Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/38/q/bon-sent-IV-d38-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether a vow can be commuted.*

Secondly, inquiry is made concerning the obligation of a vow in comparison to commutation, whether it can be commuted. And that it *cannot*, seems [to be the case]:

1. Leviticus, the last [chapter]: *An animal that can be immolated to the Lord cannot be changed, neither for the worse nor for the better*: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Ecclesiastes, chapter five: *Whatever you have vowed, render it*: therefore to that which a man vows he is bound: therefore he cannot commute it.

3. Likewise, just as the truth of speech consists in the agreement of the voice and the understanding, so the truth of a vow [consists] in the agreement of the promise and its fulfillment; but whenever the voice is discordant from the understanding, there is falsity there: therefore also in a vow, when the promise [is discordant] from the fulfillment. But everyone is bound to be truthful in what he has promised: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that it cannot [be commuted] without the *authority of a superior*, seems [to be shown]. Bernard, On Dispensation, etc.: "From well-ordered monasteries let no one, by my counsel, depart out of a desire for a stricter life without the permission of his superior": if therefore one is the more bound to this, it is clear, etc.

5. Likewise, that a *superior cannot change* [it], seems [to be shown]: because a solemn vow binds equally, like matrimony; but matrimony cannot be changed by any authority of a superior: therefore neither can a vow.

**On the contrary:** 1. A vow is instituted for fostering charity; but Bernard says: "What is instituted out of charity ought not to be maintained against charity": therefore where there is necessity or utility, since charity requires it, it can be commuted; but this is [done] through a vow: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it is always permitted to make progress according to one's state: therefore also to commute a vow from a good [thing] into a better [thing], therefore etc.

3. Likewise, if someone makes two incompatible vows, of which one is more perfect, when the more perfect has been fulfilled, he is absolved from the other, even from that which he vowed first: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, just as a testament is of one's own will, so also is a vow; but it is permitted, as long as a man lives, to change a testament: therefore also [to change] a vow, without any permission.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** *A vow can, with the authority of a prelate, be changed both on account of a supervening necessity and on account of an imminent danger and on account of the greater utility of the one who vows.*

**I respond:** It must be said that it is permitted to change a vow for a cause — namely, that [cause] which admits a recompense; but not out of levity nor out of the private will by which one bound oneself, but out of necessity or utility, with the authority of a prelate; with the exception of the vow of religion, or even of a more perfect state, into which another vow can be commuted without the permission of a prelate, because on account of its dignity the laws grant permission. Yet it is sound counsel that it be done by the authority of the superior, where it is not believed that he would contradict [it], lest one seem to proceed out of levity and to despise the authority of the superior.

Now the reason why it is permitted to change and commute a vow is on account of a supervening *necessity*, or on account of a *danger* which frequently threatens in the observance [of it], or on account of the *greater utility* both of the one who vows and of others. For in these [cases] right reason and divine illumination manifestly cry out that through a mediator and procurator it ought to and can be provided that God be not defrauded, nor this man endangered — in which [matter] both this man ought to be preserved and God to be honored, and on account of which a well-ordered vow is made. And therefore on this account it can be changed.

But what he objects concerning a testament is not similar, because a testament does not bind, as a vow does.

1. To that which is objected from Leviticus, according to the Gloss, it must be resolved: *by one's own authority*.

2. 3. 4. To that which is objected from Ecclesiastes, it must be said that it is understood [as fulfilled] either in itself or in an equivalent. — And through this the matter of truth is made clear, because the fulfillment agrees with the promise, when an equivalent to it is given. — But as to what Bernard says about those ascending to a higher state, I believe that it is said by way of counsel.

5. To that which is objected last concerning matrimony, it must be resolved that it is not similar: because the bond of matrimony binds not only by reason of the *promise*, but also of the *signification* of an indissoluble thing, over which no authority has power. — *Moreover*, one matrimony is not better than another, as [one] vow [is better than another]; and therefore it is not fitting for a matrimony to be exchanged or commuted, as it is fitting concerning a vow.

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