Dist. 43, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/43/q/bon-sent-IV-d43-a3-q1
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### Article III. *On the books of conscience.*

Consequently, as to the second article concerning this, inquiry is made about the books of consciences. And concerning this three things are asked.

First it is asked, whether all merits are read in the conscience, or [only] certain ones.

Secondly, whether anyone reads all things in another's conscience.

Thirdly, whether all things are seen at once by all.

### Question I. *Whether all merits are read in the conscience.*

As to the first, then, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that *all things* will be read in the books of conscience.

1. Augustine, *On the City of God*, book twenty, says that "there will be a divine power by which it will come about that all things are recalled to memory."

2. Likewise, this same thing seems [to hold] by *reason*: because reading is for the sake of knowing the quantity of merits; but the merit of a man is read in such a way that it may be known how many and how great goods, and how many and how great evils, he has done: therefore if justice is there to be fully shown, it is clear that all things ought to be read there.

3. Likewise, God's justice will be declared there supremely and as to the retribution of glory and punishment: therefore merits ought to be supremely declared; but they cannot be, unless all goods and evils are recalled to memory: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** That *not all things* [are read] seems [true]:

1. Because there will be there only the memory of those things for which there will be retribution; but for evils, for which there was penance, retribution will not be made, [and] for goods, in which one has not persevered, retribution will not be made: therefore such things will not be read.

2. Likewise, the memory of past goods generates delight, [the memory] of evils, horror: therefore if in the evils there will be no delight, they ought not to recall the good deeds done; and if in the goods [there is] no horror, they ought not to recall the evils.

3. Likewise, only those things will be read in the books which are written; but the evils of the good have been blotted out through grace, [and] the goods of the evil have been blotted out from their soul through fault: therefore neither these nor those will be read in the books.

> **Conclusion.** Of all merits there will be in the books of conscience a reading and a memory.

**I respond:** It must be said that of all merits there will be there a reading and a memory: because, as the

Apostle says, "there will be *thoughts accusing and defending*," and thus goods and evils will be manifest there, and consequently affections and operations. — But all things will be brought back to memory, because the recalling of prior acts and thoughts to memory will be for the showing of divine *justice* according to *that* [present] state, and of *mercy* according to the *past* or bygone state. On account of the showing of *justice* in retributing, there will be recalled the goods and evils in which they persevered *finally*; for these alone are worthy of retribution. On account of the showing of *mercy* concerning the *past*, there will be recalled the evils of the good, from which they were mercifully freed, and the goods of the evil, which God mercifully worked in them, *who makes his sun to rise upon the good and the evil*. Therefore all their goods and evils will be in their memory.

1. To that, then, which is objected first, that that reading and remembering is for the showing of justice; it must be said that this is true, but not only for this, but also for the declaration of mercy.

2. To that which is objected, that the memory of evils causes sadness, and of goods gladness; it must be said that this is true in those who can be sad and glad; but the evil cannot be glad, and the good cannot be sad. — But this does not suffice, because, if they cannot be sad: therefore neither [can they] know whence they ought to be sad. — Therefore it must be said that the memory of evils can be twofold: either by considering the *evil outcome*, and thus it generates sadness, as is clear in one who is contrite; or by considering the *good outcome*, namely that from such great evils one was mercifully rescued, and this generates gladness, and this will be in the good. Likewise concerning the memory of goods a distinction must be made.

3. To that which is objected, that in the evil the goods have been blotted out; it must be said that they have been blotted out as to the *truth of essence*, yet they remain as to the *mark and likeness*, as is clear in one who has lost charity and remembers that he had it. Hence upon that [passage] to the Romans, chapter two: *Of thoughts accusing*, the Gloss says: "It must be known that on that day the thoughts will accuse or defend the soul, not those which will then be, but these which now are in us, whose marks and seals are left in our heart as in wax; which, now placed in secret, are said to be revealed on that day," and thus they remain according to a likeness. — Or granted that that likeness be utterly blotted out, which is scarcely possible; by divine power it is then restored, for the glory of God and the punishment of the evil, [and] the praise of the good.