Dist. 38, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/38/q/bon-sent-IV-d38-a1-q3
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### Question III. *In what subject a vow can exist.*

Thirdly, inquiry is made concerning the matter in which, or the subject in which, a vow is. And it seems that it is in everyone having the use of reason:

1. For everyone such has the use of free choice; but a vow is from the freedom of choice: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, everyone having discretion of reason can voluntarily bind himself to the devil through sin, with nothing hindering: therefore much more strongly can he bind himself to God through a vow.

3. Likewise, the way of salvation lies open to all, and the condition of all is equal as to this; but a vow is about those things which promote salvation: therefore all are equal in vowing.

4. Likewise, this is shown through the definition of a vow, for it is "a conception of a good mind, confirmed by deliberation"; but all who use reason can conceive a good: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. In Numbers, chapter thirty, it is said that if a woman be in her husband's house and vow anything, and the husband, as soon as he heard it, contradicted, she will not be guilty of the promise: therefore a married woman cannot vow by her own authority; and likewise it seems concerning the husband, because *he does not have power over his own body*.

2. Likewise, a boy and a girl, so long as they are underage, are entirely under the disposition of parents and guardians, as a slave is under the disposition of a master: therefore if they are entirely subject, they can vow nothing of themselves.

3. Likewise, a religious has renounced his own will; but a vow is an obligation proceeding from one's own will: therefore he cannot vow.

4. Likewise, a slave is subject to the command of his master, whence if he enters religion, [the master] can draw him out: therefore he is not his own; but a vow is from freedom: therefore etc.

> **Conclusion.**
> *He who is subject to no one can simply and freely vow; but he who is subject, according to that in which he is subject, cannot vow of himself.*

**I respond:** It must be said that a vow proceeds from a free will. Everyone, therefore, who can freely do what he wills, with no impediment existing in himself, no man hindering in fact, no law prohibiting, can simply vow; but he who is subject in all things can vow nothing of himself; while he who is subject in some things, according to that in which he is subject, cannot vow. — Since, therefore, a *wife* is subject to her husband, and a *child* to its father in the governance of life, they can vow nothing concerning this which is stable, without their authority. But a *husband* is subject to his wife in the debt of the flesh; therefore against this he cannot vow. A *religious* is subject in all things which are within religion; and therefore he can vow nothing without the will of his prelate. But a *slave* is subject as to bodily service; therefore, that he should vow against this he cannot do except by the master's authority; but if there is anything which he can freely do, that he can vow.

1. To that which is objected, that all are of free will; it must be said that this is true as to vowing, but not all are of free will as to doing everything they will; and this will is required in a vow.

2. To that which is objected concerning the obligation to the devil, it must be said that that comes about by the freedom of the will alone; but it is not so concerning the obligation to God as

to a vow, since a vow regards some work, with respect to which free choice frequently does not have the power, either in fact, or even in law.

3. To that which is objected, that the way of salvation lies open to all; it must be said that this is true as to those things which are of precept, not as to those which are of supererogation, which regard diverse states, for which some are fit, but others not at all.

4. To that which is objected, that all can conceive [a good] and confirm it by deliberation; it must be said that, as was said above, that confirmation is through a promise; but not every promise confirms except an obligatory promise; and no promise is obligatory except one that is made by him who can bind himself; and such a one is of his own right with respect to that which he ought to vow; and because not all are such, therefore it does not belong to all to vow, but only to those who have this.

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