Dist. 36, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/36/q/bon-sent-IV-d36-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the condition of servitude.*
### Question I. *Whether the condition of servitude, with the master objecting, impedes marriage.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the [servile] condition, with the master objecting, impedes marriage:

1. Because a slave cannot enter religious life when his master objects, as the laws say, and if he does enter, he is compelled to leave, and his vow is held for nothing: if therefore he cannot bind himself to God by a vow, much less to a woman by marriage.

2. Likewise, a slave, with his master objecting, cannot be promoted to sacred orders: therefore it seems that neither [can he] contract marriage, by parallel reasoning.

3. Likewise, in marriage the power over the husband's body is transferred to the wife, and conversely; but a slave does not have power over his own body — rather his master does: therefore he cannot contract against his master's will.

4. Likewise, a slave is bound to obey his master when he commands him something; likewise he is bound to render the debt to his wife when she asks; but it can happen that the master demands service and the wife then demands the debt; but to render both is impossible: therefore, if no one can bind himself to incompatible things, then if he is a slave, he cannot contract.

5. Likewise, [servile] condition is numbered among the impediments of marriage; but this is servitude: therefore, etc.

**Contra:**

1. To the Galatians, chapter three: *In Christ Jesus there is neither slave nor free*: therefore, as regards the Sacraments of Christ and the Church, there is no distinction of slave and free: therefore neither in marriage.

2. Likewise, slave and master are equals in the disease of concupiscence, therefore also in its remedy; but the remedy of carnal concupiscence is marriage: therefore in this they are equals: therefore the one cannot impede the other.

3. Likewise, servitude is of positive law; but marriage is of natural law: therefore, if positive law does not prejudice nor impede natural law, neither does servitude [impede] marriage.

4. Likewise, just as a slave is bound to obey his master, so too a son [is bound to obey] his father; but in this matter the son is not bound to obey his father, as was held above and shown as regards the contracting of marriage: therefore neither [is] the slave [bound to obey] his master.

> **Conclusion.** The condition of servitude does not impede marriage, even with the master objecting.

**I respond:** It must be said that according to the new law the condition of servitude does not impede marriage, even with the master, or the masters, objecting, because the ecclesiastical Sacraments are common to all, and a slave, even when married, can render the due services to his master; hence through marriage he is not withdrawn from the master's power.

*To the 1st and 2nd.* To that, then, which is objected concerning religious life, it must be said that in religious life the religious is wholly subject to the precept of religion for all time, and therefore is absolved from every other power; and because the master's right, which he has over the slave, cannot and must not be taken away against his will: therefore it is clear, etc. It is not so in marriage, because he is still a slave. — And by this is made clear that [point] about orders, because one promoted to sacred orders is by that very fact made free.

*To the 3rd.* To that which is objected, that the power of the husband is transferred to the woman; it must be said that it is not transferred *absolutely* — for the wife is not called the mistress of the husband — but as regards the *conjugal act*, over which the master had no power over the slave; and therefore as regards that act he can transfer [it], though not so freely as any other [free man], as will be seen.

*To the 4th.* To that which is objected concerning the rendering of service, it must be said that the slave either contracts with the master *consenting* or *objecting*. If [the master is] *consenting*; since one who grants something grants also those things that pertain to that thing's right, and to marriage pertains the rendering of the debt, when the wife asks; when the wife asks for the debt, and the master commands something else, he is bound and ought to obey not the master, but the wife. — But if it has been contracted with the master *objecting*; since the master ought not to be deprived of his right, when equal danger threatens on both sides, he ought to obey the master. But if the greater danger is on the wife's side, because she fears a lapse into fornication and does not gravely fear to offend the master; he ought, according to the law of divine charity, to render the debt to the wife first rather than carry out the command of his master. Yet as a rule it must be held that when someone knowingly contracts with a slave, the master objecting, or conversely, he prejudices himself, so that he does not have the right of demanding [the debt], whenever [the master] shall demand service; and therefore the slave is not bound by this conflict, because he is bound to pay the debt, since no prejudice is generated for the master.