Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/38/q/bon-sent-IV-d38-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the vow in itself.*

Concerning the first, three [questions] are asked. First it is asked about a vow, what it is according to its essence. Second it is asked, of what it is. Third, in whom it is.

### Question I. *What a vow is according to its essence.*

As to the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that a vow according to its substance is a *promise*:

1. By the definition of Hugh: "A vow is a certain attestation of a spontaneous promise, which ought properly to be made to God and concerning the things that pertain to God."

2. Likewise, by a vow a man binds himself to that to which he was not previously bound; but a man does not bind himself to something new except on account of a benefit, or on account of a sin, or on account of a promise; but in a vow a man is not bound by a benefit or by a sin: therefore he is bound by a promise: therefore a promise is of the substance of a vow.

Likewise, that there is an *intention to bind*, seems [to be shown]:

3. Because, just as matrimony is from our own act, so also is a vow; but no one contracts matrimony, however much he may promise outwardly, unless he intends to bind himself or consents inwardly: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a vow is a spontaneous or

voluntary obligation; but no one is bound by a voluntary obligation unless he wills to be bound; and no one wills to be bound by a word unless he intends to bind himself: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** It is shown that a *promise* is not of the genus of a vow:

1. By another definition of a vow: "A vow is the conception of a better good confirmed by deliberation" — this definition states the substance of a vow — but this whole can exist without a promise: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory on Ezekiel: "Those who deliberate to do better things and do not do the things deliberated, while they lift themselves up, fall": therefore the deliberation of a better [good] binds one to the doing [of it], otherwise there would be no fall; but there is there no other obligation than that of a vow: therefore deliberation alone without a promise is a vow: therefore a promise is not of the essence of a vow.

Likewise, that neither is there an *intention to bind*, seems [to be shown]:

3. Because someone promoted to sacred orders, intending to receive orders and in no way to be bound to chastity, is nonetheless bound, as if he had so intended: therefore it seems that the intention to bind is not of the substance of a vow.

4. Likewise, if someone swears to another, not intending to bind himself to that which the words signify, he is nonetheless judged to be bound thereby, as if he had so intended: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [the same] in a vow, that it comes to be without intention.

Likewise, since these two, namely a promise and the intention to bind, similarly make for the being of an oath, it is asked what the difference is.

### Conclusio

> **Conclusion.** *Of the essence of a vow are a promise and the intention to bind; and in a simple vow an inward word is required, in a solemn one an outward word.*

**I respond:** It must be said that these two are of the essence of a vow, namely a *promise* and an *intention to bind*. Since a vow is a *new and voluntary obligation*, because it is *newly* superadded, a *promise* is necessary; but because it is *voluntary*, it is required that he *will to be bound*, and thus that he intend to bind himself. But it happens that one promises to another by a twofold word, namely *inward and outward*. A promise as regards the inward word of thought and deliberation is of the necessity of a *simple* vow, which binds with respect to God, who *beholds the heart*. But a promise as regards the outward word or sign, *outwardly*, is of the necessity of a *solemn* vow, which binds with respect to the face of the Church, which judges according to the things that are manifest. According to this a twofold definition of a vow is given; the magisterial and common one is of the simple vow: "The conception of a better resolve," etc.

1 and 2. To that which is objected by the definition of a vow and the authority of Gregory, that a vow consists in deliberation alone; it must be said that they do not understand [this] of any deliberation whatever, but of that which confirms the resolve; and this is what adds a promise to consent; otherwise it does not confirm, whence it is permitted to dissent.

3. To that which is objected, that the intention to bind is not necessary, as is clear in the case of [holy] orders; it must be said that intention with respect to something can be twofold: either principally, because one thinks of it and it pleases him, or because he intends something antecedent to it, or simply annexed to it; just as, if someone intends to vow the rule of monks, consequently he intends also to be bound to continence and to obedience; otherwise he foolishly desires and wills. Likewise, because a vow is annexed to a sacred order, if he intends to receive a sacred order, consequently [he intends] also to be bound to continence, either principally or by consequence; but if he in no way intends it, it is not a vow; and so neither is it matrimony.

4. To that which is objected, that he who swears in deceit is held [bound]; it must be said that there is a twofold forum, namely the *judicial* and the *penitential*. In the *judicial* forum one is judged according to outward things, in the *penitential* according to conscience. In the *judicial* forum, because "deceit ought to profit no one," the words are taken according to the common and sound understanding; and because deceit ought not to profit him, he is judged to be bound, just as if he had spoken the words according to a right intention. In the *penitential* forum, where there is judgment according to truth, he is judged to have sinned by deceit, but by no means to be bound by that promise; whence,

just as a matrimony contracted by outward words without any consent is a matrimony only according to the interpretation of the *judicial* forum, not according to *truth*; so must it be said of a vow.

To that which is finally asked concerning the difference of a vow from a binding oath, it must be said that there is a threefold difference, namely in *object*, in *medium*, and in *end*. In *object*, because a vow is made to God, but an oath to a man; in *medium*, because one swears by God, but one vows by a promise; in *end*, because an oath is for establishing truth, but a vow for increasing uprightness and goodness.