Dist. 38, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/38/q/bon-sent-IV-d38-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in a matter of a vow.*

Thirdly there is inquiry concerning the obligation of a vow in comparison to dispensation, and it is asked whether the Supreme Pontiff can dispense in a matter of a vow. And that he *cannot*, seems [to follow]:

1. Because the Gloss on that [text] of the Psalm: *Vow and pay* etc., [says]: "To pay back belongs to necessity"; but concerning those things which are of the necessity of salvation, one cannot be dispensed: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, the obligation of a vow is according to natural law, which is clear, because it has run in every age; but the Pontiff has no power in those things which are of natural law: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, Bernard says: some are moral precepts of the first table, ordaining [man] toward God; some of the second, ordaining toward the neighbor; some are superadded, such as canonical sanctions and the institutions of the Fathers. In the first neither man nor God can dispense; in the second not man, but God; in the third both man and God. And the reason for this is: because the precepts of the first table order [man] immediately toward God: if, then, a vow orders [him] immediately toward God, it seems etc.

4. Likewise, he who does not do what he promises lies; but the Pope cannot dispense in a lie: therefore neither in a vow.

5. Likewise, that [he cannot] especially in a vow of *continence*, seems [so]: Ecclesiasticus 26: *No weighing is worthy of a continent soul*: if, then, continence can in no way be recompensed, it is evident etc.

6. Likewise, that [he cannot] even in a vow of *poverty*, seems [so], because it is more perfect to beg for God's sake than to be continent: therefore the vow of poverty is more perfect: therefore if he cannot dispense in a vow of continence, neither [can he] in [a vow] of poverty.

7. Likewise, that [he cannot] even in a vow of *obedience*, seems [so]: because this is the most perfect, since in chastity a man conquers his own body, in poverty the world, in obedience a man immolates his very self: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. That he can dispense in *every* [vow], seems [so]: because one vow does not bind less than another; but he can dispense in some, as in a vow of pilgrimage and of abstinence: therefore also in every one.

2. Likewise, that [he can] especially in a vow of *continence*, seems [so]: because dispensation has place, as Bernard says, where *necessity* falls, or *common utility*; but it is possible that someone through the defect of a woman incur danger of death, as is said of King Louis; but it is possible that all who can generate should die, only he remaining who vowed, and the Pope and the woman remaining: therefore, if there is necessity of preserving the *species*, in that case he could contract [marriage].

3. Likewise, it is possible that peace of the Church be given from a marriage, which is a common utility; but common utility is to be preferred to a private good: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that [he can] in a vow of *poverty*, seems [so]: because he can dispense in a vow of abstinence; but it is greater to mortify one's own flesh than to relinquish riches: therefore etc.

5. Likewise, that [he can] in a vow of *obedience*, seems [so]: because the Supreme Pontiff takes [men] from religious orders to dignities and prelacies; but those so taken are not bound to obey the prelates of their own order, to whom they vowed obedience: therefore etc.

### Conclusion.

> *A vow can be dispensed by the Supreme Pontiff insofar as dispensation means a declaration of the law, but not insofar as it means a relaxation of the law.*

**I respond:** It must be said that dispensation is spoken of in two ways: in one way [as] a *relaxation* of the law, in another way [as] a *declaration* of the law. — Some, then, say that the Pope can dispense in a vow insofar as dispensation is a *relaxation* of the law, because his authority is over the obligation of a vow. And they assign the reason for this: that the Pope is the immediate prelate of all, and to him belongs the ordering of all, especially as to those things which are of supererogation. And because the wills of all are subject to his authority and disposition; no vow ought to be made otherwise than with this condition, unless the lord Pope should judge to dispose otherwise concerning the one vowing; and therefore no one is bound to make a vow, when the Pope disposes otherwise; but if he does not append that condition, still he cannot exclude it. And therefore they say that in every vow he can dispense and absolve from every such obligation. And to all the reasons they respond that the obligation there is not *absolute*, but *conditioned*; and therefore he can dispense, since he can break that condition, if it pleases him to dispose otherwise concerning the one vowing. — But since those things which God counsels to be done — and they are without doubt good — are to be embraced without hesitation with the whole heart; it seems also, since God has so willed, that each one is free, so that everyone without any condition can and ought to vow such things.

And therefore others say that the Pope can dispense in no vow, insofar as to dispense is a *relaxation* of the law, because the obligation of a vow depends on divine law, not human, on natural law, not on the institution of the Fathers. Therefore the Pope has neither *power* nor authority over a vow by *relaxing the law*, because that is not subject to him; yet he has power, insofar as the law grants it to him; and therefore he can dispense, insofar as dispensation is a *declaration* of the law. And this position is more reasonable and safer, because through it the conscience is more fully satisfied.

For the understanding of this it must be noted that the law of the obligation of a vow is constituted from a twofold natural law, namely from this: that a man ought to be truthful in his promise; and from another: that a man ought to promise nothing except with his salvation preserved and the honor of the divine majesty: therefore it is of natural law that a man ought not to be impeded by a vow from being able to do for himself what is more useful and more acceptable to God; and therefore in every vow which admits a recompense of a better good, whether simply or for place and time, the lord Pope, whose it is to clarify the law, can dispense.

And in this all commonly agree, but they differ as to the *manner* of dispensing. For some say that there is no vow which for place and time does not *admit a recompense*; therefore there is none in which he cannot dispense. Whence they say that to the good of continence is preferred the good of the universal Church, such as peace; and therefore in a vow of continence, in which it seems least [possible], a dispensation can be made, whether *simply* or *for a time*, as indeed has sometimes been done.

But others say that a vow of continence does not

recompense, because *no weighing is worthy of a continent soul*, when victory over the domestic enemy is obtained; in all others there is *recompense*: therefore he can dispense in all, except in this.

The third say that to the *perfection of religion*, which consists in the imitation of Christ, nothing can be equated nor recompensed for it; and that consists substantially in the threefold vow, namely of continence, poverty, and obedience: and therefore in these three he cannot dispense. For perfection consists in assimilation to Christ most of all, as Augustine says in the book *On True Religion*; and because in nothing is a man so assimilated to Christ as in these; nothing can recompense these three to a man; since recompense regards not only the good of others, but also of the one vowing, for God wills that each one be more solicitous of his own salvation than of others'.

Which of these three opinions is truer, I confess that I do not know; and each can well enough be maintained, therefore I assert none. If, however, anyone wish to accept this last one, no manifest inconvenience meets him, so that it be said that [he can dispense] neither in every [vow] nor in none, but in a certain one yes and in a certain one no.

To that, then, which is objected, that he can dispense in none; it must be said that those arguments run insofar as dispensation is a *relaxation* of the law; and in this sense he cannot, yet he can, insofar as dispensation is a *declaration* of the law, because the law grants that a vow is not binding when it can be recompensed; and universally it belongs to the lord Pope to interpret this law: and therefore in all others besides these three he can dispense.

1. To that which is objected, if he can in one, [then] also in all; it must be said that it is not similar; because the condition of a better recompense does not stand uniformly in all.

2. 3. To that which is objected, that in a vow of continence *necessity* and *utility* can fall; it must be said that it does not fall; and *besides*, when certitude falls, necessity does not fall, because there is never an infirmity from which one cannot be freed except by intercourse. Necessity does not fall with respect to the *species*, because there will never be anyone alone. Nor does there fall there a greater *utility of the agent*, and there it is not [present], because he exchanges the merit of the hundredfold fruit for the merit of the thirtyfold. — *Besides*, if all this were so, it would be uncertain, because it is not known whether the sick man would be healed by intercourse; it is not known whether anyone would be generated from the intercourse; it is not known either whether peace would be restored from the marriage; and the certain is not to be relinquished for the uncertain: therefore it does not hold.

4. To that which is objected, that a vow of abstinence is greater than a vow of poverty; it must be said that it is false: because *bodily exercise is useful for a little, but piety avails for all things*, as the Apostle says; and the highest piety is that all things be sold and given to the poor. — *Besides*, it is more difficult; for more are found who wish to fast than who wish to beg. — *Besides*, there [in poverty] there is not only the renunciation of an *earthly thing*, but also of the *will to possess*; whence the poor man coming to religion relinquishes the whole world by reason of the will.

5. To that which is objected concerning a vow of obedience, that dispensation is made in religious who are promoted; it must be said that, although in prelacies they are not bound to obey and have many things which would not be licit for them if they were subjects; nevertheless in neither vow is there a dispensation. For in a vow of *poverty* there is no dispensation, because it is not licit for such a religious to have property, even if the Pope dispense; yet he can dispense the goods of the Church, as an abbot [dispenses] the goods of the monastery, nor does he lose the merit of poverty; but he is of riches not the owner, but the dispenser, not the lover, but the despiser, not the keeper, but the disperser among the poor. — Similarly in a vow of *obedience* there is no dispensation, because all the obedience which he owed before to his superior he owes to the Pope; and the Pope cannot absolve him from his obedience; and in such cases the merit of obedience is exchanged for the merit of pastoral care; nor is it a *dispensation*, but rather ought to be called an *exemption*.

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