Dist. 35, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/35/q/bon-sent-IV-d35-dubia
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### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first upon that which he says: *An adulterous wife cannot be dismissed by her husband*; it is asked whether a husband who fornicates in secret may dismiss a wife who fornicates openly. And that he can, it seems: since the husband can bring an action against the wife, while she cannot lodge an exception against the husband, and if she does lodge it, it is of no avail, since she cannot prove it. — Along with this it is asked in which cases it is competent to a wife to lodge an exception against a husband who seeks a divorce.

I respond: It must be said that such a fornicating husband ought not to dismiss her, nor can he do so without sin in the sight of God, although he can in the sight of the Church, for the reason that the wife did not lack the right of lodging an exception, even though proof is wanting. The argument is Causa 32, question 6, throughout. If, however, the husband had done penance, and she, being accused, were unwilling to do penance but persevered in adultery, then it is held that the husband can accuse her and dismiss her by sentence; but if the husband were in a notorious crime, like the wife, he could not. — Hence there are seven cases in which, according to the laws, an adulteress can lodge an exception against her husband. The first is if he is convicted of fornication; Causa 32, question 6, throughout, and the Decretals, *On Divorces*. — The second, if someone has prostituted her; the Decretals, *On the man who has known a kinswoman of his wife*, *Discretionem* etc. — The third, when she believed her husband dead in war and married another; Causa 34, question 1: *Cum per bellicam*. — The fourth, if she was secretly known by someone whom she believed to be her own husband; the argument, Causa 34, question 1. — The fifth, if she was overpowered by force; Causa 32, question 5, *Proposito* etc.; but this is to be understood of absolute force, not of fear. — The sixth, when he reconciled her to himself after the adultery and demanded the [marriage] debt; Causa 32, question 1. — The seventh is rare: if an unbeliever repudiates his wife, and she takes another husband; if he comes to the faith, he ought to take her back, notwithstanding that she has fornicated; the Decretals, *On Divorces*, *Gaudemus*.

### Doubt II.

Likewise, upon that which he says: *Since they must be punished so much the more gravely* etc.; it is asked: who sins more gravely, whether the woman who commits adultery, or the man, or the reverse? And that the man does more, the text seems to say. — Likewise, the female sex is weaker and more

prone to a fall by nature: therefore it is more excused in fault. — But *against* this stands the fact that the female sex is naturally more modest and ought to be more subject to the man: therefore it seems that she sins more gravely if she commits adultery.

I respond: It must be said that these two crimes stand to one another as the exceeding and the exceeded. For in this respect, that the male sex is more stable by nature and ought to rule the woman, he sins more gravely in committing adultery; but because the man has a greater impulse toward lust on account of the strength of his heat, and because he has greater abundance, and the sex is not so modest by nature: hence it is that the woman sins more gravely, and therefore a greater infamy arises from the woman's sin, both for the man and for the woman. Hence in some way what Gregory says of the carnal vices is true, namely that they are of lesser guilt but greater infamy. — For in nearly all vices this is found, that when compared with one another they stand as the exceeding and the exceeded. — Nevertheless, if it be asked which exceeds the more, it seems that the woman's fornication does, because it harms the husband more and has less that impels it, although she is less strong for resisting; for this is compensated by the human modesty which ought to hold her back greatly.

### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which Chrysostom says: *For he is a patron of baseness who conceals his wife's crime*. For he seems to speak ill, because in Proverbs, chapter eleven: *Faithful is he who conceals a friend's crime*: therefore it is good to conceal a crime. — Likewise, he who knowingly defames another takes from him the greatest good: therefore he sins gravely.

I respond: It must be said that to *conceal* is twofold: either when one knows, but it is nonetheless *hidden from others*, and he does not disclose it; or when one knows it *open* and manifest and, by dissembling, covers it up. And the first belongs to *faithfulness*, but the second is to *furnish patronage to wickedness*. — Or otherwise, to *conceal* this is twofold: either to the *prejudice of correction*, or unto the *bearing-with of a sinner* and a weak person; and the first is evil, but the second is good. — Or otherwise, to *conceal a crime* is twofold: either to a person who *can be benefited*, or to a person who *can be harmed*; the first is evil, the second permissible. And thus that [saying] is clear.

### Doubt IV.

Likewise, upon that which Augustine says: *But if it seems hard to you that after adultery your spouse should be reconciled to you* etc.; it is asked, if a sentence of divorce was passed through error, and afterward the man was promoted to the priesthood; if the error and deception of the Church become manifest, whether he must be restored to his wife, if she is unwilling to remain continent. And that he must, it seems: because the woman had her right, and, the woman's right being preserved, he could not vow continence against his wife's will.

I respond: It must be said that she must be led to continence; but if a manifest deception should appear in the passing of the prior sentence, and she is unwilling to remain continent, her own man must be restored to her. Nevertheless he will not be able to *demand* the debt, since, as far as lay in him, he vowed continence; and this I say unless the woman has fornicated.

### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning that which he says: *And moreover that the adulteress has given her oath* etc. For it seems that the superadded faith [i.e. the pledge given] impedes his oath. But it seems that it does *not*: because it is permissible to take this woman as wife after the husband's death: therefore it is permissible to promise: therefore on account of that promise the subsequent marriage ought not to be impeded but confirmed: if therefore simple adultery does not impede, it seems that neither would it impede along with the giving of faith.

I respond: It must be said that such faith is not faith, but rather *infidelity*, for the reason that it is against the *good of faith* by which the wife is held bound to her husband; and therefore, since marriages are begun in the giving of faith, and such a faith is repugnant to marriage, it does not initiate [the marriage], but rather renders them simply incapable, since such persons can neither be initiated further [into marriage] nor consummate it. Likewise, if one party contrives the death of the [other's] husband in order to contract marriage, he rather makes himself incapable than renders himself capable. As to the objection, then, that it is permissible, it must be said that it is not, both because it is done from an evil cause, and because it is the occasion of many evils; and therefore, if he swears, he is not bound to keep the oath, but rather to do penance for an oath wickedly and inordinately uttered. And thus that [saying] is clear.

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