Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/38/q/bon-sent-IV-d38-a1-q2
----------------------------------------
### Question II. *On what, or the matter concerning which, a vow is.*

In the second place inquiry is made concerning what a vow is about, or concerning the matter about which a vow is; and it seems that it is about everything.

1. And *first* it seems that it is about *every good*: because a man can promise and pledge every good to God, and by such a pledge he is bound; but this is nothing other than a vow: therefore etc. Hence also in baptism he promises what is of necessity, namely to renounce Satan.

2. Likewise, that it is about a *lesser good* seems [to be the case]: because it is licit to will it: therefore a man can licitly bind himself to it, therefore [he can] licitly vow it; and this seems [to hold] *by a similar case* in marriage, in which one binds himself to a state of imperfection.

3. Likewise, that it is about the *indifferent* seems [to be the case]: because food and drink, so far as they are of themselves, are called indifferent acts, since they are natural; but concerning food and drink a vow can be made, as for instance a vow of abstinence: therefore also concerning indifferent things.

4. Likewise, it seems that a vow can be about *evils*: because to kill an innocent person is evil; but Jephthah on account of a vow killed his virgin daughter and is praised for the vow. Hence Jerome says that "he is therefore placed in the catalogue of the Saints," because "the mind of the one vowing was pleasing to God": therefore etc.

5. Likewise, conscience does not bind more than a vow; but an erroneous conscience binds, because *what is not of faith is sin*, that is, contrary to conscience: therefore also an erroneous vow [binds]; but then a man errs in the vow when he vows evil for good: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**
1. That it is not about the *good of precept* seems [to be the case]: because upon that text: *Vow and render*, the Gloss [says]: "To vow belongs to the will, but to render belongs to necessity": therefore it is only about those things to which a man is bound not from elsewhere, but voluntarily; but such things are of supererogation: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, that it is not about a *lesser good* seems [to be the case] from the definition of a vow: "A vow is the conception of a better purpose, confirmed by deliberation": therefore it does not seem that it is about a state of imperfection and a lesser good. And therefore it seems that a vow ought to be for the promotion of our salvation, not to its detriment; but to bind oneself to a lesser good is to the detriment of salvation, because according to Bernard: "No one is good who does not wish to be better": therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that it is not about the *indifferent* is shown from the definition; for it is said that "a vow ought to be made concerning those things which pertain to God"; but such things are not indifferent: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that it is not about *evils* seems [to be the case]: because Isidore says: "In evil promises break faith, in a base vow change the decree"; but a true vow is unchangeable for the one vowing: therefore a base vow, or one about a base thing, is not a true vow.

5. Likewise, a true vow binds to that of which it is; but no one can be bound to evil: therefore etc.

*Proof of the minor*: no one doing that to which he is bound does evil; but if a man is bound to evil and does evil, he does that to which he is bound: therefore one doing evil does not do evil.

### Conclusion.

> A vow, generally speaking, is about those things which pertain to God and conduce to salvation; but simply and properly it is about those things which promote salvation beyond the common state.

**I respond:** It must be said that a vow, generally speaking, is about those things which pertain to God and conduce to salvation; but simply and properly it is about those things which promote salvation beyond the common state. Hence whatever things are such fall under a vow; but those things which are opposed to these, as those which tend to the detriment of salvation, cannot fall under a vow; since a vow ought to have the companions which an oath has, namely *truth, judgment*, and *justice*.

For first it is necessary that there be *justice* in it, namely that what is vowed pertain to salvation and be good and honorable. — Secondly there is *judgment*, that the one vowing vow deliberately, not precipitately. — Thirdly, that there be *truth* in it, so that what he vowed discreetly and justly, this he should pay. If therefore what is vowed should tend to the detriment of justice, there is there no law of the vow nor obligation, but injury is done to the vow itself; nor is there an obligation to keep it, but rather to repent, as is judged concerning an erroneous conscience. According to this common rule judgment must be made concerning those things which are inquired into in particular.

1. For as to what is inquired, whether a vow is about *every good*, namely of precept and of counsel; it must be said that a vow, taking it properly, is about the good of supererogation, yet broadly, if any testification whatever be so called, it can be about the good of precept. — And through this the objections on both sides are made evident. For that vow, although it is not an obligation anew, is nevertheless a testification of the obligation, by which a man not only confesses himself bound, but also takes pleasure in that obligation, and the necessary obligation becomes voluntary; and thus many make a virtue of necessity.

2. But to that which is inquired, whether it is about a *lesser good*; it must be said that a lesser good can be considered in two ways: in one way, as it names a certain licit state; in another way, as it names a privation of a greater good. In the first way it is licit to vow it with respect to evil, because with respect to that [evil] it is in a certain way a greater good. In the second way, as depriving of a greater good, it is not licit, nor is anyone bound to keep it, but to repent; as if someone should vow that he will serve God chastely in the secular state, and will never enter religion: the first is good and licit, but insofar as it deprives of a higher state, it is illicit, because it repels the grace of God with a hard heart; and this is to the prejudice of salvation and to the derogation of abounding justice. — And *if you object*: it is licit so to be, therefore also to *vow* it; it must be said that, just as to be praised is not evil, yet to seek praise is evil; so to be in such a state is not evil, but to bind oneself, so that one cannot attain to something better, by an obligation made to God, does injury to God. Nor is it similar with marriage, because it is an obligation made to another person, who is content with that [state] and does not seek a more perfect one; but God always wills what is better.

3. To that which is inquired concerning the *indifferent*, it must be said that the indifferent is twofold: one that is capable of being informed by the movement and circumstance of virtue, such as eating and abstaining, and this can be vowed; the other, which does nothing, so far as it is of itself, as to lift a straw or to go to the meadows, and about such a thing there is properly no vow; and if anyone should vow such a thing, he lacks judgment, because nothing is to be vowed except what is believed to be reasonably acceptable to God. Hence if anyone should vow such a vow, it is not to be kept, but to be commuted. And through this both objections are made evident.

4. But to that which is objected concerning *evil*, it must be said that something is *simply* evil; and this no one can in any way vow, and if he vows it, he sins, but is not bound. There is another thing, which by one contingent case can be good, by another contingent case can be evil; and this can be vowed under the condition of a good outcome; but if it is vowed *for every outcome* without condition, the vow is indiscreet, and one is not bound to it. — As to what is therefore objected concerning the vow of Jephthah, it must be said that, because he vowed *for every outcome*, the vow was indiscreet; but nevertheless, because devotion and faith moved him, yet he uttered it indiscreetly, thence there were two things in the *making* of the vow: one praiseworthy, the other blameworthy; likewise in the *fulfilling* of the vow there were two things, namely the *figure* and the *deed*, and the deed was blameworthy, but the figure praiseworthy. As therefore to the diverse things in the vow of Jephthah, it must be said that he is praised by the Apostle and by Jerome, namely as to faith and

devotion; but as to the indiscretion and cruelty he is blamed by Augustine; for he says that he was foolish in vowing and impious in rendering.

5. To that which is objected, that an erroneous conscience binds; it must be said that a conscience is called erroneous in two ways: either because it believes itself bound to that to which it is not bound, yet it is not bound to the opposite of it; and such an error is not dangerous, and such [a conscience] binds. There is also another erroneous [conscience], which believes to be good what is not good, but rather evil; and such [a conscience] binds not to sin nor to the deed, but to laying itself aside. Thus an erroneous vow, which tends toward evil, is to be dismissed, because it does not bind to the doing of it.

---