lack of that thing: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the will to abstain in both spouses does not dissolve marriage, therefore neither does the necessity of abstaining, by parity of reasoning; but where there is impotence etc.

3. Likewise, marriage is an insoluble bond; but it is possible for accidental impotence for intercourse to be contracted: therefore if a perpetual [bond] is not impeded by an accidental [impotence], neither is marriage impeded by impotence for intercourse.

4. Likewise, natural impotence comes from coldness in the man; but coldness is an accident: therefore it can be driven out by heat: therefore so too can such impotence. But an accident quickly passing away does not dissolve a perpetual bond: therefore etc. A like objection is made concerning constriction on the woman's part.

**On the contrary:** 1. In the Decretals [Extra], Book Four, on the frigid and the bewitched: «Just as a boy, who cannot render the debt, is not fit for marriage, so those who are impotent are reckoned least fit to contract marriages».

2. Likewise, in marriage a man is bound to render the debt; but no one can bind himself to the impossible; but one impotent to have intercourse cannot render the debt: therefore he cannot contract marriage.

3. Likewise, in marriage the power over the body of the man passes over to the woman, and conversely; but when one party is impotent, the power does not pass over, because «no one gives what he does not have»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, if marriage is for a remedy, then between persons among whom there can be neither duty nor remedy, there can be no marriage; but this is [the case] through impotence: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, to this effect there is the authority of the law, Cause thirty-three, question one, which grants license to one of the persons to contract in this case: therefore it is no marriage.

### Conclusion.

> *Natural and perpetual impotence for intercourse impedes marriage from being contracted and annuls the contract.*

**I respond:** It must be said that natural impotence for intercourse is either temporary or perpetual. If tempo-
rary, it does not impede; if perpetual, then it impedes the contracting and annuls the contract; and if one of the spouses seeks separation, they are to be separated; but if they wish to live together by mutual consent, they may, so that he who cannot have the woman as a wife may have her as a sister. — But because it is doubtful whether such impotence is perpetual, therefore the Church applies due diligence to each party for ascertaining its perpetuity, and enjoins them to cohabit for three years and to try out that act and the remedies, if any there can be against such impotence. — But for ascertaining what has gone before, credence is given to the oath of seven witnesses, or also to the inspection of the private parts; otherwise the man's word is accepted. Yet the Church is sometimes deceived, and when the deception is established, it orders those whom it had separated to return to their former rights. — It must be granted, therefore, that impotence for intercourse which comes from natural coldness impedes marriage, if it be perpetual in truth. But in what way its perpetuity may be known, and what diligence is to be applied — this is for a lower science to determine, such as that of the jurists or of the physicians.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that a true marriage is without carnal union; it must be said that this is true; but it is not without an orderability toward carnal union, because, as was said above, it is necessary to consent to a mutual power over [each other's] bodies; but here there is no such consent, nor any such obligation in one who does not have the *ability* to exercise that act. And therefore the argument does not hold, because the *power* for intercourse, as regards the legitimacy of the contracting person, belongs to the essence [of marriage], but not so the *act*.

2. By this the response to the following [objection] is clear, [namely] that the will to abstain does not impede marriage, since the orderability to the act still remains together with the will; because it is not necessary that it be perpetual, since the will can be turned; and therefore the case of impotence and of the will is not alike.

3. To that which is objected, that it is an insoluble bond; it must be said that this is true after it has been contracted legitimately; and from then on, if illegitimacy supervenes, it does not dissolve the marriage; but if it precedes, it impedes the contracting: and it impedes to such a degree that, although marriage may seem to be contracted according to the appearance of men, yet in truth it is not contracted. And therefore it is said to annul what has already been contracted, not because it breaks that bond, but [because] it is only an impediment, such that even if it be consummated in fact in the sight of men, it nevertheless has no solidity.

4. To that which is objected, that coldness is an accident etc.; it must be said that coldness is twofold: one [kind] accidentally, another by complexion and by nature. That which is in a man accidentally can for the most part be driven out, inasmuch as it is not from his first complexion. But the coldness which is from the complexion and is naturally present — as in those who are insensible by nature, or by a bad disposition of some member ordered to this [act], as constriction in a woman, if it be so great that no remedy can be applied according to the judgment of good matrons — this is what impedes, and this is inseparable and perpetual; and against this the argument does not hold. For what is said, that «a contrary is driven out by its contrary»: this is true, as the Philosopher says, «unless the one is present by nature».

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