Dist. 34, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/34/q/bon-sent-IV-d34-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On the defect on the part of free choice.*

Next, as regards the third article, inquiry is made concerning the defect or impediment that comes on the part of free choice. And concerning this two things are asked. First it is asked concerning the perversity of the reason, which is in the mad. Secondly, concerning the subversion of the will in the incestuous.

### Question I. *Whether madness impedes marriage.*

As, then, to the first, it is asked whether madness impedes marriage. And that it does, seems [to be shown]:

1. Because marriage belongs only to those consenting, and consent belongs to those using reason; but the mad do not use reason: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, folly takes away consent more than error [does]; but error impedes marriage: therefore much more [does] madness.

3. Likewise, a madman cannot stand in judgment nor give testimony, therefore neither make a contract; but it is a greater thing to make a contract by reason of one's own body than [by reason] of things: therefore if marriage is a contract with respect to one's own body, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, a madman neither merits nor demerits; but everyone who receives a Sacrament receives [it] unto merit, or demerit, either worthily or unworthily: therefore a madman cannot receive a Sacrament, and thus neither marriage.

**On the contrary:**
1. Marriage is for procreating offspring for the worship of God, therefore he who can do this can contract marriage; but a madman can beget: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, madness comes about accidentally; but marriage is an indissoluble bond: therefore madness does not impede marriage.

3. Likewise, if someone can be freed from madness, and no one can know whether it be perpetual; but impotence of intercourse does not impede unless it be perpetual in truth, or be conjectured probably [to be so]: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a madman can be baptized and receives the Sacrament of baptism: therefore for a like reason he can contract marriage.

### Conclusion.

> Madness accompanying in act the contracting of marriage impedes marriage, but not if it only precedes [it] in disposition, or if it follows [after].

**I respond:** It must be said that concerning this a distinction must be made, since madness either *accompanies*, or *precedes*, or *follows*. If it *accompanies*; then, because the madman does not have the power of consenting, it both impedes the marriage and it is null; but if it *precedes*, and that man has lucid intervals, or if it *follows*; it does not impede the marriage. — The reasons, therefore, proving that it impedes proceed by that way in which the madness is *at the time of consent* and according to *act*; but if he were not mad *in act*, but *in disposition*; even if he were to have a lucid interval, he ought not to contract [marriage] on account of the danger, because such a person does not know how to raise offspring nor to cohabit duly with a wife; nevertheless, if he did contract, it would be contracted [validly].

**To the objections on the contrary side:**

*To 1.* As to that indeed which is objected on the contrary, that he can procreate offspring; it must be said that according to the state of madness he cannot, because he does not know what the worship of God is; he does not know, moreover, how to raise children. *Besides*, if he could do this, it would not follow, because this does not state the whole *being* of marriage.

*To 2.* As to that which is objected, that it comes and recedes accidentally; it must be said that although a marriage be contracted through madness, it is not dissolved, but it can be impeded, so that it is not contracted; and even if it be contracted, nothing comes about, unless afterward he consent, when he has had lucid intervals.

*To 3.* As to that which is objected, that one can be freed from madness; it must be said that the case is not alike as to *madness* and as to *impotence* of intercourse: because *madness* impedes by reason of *consent*, and consent is in a single act and in a brief time; and therefore, if there be madness then, since it takes away consent, it impedes the marriage. But *impotence* of intercourse is against the *use* of marriage, not against consent; and because the use concerns the whole time of life, therefore it is not an impediment unless it extend through the whole of life. And thus that [argument] is clear.

*To 4.* As to that which is objected concerning baptism, it must be said that the case is not alike: because baptism is a Sacrament against original [sin], which, since it was contracted from elsewhere, another's consent suffices, nor is it necessary that one's own intervene; not so in the case at hand, but rather it is necessary that the one contracting consent.