Dist. 36, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/36/q/bon-sent-IV-d36-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the impediment arising from defect of age.*

Next, concerning the second article, there is inquiry about the impediment that arises from defect of age. And concerning this three questions are asked.

First it is asked, whether the state of age impedes marriage.

Second, whether defect of age impedes the contracting of a betrothal.

Third, whether a betrothal contracted after the seventh year can be dissolved by mutual consent.

### Question I. *Whether the state of age impedes marriage.*

Concerning the first point one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the state of age impedes marriage:

1. Because impotence for intercourse follows upon the state of [immature] age; but impotence for intercourse impedes marriage: therefore so also does the state of age.

2. Likewise, indiscretion follows upon the state of age; but discretion is required for legitimate consent, and consent is required for marriage: therefore the state of age can be such that it impedes marriage.

3. Likewise, the canon laws and the civil laws say that those below puberty cannot contract marriage; but they are judged to be below puberty by reason of age, as a male before his fourteenth year and a female before her twelfth: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. The state of puberty does not impede the reception of any other Sacrament, which are even of greater perfection: therefore neither [does it impede] marriage.

2. Likewise, why can they not contract before the time of puberty? Either on account of impotence for intercourse, or on account of a defect of discretion. If on account of impotence — but many sick men are impotent to render the debt, and yet they can contract; moreover, many worn out with age are impotent, and yet they can contract; moreover, many even before the fourteenth year have intercourse. If on account of a defect of discretion — against this is the fact that many are more discreet in their tenth year than others in their twentieth year, who [nonetheless] can contract: therefore, etc.

Likewise, it is asked why the time of puberty is completed sooner in a woman than in a man. And it seems that it ought not to be so, because, as regards the contracting of a betrothal, a male and a female are judged [fit] at an equal and identical time, namely at the seventh year: therefore, by parallel reasoning, [they should be judged equal] as regards the contracting of marriage.

> **Conclusion.** Before the time of puberty, marriage cannot lawfully be contracted.

**I respond:** For the understanding of what has been said, it must be noted that marriage is [ordained] to a duty and to a remedy and to a Sacrament or sign: to a duty, I say, of procreating offspring; to a remedy against the impulse of lust; and to a Sacrament of the indissoluble joining of the natures in Christ. Since, therefore, before the time of puberty a male and a female cannot generate, nor are they stirred by the ardor of lust, being as it were impotent for its act; and since also before that time they are changeable, whereas marriage is unchangeable: the laws decreed that such persons are not legitimate [to marry] until they come to the time of puberty.

**To the objections:**

1. To that which is objected concerning the other Sacraments, it must be said that it is not alike, because they are useful and necessary before the time of puberty.

2. To that which is asked, what impedes [marriage], it must be said that [it is] the defect of age, by reason of childish instability and of natural impotence for intercourse. — As for what is objected concerning the old man and the sick man, it is not alike, because they are stable in sense and in affection. — But as for what he says, that they can [have intercourse] beforehand, it must be said that the laws judge and establish things not according to what happens *always*, but according to what happens *frequently*; and because, although before the appointed time some can have intercourse on account of a hastening of nature, nevertheless for the most part they cannot before that time. Yet because the laws saw that some could, they did not restrict it so far but that those close to puberty, around the middle of the [fourteenth] year, may also contract.

To that which is asked — why the time of puberty is completed sooner in a woman — it must be said that the time of betrothal is determined with regard to *discretion*, but the time of puberty with regard to the *power of intercourse*; and because a woman can have intercourse sooner than a man: therefore, etc. — *If you should ask:* why can a woman [do so] sooner than a man? It can be answered that this happens for many reasons: first, because the dissolving of the [bodily] viscosity occurs earlier on account of wider passages; second, because it is more difficult to act than to be acted upon; third, because imperfect nature in the woman desires the man, as matter [desires] form; whence, on account of the greater appetite of nature, a greater hastening takes place.