Dist. 40, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/40/q/bon-sent-IV-d40-a1-q3
----------------------------------------
### Article Unique. *On carnal kinship, or consanguinity.*
### Question III. *To what degree the impediment of consanguinity extends.*

Thirdly it is asked, up to what degree consanguinity impedes marriage. And it seems that it does so up to the *seventh*.

1. Gregory says, and it is had in the text: «We have decreed that each one is to observe his own progeny up to the seventh generation». *If you should say* that this was retracted in the general Council, Extra, *On Consanguinity*, *Non debet* etc.; it is shown that it ought not to have been retracted, since either this was *well established*, or *not*. If *not*: then Saint Gregory and the other Saints legislated badly. If *so* — but what has been well established does not need retraction but observance: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, according to right order one ought not to go backward but to advance further: therefore, if the holy Fathers extended consanguinity up to the seventh degree, then he who reduces it to the fourth goes backward. But he who *looks back is not fit for the kingdom of God*: therefore those who retracted it did badly.

3. Likewise, in the nearest degrees contracting is not permitted, on account of the widening of charity; but the colder charity is, the more it needs to be widened: since therefore at the end *charity grows cold*, and this has already come to pass; it seems that now it is more fitting to extend the degrees of consanguinity than to restrict them.

4. Likewise, the more the faithful are multiplied, the more they have an abundance of those with whom they can lawfully contract: therefore there was a greater opportunity in preceding times with kinsfolk than now: if therefore that opportunity did not exclude the constitution about observing the seventh degree of consanguinity, then neither does it now.

**On the contrary:**

1. That it ought not to impede beyond the *second* [degree] seems [true]: because in the Law nothing is prohibited except up to the second degree, as is plain from Leviticus, chapter eighteen: therefore, if all can be joined matrimonially by God who are not prohibited by God; then all, as many as are joined within that degree, are joined by God: therefore they cannot be separated by man: therefore marriage cannot be prohibited to anyone within that degree.

2. Likewise, the Church cannot bring it about that one baptized should lack baptism, and however much she may legislate, if someone is baptized, he is in fact baptized: therefore, however much she may prohibit and legislate that certain persons not contract with one another, nevertheless, if they do in fact contract, the contract holds: therefore it seems that the degrees prohibited by the Church do not impede marriage. But all these [degrees] are beyond the second: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, a marriage contracted against the Church's *interdict* is a true marriage: therefore, since the degrees of consanguinity have no power of impeding except on account of the Church's statute; it seems that in truth they do not impede.

4. Likewise, Jerome says that «nothing is to be believed on a man's word unless he proves it by the Old or by the New Testament»: therefore, since it cannot be proved by the New nor by the Old that one cannot contract in degrees beyond the second; it seems that no one is to be believed if he says the contrary: therefore it is to be held that one can contract.

> **Conclusion.** Consanguinity, according to the natural law, impedes in the first degree; according to the old law, up to the second; according to the evangelical law, up to the fourth.

**I respond:** It must be said that, according to our times, marriage is impeded by the degrees of consanguinity up to the *fourth inclusive*, as is plain from Extra, *On Consanguinity*, *Non debet*, in the decretal published in the general Council.

But if the reason for this be asked; it must be said that the reason for this is the *statute of the Church*. If it be asked further, why the Church legislated thus; it must be said that it is because she

*could*, and because it was *fitting*, and because it was *useful*, and because it was *necessary*. — First indeed she *could*, and that she could is proved through Scripture: because in the beginning, in the constitution of marriage under the law of nature, two persons were excepted, namely father and mother, Genesis, chapter two: *A man shall leave father and mother* etc.; afterward, in the course of time, under the Law more were excepted, as is plain from Leviticus, chapter eighteen: if therefore the evangelical law ought to abound beyond the Mosaic, then under the evangelical law more ought to have been excepted. But Christ in his own person did not except any: therefore, if nothing ought to be diminished in the Church, then he left the *power* of determining to the Church, especially to Peter and his successor. Attending to this, the holy Fathers excepted many degrees of consanguinity; from which it appears that they had the *power*.

*But if you should ask me*: why did he leave a power of this kind to the Church? it must be said that the reason for this is that that Sacrament consists in a *contract*, which is of person to person; and because the Lord gave to Peter full jurisdiction over spiritual things, and a fuller one than kings of the earth and the emperor have over temporal things. If therefore the power of a king and a prince can limit contracts, so that he is judged a possessor in bad faith who trades against their interdicts; what wonder if he gave the *power* to the Church? Indeed he had to give it, so that she might be able to determine the legitimacy and fitness of persons for contracting.

*If you should ask*: why did he not determine it himself, of himself? it can be said that, according to diverse times, diverse persons and diverse degrees had to be excepted; since therefore it is not becoming that divine statutes be changed as human ones are: hence it is that Christ himself did not have to set the limits, but to commit the setting of limits to Peter and his successors. And thus it is plain that she *could*.

Secondly, it was *fitting* that consanguinity be extended up to such a degree: since consanguinity has its origin from propagation; and propagation is from the seed, and the seed has in itself the nature of the four humors and of the four elements: and hence it is that consanguinity ought not to have been determined *beyond* the fourth generation. And *again*, *within* that degree there ought to be no carnal mingling, nor marriage joined, where the power of the body is given to another. As therefore the body is composed of four elements, so those who are to be carnally mingled must be four degrees apart. — And *again*, the new law ought to add more of perfection over the Mosaic law than the Mosaic law over the law of nature. If therefore the Mosaic law added one degree above the law of nature; then the evangelical law ought to add at least two, just as the justice of the Gospel not only surpasses the justice of the Law, but even superabounds. It was therefore *fitting*, both on account of the law of marriage and on account of the law of the Gospel, that marriage be impeded by the *fourth* degree of consanguinity, and that nothing be added beyond it nor taken from it. And thus it is plain how it was *fitting*.

It was also *useful*, because the bond of marriage, by reason of the affinity which is contracted there, fosters charity and makes allies of enemies; and because charity in our times has grown cold, therefore the bond of love is now more quickly broken than in the primitive Church; and one bound by the bond more quickly flees, and he who had been a neighbor very often becomes an enemy. Therefore, that the one fleeing might be called back — since from the fourth degree and onward they already grow cold in the affection of love — it was useful to establish that after the fourth degree the one fleeing might be called back to the bond, and the enemy might also be made an ally; on account of which usefulness it was becoming that the Supreme Pontiff should dispense, the prior prohibition remaining; and since this usefulness is very frequent, it was useful that it should become common law.

Fourthly, it was *necessary* on account of danger: since, on account of the multitude of blood-relations and the shortness of days, scarcely can anyone reckon his blood-relations up to the seventh degree; and so there was the greatest danger there, because it very frequently happened that men were joined within the prohibited degrees — indeed, scarcely could anyone escape it: and therefore it was necessary to retract the earlier statute. Such danger or such necessity did not exist in the time of the primitive Church, both because men were *of longer life*, and because they were *of smaller generation*; but now the power of the nutritive faculty has decreased in men, and the power of the generative faculty has been increased on account of the ardor of lust, which now so flourishes in men that, according to the common course, men could so multiply that scarcely would anyone find a woman with whom he might contract even up to the fourth degree, not to say up to the eighth. — And this is plain to the eye: for it is possible that someone beget twenty, and again, that someone beget three; now let us suppose, according to the common course, that he beget ten, and those ten another ten each; in the second degree there will be a hundred, in the third a thousand, in the fourth ten thousand; and thus within four degrees a man would have, in one line, eleven thousand one hundred and eleven blood-relations, as many in the ascending line,

and as many in the collateral line: therefore according to nature he would have thirty-three thousand three hundred and thirty-three blood-relations. And in one great country he would scarcely find a woman with whom he might contract up to the fourth degree — how much less up to the seventh. Therefore on account of the danger it was necessary to revoke that statute, and namely to establish [it] up to the fourth degree. — And this was the strongest reason why it was changed, as is expressly said in the decretal published in the general Council, where it is said: «It ought not to be judged reprehensible if, according to the variety of the times, human statutes too are varied, especially when urgent necessity or evident usefulness demands it». — Now not only did *necessity* demand this, but *usefulness* also required it, and there was present both *fittingness* and *power*; therefore rightly, most rightly and irreprehensibly, has the Church established and ordained that marriage be impeded up to the fourth degree.

**To the arguments of the first part:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected concerning Gregory, it must be said that that statute was reasonable in his own time, and no less reasonably was it revoked in the modern time; nor was it revoked because it had been badly established, but because what was fitting in the primitive time was not fitting for our condition, on account of the greater imperfection which is in us, and on account of the greater dangers.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that one ought not to go backward; it must be said that this is true in those things which belong to *perfection*, but those things which belong to rigor can and ought to be tempered. — Or it must be said, and better, that one ought to condescend to weakness, and where we cannot raise ourselves up, we must of necessity humble ourselves and bow down; and therefore, on account of the imperfection of men, that statute had to be tempered. Hence it is true that one ought not to go backward, but nevertheless it is opportune to bear with the imperfection of men.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the widening of charity, it must be said that that argument is rather for the opposite than for the proposition. For because charity extends itself less, therefore it must the more quickly be succored and assisted; and one's neighbor flees the more quickly from love, and therefore he is the more quickly to be called back.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the faithful have a greater abundance; it must be said that this would be true if persons were multiplied in such a way that blood-relations were not multiplied; but this is not true: and therefore, just as on the one side aptitude grows, so on the other side ineptitude grows.

**To the arguments for the second part:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected, that God does not prohibit beyond the second [degree]; it must be said that this is true *of himself*; nevertheless he prohibits *through the Church*, because the Church prohibits by the authority divinely given to her. And the reason why God gave the Church authority over this has already been seen.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that she cannot bring it about that one lack baptism; it must be said that the case is not the same: because God of himself ordained and confirmed the institution of baptism; but the legitimacy of persons he committed to the Church, since marriage is contracted between a man and a woman, and the Church has fullness of jurisdiction over both.

*To 3.* To that which is objected concerning the Church's interdict, it must be said that the case is not the same: because that interdict is *for a time*, not *absolutely*, nor does it make persons illegitimate absolutely, but it binds them, so that they cannot [do it] without sin, and therefore a penalty ought to be imposed on such persons.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning Jerome, it must be said that it is otherwise in the sayings of the Church and in those of Jerome: because Jerome could not prove by Scripture that he was a witness of the truth; therefore, in order that he be believed, it was necessary that he prove by Scripture that what he testified and said was true. But the Church was able to prove her authority by her own Scripture; and this being proved, one must obey, and not seek another testimony. And thus the whole is plain.

---