Dist. 38, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/38/q/bon-sent-IV-d38-dubia
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### Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about that which he says: *Those who privately make a vow sin mortally by contracting [marriage].* For it seems to say something false, because it is possible that they contract [marriage], yet in such a way that they in no manner come together carnally, as Joseph and Mary, and Tiburtius and
Cecilia: therefore there is no fault there. — Likewise, if there is mortal sin there: then no one ought to be licensed for this; but a woman who has vowed with a private vow is licensed to contract marriage, under the title *On the fact that those who vow cannot* etc., in the decretal *Veniens* etc.; there it is said, "concerning a violated vow, enjoin a fitting satisfaction, and do not withhold from her, for the one she wishes, license to marry in the Lord."

**I respond:** It must be said that one contracting marriage either intends to contract solely by intending and consenting to the *conjugal society*, or [intends] *carnal union*, whether on account of lust or on account of generation. The first is licit, the second is mortal sin. Of the first the Master does not speak, but of the second, because nearly all who contract have been accustomed to contract thus.

As for what is asked concerning her who vowed with a simple vow; it must be said that the Church does not there give license *simply*, but, as is clear from the preceding text, and the Apparatus says there, "it is a comparative permission, because an evil is permitted to be done, lest a worse come about," as is clear from what is said in Cause twenty-two, question one, *Consider, that the Savior* etc. Hence that deed is in no way to be drawn into a precedent, because, as is held in other decretals of the same title, a *simple* vow impedes. — And note that the aforesaid woman vowed with a simple vow, because, although she vowed into the hands of a hermit, yet, since she did not bind herself to a special religious order but to continence in general, and that hermit was not a public person, nor did she change her habit, it was not a solemn vow.

### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *To violate a solemn vow is a sin and a scandal.* For it seems to distinguish these two badly, because scandal itself is a sin. — Likewise it is asked whether there are two sins there. And that there are, it seems: because by breaking the vow one sins against God, but by giving scandal against the neighbor.

**I respond:** It must be said that scandal united to a sin does not make a new sin as regards the transgression nor as regards the penance, but adds a new aggravating circumstance, as public fornication [adds] beyond private; it could nevertheless be twofold as regards accusation. — As to the objection that the one is joined to the other; it must be said that this is not on account of a diversity of the sin, but of the added circumstance. — As to the objection that [it is] against God etc.; it must be said that the same sin can be both against God and against the neighbor, but against God principally, against the neighbor by reason of the adjoined circumstance; and therefore this does not make diverse sins, because a sin is numbered by reason of the act about which it is, not by reason of the one against whom it is. For if someone by one action should offend several men, he would sin with one sin.

### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *it cannot be proved which has been done secretly* etc. For the reasoning seems bad, because a defect of proof neither takes away marriage nor makes it.

**I respond:** The opinion of some was, as of Hugutio, that a simple vow impedes before God just as a solemn one does; hence that [marriage] is not a marriage in the sight of God, but only in the face of the Church, because there are no witnesses through whom it can be dissolved; and always one of the spouses fornicates, but the other is excused through ignorance. — But now by the new laws it has been sufficiently determined that the bond of a simple vow does not take away the obligation of marriage, both because it is less, and because the power over the body is not transferred, and also because in marriage, if [the debt] is not demanded but only rendered, as one who has vowed ought to do, it is reckoned to perfect sanctification; hence a defect of proof is not a sufficient reason, but a certain adjoined congruity.

### Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *Widows withdrawing from their resolve* etc. For it seems to say something wrong, because a resolve does not bind anyone: therefore it seems that such [widows] are not bound on account of this, therefore they can go back.

**I respond:** It must be said that Gregory understands [this] not of a simple resolve or of any whatsoever, but of a resolve which is confirmed by public attestation, in which there is a solemn vow; and these are the ones who *make void their first pledge*, and thereby are known to incur damnation.

### Dub. V.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *They pretended to persevere in a virginal resolve.* For it seems to say something false, because where there is pretense there is no true vow: therefore neither is one bound to the Lord who pretends to be bound.

**I respond:** It must be said that a simulated promise can be so in two ways: either because it does not have stability, or because it does not have an interior assent corresponding [to it]. And this [latter] is twofold, because one kind is made from fear or dread, "which can befall a steadfast man," as David feigned himself mad before Achis, first [book] of Kings, chapter twenty-one; another kind, with the intention of deceiving others. — The first pretense binds simply, because it is necessary, from the fact that one once bound himself voluntarily and pledged with the mouth, that he remain in his promise. — But if he pledged by a sign, not with the heart; he is held in the judicial forum and before the Church, if fear was not present; but before God he is held to do penance for the duplicity and the lie. — But if the pretense was in the third way, then he is bound neither before God nor before the Church. Here, however, the discourse is about a simulated pledge in the first way, as is clear in Cause twenty-seven, question one. It could also happen in the second way, namely when he does not even have the intention; for then he is compelled by the Church, as is said in the Extra[vagantes], on Religious and those passing over to religious life, *A widow if of her own accord [she takes] the veil.*

### Dub. VI.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *That virgins and widows, whether they have been veiled or not, can in no way obtain marriage.* — For it seems to say something wrong, because the veil is a sign of profession, as the habit is for religious men; but before the reception of the habit the vow does not seem to be solemnized: therefore marriage does not seem to be wholly impeded.

**I respond:** It must be said that a vow happens to be solemnized in three ways, namely by *the reception of an order*, by *the assumption of the habit*, where there is a distinction of the professed from the non-professed, and by *proper attestation*, provided nevertheless that it be made in the hand of a public person. Although therefore such [women] have not received the veil; if nevertheless they bound themselves in the hand of a public person to continence, they can in no way contract [marriage], neither by law nor in fact. But if they bound themselves by a *simple* vow, they cannot, namely *without sin*; they can, however, *in fact*.

### Dub. VII.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *What in all sins is graver than adultery?* For it seems to say something wrong, because graver is the sin against the Holy Spirit, which *is not remitted, neither in this age nor in the future*. Likewise, graver is the sin of incest, as is held in the following text; likewise, still graver is the sin against nature; likewise, graver is homicide and wife-murder, for which a solemn penance is imposed [in] Cause thirty-three, question two, *Admonere* etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that a sin is called graver in many ways: either by reason of *contempt*, and thus the sin against the Holy Spirit; or by reason of *lust*, as the sins against nature, in which lust absorbs the whole natural judgment; or by reason of *ingratitude*, and thus the sin of Adam in paradise; or by reason of *punishment*, and thus the sin of adultery, in which the adulterer and the adulteress were commanded to be overwhelmed with stones, as is said in Deuteronomy, chapter twenty-two. And thus it is taken in the matter at hand, when it is said that it is graver etc.

### Dub. VIII.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *For it holds the second place among penalties.* For it seems to say something wrong, because the order of transgressions and of punishments is according to the order of the precepts; but that [precept], namely not to commit adultery, is not according to the [first] commandment, but is in the second tablet. — *If you should say* that
it holds the second place by reason of *the penalty of stoning*, which is due to the blasphemer, Leviticus, chapter twenty-four, and to the adulterer, Deuteronomy, chapter twenty-two; *it is objected* then that the same penalty is inflicted on the contumacious and insolent son, Deuteronomy, chapter twenty-one.

**I respond:** It must be said that some say this is to be understood thus, that it holds the second place, because the sin of blasphemy is on the part of the soul, but the sin of adultery is on the part of the body, and the sin of homicide on the part of the conjunct [i.e., the composite]. — But this does not seem [right], since the same penalty has been inflicted for all these; for all were beheaded. — And therefore it is better to say that this is understood by reason of *the penalty of stoning*; whereas homicide was punished according to the law of *retaliation*.

But if it is objected concerning the disobedient son, it must be said that [he was punished] not by reason of disobedience alone, but also by reason of other sins, which were toward the ruin of the commonwealth, because [he was] dissolute, and the like.

If it is asked why adultery was punished so gravely; it must be said [that it was] on account of two things, namely because it was toward the destruction of concord and thereby of the commonwealth, because it was generative of great infamy; lastly, by reason of the great proneness [to it]. And this is the reason why so grave a penance is imposed for wife-murder, that the proneness may be restrained.

### Dub. IX.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *It is done execrably with a harlot, but more execrably with a wife.* For it seems to say something false, because he sins more who misuses a thing not conceded than he who [misuses] a thing conceded; because the former [sins] in two ways, the latter in one way: therefore the former [sins] more gravely. — Likewise, Augustine, in *On the Good of Marriage*, before that saying in the original text says: "In things conceded for use it becomes far more reasonable [a matter], than in those which are not conceded, whether a lesser or a rare excess": therefore since a wife is conceded for use, it is clear etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that excess in the use of a wife can be twofold: either *according to* nature, or *against* nature. If *according to* nature, it is more tolerable in a wife, on account of the fact that it has some excuse. If *against* nature, the contrary is [the case], since in marriage the goods of marriage are to be sought, and a spouse is to be treated more honorably than a harlot; therefore, since the sin against nature both is against the goods of marriage and is to the contumely of the wife, to whom a certain greater honor is to be shown in treating her: hence it is that he sins more gravely who does [this] with a wife; and therefore it is also said that on account of that sin, namely against nature, the woman can dismiss and flee her husband. And thus it is clear that although he who sins with a harlot sins in more ways than he who sins with a wife; nevertheless here [with the wife] one sins more intensely on account of the greater contempt.

### Dub. X.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says, that *we should believe the covenants of lawful marriages are to be restored* etc. It is asked therefore here, if someone dies and is raised, whether his wife is to be rendered back to him. And that she is, it seems from this text, because the first nuptials were *lawful*. — Likewise it appears through that which is said to the Hebrews, chapter eleven: *Women received back their dead from the resurrection.* — Likewise by *reason* it seems: because those who are raised are not deprived of the paternal inheritance: therefore neither of the right over the wife. — Likewise, those who are raised by divine judgment are as sleepers; but marriages are to be ruled by the law of heaven [*iure poli*]: therefore if, as regards God, this [dead man] is here judged sleeping, just as sleep does not dissolve marriage, so neither does such a dead man, as it seems. — Likewise, if it is dissolved: then if he should rise, it will be necessary to contract with the same woman: therefore he is judged a bigamist: therefore if it is not necessary that he contract; it seems that the first bond still remains.

**On the contrary:** to the Romans, chapter seven: *The husband being dead, the woman is loosed from the law of the husband:* therefore it seems that the marriage is dissolved. — Likewise, let it be supposed that a woman, her husband being dead, immediately contracts [anew]; it is certain, since she is not bound, because there is no one to whom she is bound, that the marriage is true: therefore if the first rises, on account of this it will not be dissolved. — Likewise, this man is as truly dead as one who is reduced to ashes; but for such a one,
when he shall rise, the wife will not be rendered back, as the Lord determines, Matthew, chapter twenty-two: therefore by parity of reasoning it seems [the same] in the matter at hand.

**I respond:** It must be said that, as was said above, the matrimonial bond is not founded in the soul, but in the conjunct; hence when someone dies, immediately the other part of the relation perishes, and therefore the bond is immediately dissolved; and if the woman were matrimonially joined to another, she would not be to be separated. If nevertheless she is not joined to another, and he wills her, out of a certain fittingness she is to be rendered back to him.

As therefore to the objection that they are to be restored, it is true when they have been dissolved only in fact. — As to the objection from the eleventh [chapter] to the Hebrews, it must be said that the women received back their dead *sons*, not *husbands*. — As to the objection concerning the inheritance, it can be said that this too is a grace and a fittingness, that it be rendered to him; nevertheless it is not similar, because concerning the wife the man can dispose nothing after death. *Moreover,* it is another matter concerning things [property]; for he can make a testament concerning things, but he cannot leave the wife to another. — As to the objection that they are sleepers; it must be said that it is true with respect to power, but with respect to the truth in judging, God judges [him] truly dead. — To that which is asked, whether he be a bigamist; it can be said that he is not, if she did not know the other man, for the reason that she does not divide the flesh, nor did she divide it.

### Dub. XI.

Likewise it is asked about that which he says: *But if husbands persevere in the love of their wives.* For it seems to say something wrong, because from this it seems that [the marriage] ought not to be restored, unless the husband wills [it]. *On the contrary:* granted that the woman demand [it]; since she is excused from fornication, it seems that the husband cannot repel her: therefore whether he love [her] or not, he ought to take her back. — Likewise it is asked whether such an opinion excuses. And that it does *not*, it seems: because no one ought to commit himself to a peril: therefore however much the woman's husband absents himself, unless she is certain, she sins if she contracts with another.

It is asked therefore, for how great a certitude she is excused.

It is asked also, if she doubts that her husband is alive, whether she ought to render the debt; for it seems that she ought *not*: because no one who doubts whether something is a mortal sin ought to do it: therefore etc.

**I respond:** It must be said that a woman who thinks her husband slain and contracts [marriage] either believes this by a *slight* presumption, which ought rather to generate doubt than belief, or believes by a *probable* presumption. In the first way she is not excused, if she contract, as is said in the Extra[vagantes], on Betrothals and marriages, where it is said that however long the man may tarry in war, and the wife be a young girl, nevertheless she ought not to contract until she has some certitude concerning the dead husband; and this being had, she can then contract without sin, as for instance if she has the oath of the commander of the army, or of his comrades, who knew of the death; and then she is excused. — But if the woman begins, after the marriage is contracted, to doubt concerning the death of the husband; either it is a *slight* doubt; and this, according to the counsel of the prelate, will be able to be removed from the heart, and she will be able to exact and demand the debt; but if she *probably* doubts, she ought to render the debt, but not exact [it]; but if she *is certified* concerning the life of the first husband, she ought neither to demand nor to render, but immediately to desert the second husband. And this is proved by that which is said in the Extra[vagantes], on Second marriages, *Dominus ac Redemptor*, and Cause thirty-four, question two, *Cum per bellicam.* But if he does not immediately return, then the crime of adultery is imputed to her, nor can she return to the prior husband, unless he himself will [it]. In this case Pope Leo speaks.

From these things all the objections are clear. For she ought not to *contract* unless she have certitude concerning the death; nor ought she to *demand* when she probably doubts; nor ought she to *render* when she is certain concerning [his] life; but if she act otherwise, she is judged guilty of fornication.

### Dub. XII.

Likewise it is asked about this case, which the Master sets down, concerning him who leaves his wife, *going off into a far country*; concerning such a one it is asked whether, his wife being dead, the man can contract with another, a second [wife]. And that he can*not*, it seems: because pollution through adultery with a pledge given impedes marriage, as was shown above; but this is [the case] here: therefore etc. — Likewise it is asked whether such a one, his lawful wife being alive, ought to render the debt, if the Church compel him. And it seems that he ought *not*, because he himself fornicates; but one ought rather to permit himself to be excommunicated than to fornicate.

**I respond:** To the first it must be said that if, while the other party was ignorant, [the marriage] was contracted, the marriage stands in favor of the one who was ignorant; but if the one who was ignorant is certified [of the truth], such a one neither ought nor can join himself [to her], the truth being certified. But the first ought not to be punished, who was ignorant, because he did not sin; and therefore, if
the first bond be dissolved, the second marriage will be able to stand.

As to what is asked, whether, the first [wife] being alive, he can know the second without sin; the Master says that he can, if he render the debt compelled by the Church. But that is not held today, because ecclesiastical excommunication does not oblige to the committing of fornication nor excuse [it]; and therefore such a one ought not to obey the Church; and this is held in the Extra[vagantes], on the Sentence of excommunication, *Inquisitioni.*

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