Dist. 4, Part 2, Art. 2, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/4/q/bon-sent-IV-d4-p2-a2-q3
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### Question III. *Whether equal grace is given to all infants in baptism.*

Thirdly it is asked whether equal grace is given to all infants in the Sacrament. And that it is so, seems [to follow]:

1. Because that a cause should imprint its effects differently is not the case unless either because the agent is voluntary, or because, if it is not voluntary, it nevertheless is disposed in a different manner, or, if in the same manner, the matter receiving is disposed in another way; but neither the Sacrament nor the power of the Passion is a voluntary agent, nor is it itself diversified, nor is one infant more disposed than another: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, with whatever disposition an infant is born and whatever natural endowments it may have, one is not born more a sinner than another: therefore by parity of reasoning in regeneration one ought not to be regenerated more or better than another.

3. Likewise, one is not punished more than another: therefore neither is one rewarded [more].

**On the contrary:**

1. The goodness of nature is a disposition toward grace: therefore where the nature is better, the disposition is better; but a cause acting uniformly imprints more on what is more disposed, as light in air rather than in water: therefore since one infant is better disposed than another, it is evident etc.

2. Likewise, because God foresaw that Jacob would be good in the future, he gave him grace, but to the other, namely his brother, he did not give it, because he saw that he would remain in malice: therefore if of the infants who are baptized he foresees some to be damned and some to be saved, it seems that he ought to give greater grace to those who are to be saved.

> **Conclusion.** God by common law gives an equal effect to infants in baptism.

**I respond:** It must be said that grace is measured according to the liberality of God who gives, not according to the quality of the one who receives, except by congruity, and this insofar as the one receiving prepares himself, not insofar as he is capable. Therefore, because God works there according to the requirement of the Sacrament, and further, one is not disposed more than another: therefore he gives equally to all infants, as far as pertains to the common law. Yet because his power is not bound to the Sacrament, it is not necessary that he always give equally, but he can grant to whom he wills a special privilege.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1 and 2.* To that which is first objected, concerning an agent [acting] in diverse ways, it must be said that it does not hold, because God works in the Sacrament as a voluntary agent. — Likewise neither does the second hold, because lustful propagation brings this about, which has been turned into nature, and therefore [acts] uniformly.

*To 3.* To that which is objected thirdly, concerning punishment, it must be said that it does not hold, because justice regards merit precisely, but mercy regards the benignity of the giver.

**To the arguments for the negative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected for the opposite [conclusion], it must be said that the goodness of nature does not dispose toward grace as a necessity, nor even as a congruity, unless a determinate preparation intervene, such that one prepare oneself as nature is born fit to receive.

*To 2.* The last is evident, because the power of the Sacrament does not regard the future but the present disposition, while God [regards] both this way and that.

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