Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/40/q/bon-sent-IV-d40-a1-q1
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### Article, the Only One. *On the impediment of consanguinity.*
### Question I. *Whether consanguinity is some bond.*

Concerning the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that consanguinity is not some bond:

1. Because, if consanguinity is a bond, this is for no other cause than on account of the propagation of many from one; but just as many men [come] from one man, so many brute animals are propagated from one: if therefore, where such a cause is, such an effect also is; if consanguinity is posited in men on account of propagation from one, by the same account it is posited in brute animals. But it is not posited in brute animals: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, consanguinity is a bond by reason of some greater agreement, either therefore *substantial* or *accidental*. If *substantial*, then either according to *specific* form or according to *numerical* form. If according to *specific* form, then all men are blood-relations. If according to *numerical* form, then no one is a blood-relation of another, since they are distinguished according to number. But if it names an agreement in an *accident*: since those born of diverse stocks for the most part agree more than those born of the same parentage, then the former will be more blood-related.

3. Likewise, generation is from the superfluity of nourishment; but a superfluity has no linkage or bond with that whose superfluity it is: therefore neither does what is generated from that superfluity have any bond with him from whom it is generated: therefore, if he is the source of the whole bond of consanguinity, it seems that that bond is nothing at all.

4. Likewise, if consanguinity is contracted on account of the propagation of the flesh, then as far as propagation extends itself, so far does the bond; but propagation extends itself even to infinite generations and has no terminus by nature: therefore neither does the bond of consanguinity.

**On the contrary:**

1. It is shown by the laws, new and ancient, which assign consanguinity and distinguish its degrees, as is plain in the *Decretals, On Consanguinity*, and in *Cause thirty-five, question five, "The Series of Consanguinity."*

2. Likewise, this is proved by *reason*: the testimony of nature cannot be a lie; but by nature men are bound more to their near kin than to strangers; which is plain, because they love them more, and this is common among all: therefore there is some bond among them which is not among others.

3. Likewise, "generation is from the substance of the one generating," as the Damascene holds: therefore, since the production of the human race is by generation, it seems that sons are of the substance and of the blood of father and mother. But all who are of the same blood are blood-relations: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, God avenges the sins *of the fathers upon the sons unto the third and fourth generation*, as is frequently said in the Law, and is had in Exodus, chapter twenty: *I am a jealous God*, etc.: therefore, if He does not avenge upon others but upon these, these are joined to one another by some bond by which others are not joined; and this we call consanguinity: therefore, etc.

### Conclusion

> *Consanguinity is some bond, founded upon relation to the same origin and upon natural affection.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there is a bond of consanguinity, because nature herself bears witness to this, and no one doubts it except one who lacks sense. But whence it comes — that has doubt and controversy as well.

For some have said that the bond of consanguinity is specially in the genus of man and not in the genus of beasts, on account of the truth of human nature, which was wholly in one man, on account of which also original sin passed into all by one sin; and on account of this too, because the son draws his whole substance from father and from mother. Hence it is that they are bound by a certain special bond.

But if it were so, that my whole substance and yours had in truth been in the same man, why then would I and another, who agree in nothing but Adam, not be near brothers and in the first degree? And *again*, because the foundation of this position is not stable, as is better shown elsewhere; hence it is that another way of speaking must be found: namely, that consanguinity comes about in men from carnal propagation; and two things make this bond, namely *relation to the same origin* and *natural affection*. *Relation to the same origin*, both as to a *material* principle, because they are generated from the blood of the same man; and as to an *effective* principle, because together with that seed there are shed spirits, and also a power which forms and assimilates the matter; whence for the most part sons are made like their parents, according as that transmitted power is more potent in operating. — And because nature in men is able to *know* its own origin and the origin of another, and is further *perspicacious*, so that it may know not only likeness in bodily form but also another [kind of likeness]; since *natural affection* is born to cleave to such a one, hence it is that there is there the *bond of consanguinity*.

And since the *assimilative power* fails through succession, and the *knowledge* also of nearness fails, and *natural affection* fails; hence it is that the bond of consanguinity is not extended as far as propagation is. — And by this the answer to the last objection is plain.

*Again*, because in brute animals there is no such *knowledge* or *binding*, except only as regards the mother and the fetus or offspring; hence it is that there is no such bond in them. — And thus the first objection is plain, because the cause is not alike, and therefore neither is the effect alike. — Nor do we speak here of *affection* according to *act*, but according to the *natural inclination*, which is naturally present even if it does not go forth into act. And this is plain, because someone believing his brother to be a stranger is not more affected [toward him] than toward another; but at once, when it has been discovered that he is his brother, he is affected and is drawn by affection and is bound to him by a certain special bond, although he was bound before.

2. To that, then, which is objected — that there is no bond on account of agreement in substance nor on account of agreement in accident — it must be said that consanguinity does not name a bond according to an *absolute* property, but according to a *relative* property, namely according to procession from the same root and origin, as is plain in the case of two brothers. Hence, just as branches proceeding from the same root make one tree, not only on account of their likeness but on account of their relation to the same principle, so it must be understood that several persons descending from the same [stock] make one line of consanguinity, which stands after the manner of a tree.

3. To that which is objected concerning superfluity, it must be said that superfluity is twofold: one of *impurity*, and this has repugnance rather than linkage; another of *residue*, and this has agreement and is not superfluity simply, because, although it be superfluous to one power, namely the nutritive, yet it is necessary to another, namely the generative; and although it be superfluous for the conservation of the individual, it is nevertheless necessary for the conservation of the species. And *moreover*, it is probable that together with that nutrimental moisture there was something of the radical moisture and of spirit, by reason of which the son more intimately pertains to the father.