Dist. 42, Art. 2, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/42/q/bon-sent-IV-d42-a2-q1
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### Article II. *On legal kinship.*

Consequently, with respect to the second article, inquiry is made concerning *legal* kinship. Concerning it, one must proceed first by way of *narration*, secondly by way of *inquiry*.

### Preliminary notes.

Concerning the first, three things are to be noted beforehand. First, what it is, and what are its species. Secondly, how it is contracted. Thirdly, in what manner it impedes marriage.

First, therefore, it must be known that legal kinship is thus described: Legal kinship is a proximity arising from adoption. Now from adoption there arises a threefold proximity, as it were. One is, as it were, *of descen-*

*dants*, which is considered between the one adopting and the daughter, or granddaughter, adopted. Another is, as it were, *from the side*, namely that which is between a natural son and an adopted daughter. But the third is, as it were, a certain *affinity*, which is between the one adopted and the wife of the one adopting, or between the one adopting and the wife of the one adopted. These are the species, of which little is said in the law of the canons.

Secondly, it must be understood that this kinship, as is evident from its very nature, is contracted through the act of *adopting*. Now *to adopt* is to take up legitimately an outside person as a son, or daughter, or grandchild, or so on. And it is called *legitimate* taking-up, because *not every* person can adopt everyone. For a woman cannot *adopt*, unless by rescript of the prince it be granted to her as a consolation for children. For this act properly belongs to men. Likewise, *not of everyone*, because one under twenty years cannot adopt, unless perhaps a just cause intervene. But he can adopt who is a father of a family and of his own right and able to beget; for a eunuch or an impotent man cannot adopt. — Now anyone can *be adopted*, whether he be male or female, provided he be of a lesser age than the adoptive father. Hence whether he be younger or older, whether he have a father or not; he can be adopted, differently nevertheless. For he who is *of his own right* is called *arrogated* and passes into the power of the one arrogating. But he who is in the *power of a father* does not pass into the power of the one adopting and is said to be *adopted simply*. The first ought to be done by the authority of the prince, the second by the command of a magistrate. — There is also another difference, because the one adopting is bound to leave a fourth part of his goods to an *arrogated* son, nothing to an *adoptive* son, if he does not wish.

Thirdly, it must be understood that legal kinship, by way of *descendants* and by way of *affinity*, always impedes marriage. Hence the one adopting can never contract with the adoptive daughter, nor with the wife of the adoptive son, and so of others. But in the second species the impediment does not remain except for a time, namely as long as the adoption exists and lasts; but once it is dissolved by the emancipation of the adoptive son, or of the natural son, thereafter it does not impede, *Extra*, *On Legal Kinship*, and Cause 30, question 3, *Ita diligere* etc., and again, *Per adoptionem* etc.

Now for the understanding of these things three questions are briefly asked. First it is asked, whether legal kinship is any kind of bond. Secondly it is asked, whether it impedes marriage. Thirdly, whether it passes from one to another.

### Question I. *Whether legal kinship is any kind of bond.*

Concerning the first one proceeds thus, and it is shown that legal kinship does denote some kind of bond in truth.

1. Pope Nicholas says, and it is had in the text: "Between those whom adoption joins marriage is not contracted": therefore there is some joining and bond there.

2. Likewise, kinship is firstly by *natural* law: if therefore the divine law adds a *spiritual* [kinship] beyond the *natural*, by the same reasoning human law will be able and bound to add a *legal* [kinship] beyond the natural.

3. Likewise, just as it belongs to a father to beget a son, so also to cherish him and to leave him an inheritance: therefore when someone takes up another for these acts, he can rightly be called *father*, and that one *son*; but these two are relations of proximity: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. No one can adopt someone for himself as a father, in such a way that there be a bond there: therefore by the same reasoning no one, as it seems, can adopt someone for himself as a son: therefore there is no bond of adoption.

2. Likewise, all the just are adoptive sons of God: therefore adoption is a general bond; but adoption is not there considered in respect of a general bond: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, in us there are but two things, namely soul and body; but on the part of the soul there is spiritual kinship, on the part of the body carnal kinship: therefore either legal kinship does not differ from these, or it is superfluous.

4. Likewise, kinship is a perpetual bond, if it is true kinship; but adoption is not a perpetual bond, because the adoptive [son] can be emancipated: therefore it seems that there is no such kinship.

### Conclusion.

> Legal kinship is some kind of bond.

**I respond:** It must be said that a bond of *legal* kinship is to be posited; but this bond is transferred and takes its origin from *carnal* kinship, just as also spiritual kinship does. For it belongs to a carnal father to beget a son and to bring up a son; since therefore through the Sacrament of regeneration there is a *spiritual* generation, hence it is that *spiritual* kinship is contracted. — Again, since in adoption there takes place a taking-up of someone for a paternal act, which is to cherish, to bring up, to relinquish possession; hence it is that there is there a paternal affection and duty, and through this some kind of bond; and this has been established by the laws as a consolation for children, which is the greatest among the other things for the married themselves. — And thus it is evident how *legal* kinship is a bond.

But if the sufficiency of these three kinships be asked, namely *carnal*, *spiritual*, and *legal*; it must be said that it can be taken in three ways: in one way in respect of the threefold *law* from which it is, namely *natural* law, *divine* law, and *positive* law. As to the first there is *carnal* kinship, as to the second *spiritual*, as to the third *legal*. — In a second way it can be taken in respect of that *which they regard*. For there are three goods in us: the good of nature, the good of grace, and the good of fortune; and *carnal* kinship regards the good of nature, *spiritual* kinship the good of grace, but *legal* kinship the good of fortune. — In a third way thus, that carnal kinship regards the *flesh*, spiritual [kinship] the *soul*, but legal [kinship] the *whole man*. — These things having been seen, it is easy to answer the objections.

1. For to that which is objected, that a son cannot adopt his father; it must be said that just as in natural things a father begets a son, not the reverse, so also in legal things it belongs to a father to adopt a son, not the reverse. For adoption is a certain generation.

2. To that which is objected, that all the just are adoptive sons of God; it must be said that just as we are all *from God*, yet we are not all *blood-relations*, although we have one father, for the reason that He is the common principle; but when we are begotten from the same carnal father, we have some special bond: so in the matter at hand it must be understood.

3. To that which is objected, that in us there is nothing but soul and body; it must be said that these are considered not only in men, but adjuncts also can [be considered]; and some regard the soul more, some more the body, some more the composite, as is evident when it is said: a man is intelligent, white, and capable of laughter. The first is by reason of the soul; the second by reason of the body; the third by reason of the composite: so in the matter at hand it can be understood.

4. To that which is objected, that it is not a perpetual bond; it must be said that there are two things in adoption: there is *dominion* and subjection, and this can be removed through emancipation; and there is a certain *bond of honorableness*, which does not depart, from the moment it is once present in someone.