Dist. 4, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/4/q/bon-sent-IV-d4-p1-a2-q1
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### ARTICLE II.
### *On those who receive baptism feignedly.*

Next, as to the second article, there is a question about those who approach feignedly. And concerning this three things are asked. First it is asked whether anyone unwilling or coerced receives the Sacrament of baptism. Second, whether the feigned person receives the Sacrament and not the reality. Third, whether, when the feigning has departed, baptism has its full efficacy in him.

### QUESTION I.
### *Whether anyone unwilling or coerced receives the Sacrament of baptism.*

And that anyone unwilling does not receive baptism, it seems:

1. Because it is said in a decretal of Innocent that « if anyone, refusing altogether, is immersed, he is not baptized ».

2. Likewise, in the Sacrament of baptism a spiritual matrimony is contracted, and the soul is betrothed to God; but spiritual matrimony requires either as much, or more, of consent than carnal matrimony: therefore if coercion impedes carnal matrimony, it seems likewise that it impedes anyone from receiving the Sacrament of baptism.

3. Likewise, the Sacrament is a gift of God not only by reason of grace making pleasing, but also of the character imprinted; but the grace of God is not only not given to those resisting, but is even withdrawn: therefore it seems that to such a one the Sacrament is in no way conferred.

4. Likewise, the evangelical law is a law of liberty: therefore the evangelical Sacraments are also of liberty; but what is of liberty is freely received by the will: therefore it seems that neither by right nor in fact does anyone receive the Sacrament of baptism unwilling.

**On the contrary:**
1. An infant and a madman receive the Sacrament, however much they resist, as will be evident below: if therefore this is true, the act of the will does not concur in its reception: therefore one receives it unwilling, just as a willing person does.

2. Likewise, baptism is a remedy against original sin; but a child necessarily contracts original sin when he is born: therefore it seems likewise that a necessity of violence can be applied to someone for baptism.

3. Likewise, the will cannot be coerced more than by threatening or intending death; but if anyone, compelled by fear of death, sacrifices, he will be an idolater: therefore likewise, if he receives the Sacrament of baptism through fear of death, the Sacrament is true.

4. Likewise, if anyone is baptized out of an evilly inflaming love, he is in fact baptized: therefore since love evilly inflaming resists baptism no less than fear evilly humbling, if this one baptized out of evil love is baptized, it seems likewise that the one baptized out of fear is baptized.

> **CONCLUSION.**
> When intention is entirely lacking in adults, the Sacrament is not received, as in one unwilling on account of sufficient coercion and in one mocking.

**I respond:** It must be said that coercion is twofold, namely *sufficient* and *inducing*. If anyone is immersed by *sufficient* coercion — namely because he was violently seized and, while he himself resists with hands and feet, he is immersed — such a one is in no way baptized, because in no way was there in him consent or will, but rather

he was altogether resisting. — But if anyone is immersed by *inducing* coercion, namely by threats or scourges, such that he wills rather to subject himself to the Sacrament of the Church than to perish by death; I say that either he intends to *mock* others and to escape death, and then, because there is no intention, it is not a Sacrament, since no one is said to be baptized who consents to be immersed in jest; or he himself wills that what the Church does about him be done rather than that he should perish; and then, whether he believes or not, whether he wills to have grace or not, it must be said that he receives the Sacrament, because, although there is no meritorious will there, there is nevertheless there consent and will, nor is it *simply* involuntary. Hence, because such a one wills outwardly to receive the Sacrament, even if he is unwilling that anything be done inwardly in him, it is nevertheless done, because he who subjects himself to the cause subjects himself to what is necessarily annexed: and therefore according to the canons and the doctors of theology such a one must be judged baptized.

1. From this is evident that which is objected first; for this is the intention of Innocent.

2. To that which is objected about carnal matrimony, it must be said that it is not a similar case: for because coerced marriages were wont to have bad outcomes, therefore the sacred canons did not allow them. — There can nevertheless be another reason for this, as will be said below. Nevertheless this is true, that not so great a will is required in someone for the reception of baptism, as for the contracting of matrimony. For if a father presents an infant for baptizing, the infant cannot, when he has come to adult age, revoke it; it is not so with matrimony, because, however much a father obliges an infant, he is never obliged unless he consents, when he has come to the years of discretion.

3. To that which is objected, that the Sacrament is a gift of God; it must be said that it is a gift of grace freely given and making pleasing; and although the gift of grace making pleasing is not given to one having a double heart and a double will, the gift of grace freely given is nevertheless given, which does not require so great a disposition in the recipient.

4. To that which is objected, that the evangelical law is a law of liberty; it must be said that it is true that by *right* it is not given nor ought to be given to him who does not approach with a free will; and the divine law dictates this, and Constantine established a law about this. In *fact*, however, if it is done, it is done; this nevertheless has the truth in the reality of the Sacrament, which makes [it] to be in the law of liberty.

1. To that which is objected on the contrary, that the Sacrament can be given to one however much resisting, on account of the infant and the madman; it must be said that it is not a similar case: because those do not have the use of will, hence one does not abide by their appetite, but by the will of those offering them. — Nevertheless concerning the *madman* a distinction is made: for either he once had the use of free choice, or he *did not have* it. If he *did not have* it, judgment must be made as about an infant. If he *had* it and in it willed to be baptized, it must be judged that he receives baptism; but if he in no way willed it, it must not be believed that he receives the Sacrament.

2. To that which is objected, that one contracts original sin unwilling; it must be said that it is not a similar case: because the contraction of original sin is as it were *natural*, and therefore inevitable; but the remedy of baptism does not regard *nature*, but rather *the will of the person*; and therefore it is not a similar case.

3, 4. To that which is objected last about the threatening of death; it must be said that there can be a greater coercion than this; for this is only *inducing*, not *sufficient*. But when one is taken, willing or unwilling, and is immersed, there is *sufficient* coercion there. For although the will cannot be coerced *in willing*, coercion can nevertheless simply be applied to a man *in the exterior act*. Hence the *induced* will is a will; and therefore here the character is imprinted, and there it is not. — And there is an example in one who places incense out of fear of death, and in one whose hand is drawn by force; the first consents and sins and is said to *sacrifice*, the second does not. Thus one who *induced* receives the Sacrament is said to consent; whether he is induced by good or evil love, or by good or evil fear, he receives the Sacrament, because the reception of the Sacrament is common to good and evil alike. And therefore such a will suffices for the Sacrament, as the elders say. — And thus it is evident to whom the baptismal character is imprinted.

### SCHOLION

**I.** A *feigned person* is commonly defined by the Scholastics as one who pretends one thing outwardly, intends another inwardly. This can be twofold with respect to baptism: either with respect to the *reception* (or also the conferral, on the part of the one baptizing) of baptism itself, when the will contradicts the very *truth* of the Sacrament, whence the conferral is altogether void (cf. below d. 6. p. II. a. 2. q. 1. ad 3.); or with respect to the *disposition* required for the *grace* of the Sacrament to be received, that is, when the will contradicts the *effect* of the Sacrament. This second feigning can again be threefold: either because the feigned person approaches *not contrite*, or *not believing*, or because he *despises* (Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p. IV. q. 8. m. 7. a. 2. § 2; cf. St. Bonaventure below q. 2.). — On the baptism of *infants* see here dub. 2, and below p. II. a. 2. and dub. 4.

**II.** Question 1 is most commonly solved by the distinction made by Innocent IV (cf. arg. 1.), namely between the manner in which one is unwilling and not unwilling, coerced and not coerced. Cajetan (in *Summa* III. q. 68. a. 7.), however, is of the opinion that even in adults the *indifference* of the will suffices, or the not-placing of an obstacle of a contrary will; which is commonly not approved. But the question concerning the necessity of intention in the *one baptizing* is treated below d. 6. p. II. a. 2. — St. Bonaventure here almost repeats the sayings of Alexander of Hales. — But that, besides the character, *grace* also be conferred (which is treated in the 2nd question), in *adults* who have grave actual sins, *attrition* is required, as is most commonly taught, with Scotus by no means opposing (cf. here q. 3. n. 2. 3.), whatever some have said about him to the contrary. A few authors, less probably, think that *natural* attrition suffices. — Most authors treat questions 1 and 2 together. On both: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 1. 2. — Scotus, in both *Scripta* here q. 3. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 2. subquestions 1. 2; *Summa* III. q. 68. a. 7. 12, q. 69. a. 9. — Blessed Albert, here a. 2. 3. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. subquestion 1. — Richard of Mediavilla, here q. 1. q. 2. — Durandus, here q. 4. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here q. 3.

**III.** As to the 3rd question, it is more commonly held with St. Augustine that, when the feigning has departed, baptism is valid for the remission of sins committed before baptism. Scotus, however, thinks it more probable that the *sin of feigning* itself is remitted not by the power of baptism, but of penance. He brings forward in the same place two other opinions as well, but as less probable. — Others with Vásquez generally denied that sins are remitted by the power of baptism when the feigning departs, but attributed this to a subsequent *penance*, which remits the sin of *feigning* *per se*, and the sins preceding baptism *per accidens*. — On the expulsion of sin through penance cf. here dub. 3. — On this 3rd question: Alexander of Hales, loc. cit. § 2. at the end. — Scotus, here q. 3. n. 4. ff. — St. Thomas, here q. 3. a. 2. subquestion 3; *Summa* III. q. 69. a. 10. — Blessed Albert, here a. 4. — Peter of Tarentaise, here q. 1. a. 2. subquestion 2. — Richard of Mediavilla, loc. cit. — Durandus, loc. cit. — Dionysius the Carthusian, here loc. cit.