Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/38/q/bon-sent-IV-d38-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On the obligation of the vow.*

Next, as to the second article, inquiry is made concerning the obligation of the vow, and about this three questions are asked. First, inquiry is made concerning the obligation of the vow by comparison to the contracting of marriage. Second, by comparison to commutation. Third, by comparison to dispensation.

### Question I. *Whether a vow of continence impedes or dissolves marriage.*

As to the first, then, one proceeds thus; it being supposed that a vow of continence universally impedes marriage, and that a solemn vow impedes the contracting [of it] and dissolves [it] once contracted; the question is asked about a simple vow, whether it is an impediment *rescinding*, or [merely] *impeding*, marriage. And that it does not dissolve [it]:

1. Pope Celestine says, in the *Extra, On those who vow and are ordained*, that they cannot contract marriage; and again, *Rursus quidam* etc., that "a simple vow impedes the contracting, but does not dissolve what is already contracted."

2. Likewise, a simple vow does not oblige more than an oath; but an oath does not impede marriage so as to dissolve what is already contracted: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if a simple vow were to dissolve marriage; since that vow is hidden, and anyone can pretend that he has vowed; whenever, maliciously, either spouse should wish it, a marriage could be dissolved, even a legitimate one.

4. Likewise, it seems that it *in no way impedes*, thus: as a consummated marriage is related to a solemnized vow, so a non-consummated marriage [is related] to a non-solemnized vow; but a non-consummated marriage does not impede a vow, therefore a non-solemnized vow neither impedes nor dissolves marriage.

**On the contrary:**

1. The reason why a vow rescinds and dissolves marriage, as the Master says in the text, is that "for those who vow, not only to marry, but even to wish to marry is damnable"; and because marriages are for them damnable, therefore they are annulled; but this is not only in a solemn vow, but also in a simple one: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Celestine says, and the authority in the aforementioned decretal, that "before God a simple vow obliges no less than a solemn vow": if therefore it obliges no less; since the obligation of a solemn vow annuls marriage, it seems that the obligation of a simple vow [does] also.

3. Likewise, he who by a simple vow vows continence is bound never to have intercourse: therefore as often as he has intercourse, he sins mortally; but no one can be obliged to a mortal sin: therefore, since marriage obliges to intercourse, such a one cannot be bound by marriage.

I also ask why a solemn vow dissolves marriage more than a simple one does. *If you say*, because [the simple vow] is private, and therefore does not scandalize nor can be proved; *against this is*, that a marriage contracted clandestinely thus annuls a subsequent marriage in fact, just as one contracted openly. And moreover,

a vow uttered in public before all, even in [the external] forum, is judged simple and does not dissolve a marriage already contracted.

> **Conclusion.** *It is proved that a simple vow of continence indeed impedes the contracting of marriage, but a simple [vow] does not, but only a solemn [vow] dissolves a marriage already contracted.*

**I respond:** It must be said that a vow of continence is such a vow as generally *impedes* the contracting of marriage, but does not *dissolve* what is already contracted unless solemnized. — And some assign as the reason for this the institution of the Church. For that the one vowing is an illegitimate person, this is not from the *vow*, because in marriage itself the perfection of continence can be preserved by him who does not exact the debt, but pays it. Whence Augustine says that "it is reckoned as perfect sanctification, if you do not exact, but render what you owe." But that it impedes, this is from the *constitution of the Church*, whose [office] it is to determine legitimate or illegitimate persons for marriage. But the reason why the Church instituted [this] concerning a solemn vow, as they say, is that in a solemn vow one cannot be deceived, and one can be scandalized at the breaking of it, because it is public; but in a simple vow neither has place, because it is private. — But this solution seems to suppose a twofold falsehood: one, that such illegitimacy is from the *institution*, since the Church, as is commonly said, cannot dispense there; but it can dispense generally in its own constitutions. The other falsehood is: that a vow is not called solemn because it is notorious or public; because a vow, however much it be published, unless something else be present, is judged *simple* and does not impede a marriage already contracted; whence one thing is a *public* vow, another a *solemn* [one].

Therefore another, truer, reason is assigned from the solemnization of the vow. For a vow is solemnized in three ways, namely by the reception of [holy] orders, by the making of profession, and by the assumption of the habit of the professed together with the other [rites], which show a man to be professed. And this is common in the solemnization of a vow, that it be made before a person who holds the place of God and who can approve the vow; and when that person receives the vow of continence, the power over the body of the one vowing is transferred to another, because another is present who receives [it]. But in a simple vow, where a man obliges himself by mere will and does this in the hands of no one, he is indeed obliged, but nevertheless the dominion of his own body is not transferred to another. And because what has been transferred into the power of one cannot be transferred into the power of another: therefore, once a solemn vow has been made, marriage cannot be contracted, in which there is a transfer of the dominion of one's own body. But what has not been transferred can still be transferred; therefore, once a simple vow has been made, a man can give the power over his body in marriage: therefore, if he contracts, it is contracted. — *Furthermore*, in a solemn vow one is obliged to God and to man, and so [also] in marriage; and since on both sides there is an *equal obligation*, and an equal obligation does not loose the bond of an equal obligation, but indeed a *more powerful* [one] looses the bond of a lesser obligation: therefore the obligation of a solemn vow cannot be infringed by a supervening bond of marriage. — But I do not say this because it would cause scandal, since that too can be present in a simple vow; but this the twofold obligation does, together with the transfer of power to another. This, then, is the sum of the reasoning: that a solemn vow obliges *equally strictly*; from the opposite side a simple [vow] does not thus [oblige]; therefore it impedes.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that the reason for the annulment of marriage is that, after a vow, it is damnable to marry; it must be said that this is not the *whole* reason, but a *concurrent cause*.

2. To that which is objected, that it obliges no less etc.; it must be said that this is true as regards *fault* or transgression; yet it obliges less as regards *the loosing of the other bond*, so that force be given to this which it says, *before God*. For this is said in two ways: either before God as an *object*, because the vow binds with the binding of necessity; or before God, that is, as regards the *divine judgment*. Now God reckons him who is bound by a solemn vow to be more obliged, in that He reckons him obliged not only to Himself, but also to man; He reckons not only the promise made to be accepted, but rather the power over the body to have been transferred through the minister: and therefore God judges that a solemn vow impedes, and not a simple one. And this is not only

manifest in the forum of the Church, but also in the forum of conscience.

3. To that which is objected, that he is bound never to have intercourse; it must be said that this is true, unless he be loosed by a stronger bond; and because marriage is stronger, therefore they say that when a marriage is consummated, then one is wholly absolved from the vow, but he ought to do penance for it, because he violated the vow; whence they say that he can seek and pay the debt. — But this I do not believe, namely that he is absolved from the vow as regards marriage, except insofar as the right of marriage compels him to act against the vow; but the right of marriage does not compel [him] to *seek* the debt — because this is a matter of liberty — but only to *pay* [it]. — Therefore I say that he can without sin *pay*, because he does that to which he is bound, yet he can never without sin *seek*; and if his wife dies, he is bound wholly to be continent.

As for what he objects, that a non-consummated marriage does not impede a vow; the reason for this is that no prejudice is done to it [the vow], for the wife, or betrothed, can marry another; but by [consummated] marriage prejudice is generated against every vow.