Dist. 43, Art. 3, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/43/q/bon-sent-IV-d43-a3-q3
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### Question III.
### *Whether all things are seen at once by all.*

Thirdly it is asked whether all things are seen *at once* by all. And that they are, it seems:

1. Because on that passage of Job, chapter eight: *They shall be clothed with confusion*, the Gloss [says]: "When the judge has been seen, all evils are set before the eyes of the mind."

2. Likewise, it seems by reason: because the whole punishment is inflicted all at once, therefore the fault too will be known and weighed at once: therefore, if the magnitude of the fault depends on the acts and the circumstances and their repetition, all these things must be made manifest at once.

3. Likewise, there is greater confusion and grief in the memory of two things than of one, and of all than of some evils; and conversely, greater joy concerning goods: therefore, if the good will have perfect joy, the wicked [will have] perfect confusion; it is clear that all things will lie open to all at once.

**On the contrary:** 1. "We understand one thing only," as the Philosopher says: therefore not several things at once: therefore not all things will be able to be seen at once.

2. Likewise, in the damned their nature will not be better than it now is: therefore, if their intellect now cannot understand several things at once, neither then will it be able to; but if it will then be able to, then it will have been elevated.

3. Likewise, in the judgment there will be an examination, which is of one before another: therefore the recollection of one will come before that of another.

> **Conclusion.** All will see all their sins suddenly, or at once, and more probably at once.

**I respond:** It must be said that all will see all their sins *suddenly*, or *at once*, and it is rather to be believed that [they will see them] *at once*. — For the understanding of which it must be noted that *to see at once* many things as many can be so in three ways: either by reason of that *in which* one sees, because he sees many things by one thing; and thus in the eternal mirror there is a seeing of many things, because through the same [mirror] a man there sees diverse things. Or by reason of the *elevation of the intellect*, which is made deiform through glory; whence it sees more, like God also, though not in every manner; just as a blessed Angel at once knows God *in himself* and the creature *in God* and in its *proper kind*. Or by reason of *the divine power doing this*; which nevertheless does not confer glory, so as to show it the eternal exemplar, but raises the intellect so that it can [attain] something above itself, whether unto glory or unto punishment. — By these *three* modes the *good* souls will see at once *in the judgment*, and by the first *two* modes *in the fatherland*; but by the *third* alone the *wicked* souls [will see] *in the judgment*. — But whether *afterwards* they thus see [things] in hell, this I do not determine, though it may not improbably be said [to be so], so that the punishment of the worm may be complete and uniform.

1. To that which is objected, that we understand one thing only; it must be said that this is true *by nature*; but this mode of understanding will be by *divine power*.

2. To that which is objected, that the cognitive [power] in the damned ought not to be elevated; it must be said that that elevation is rather a *lowering*, namely in the display of all [their] foulnesses. For just as the recollection of many goods amplifies gladness, so the recollection of many evils amplifies sadness.

3. To that which is objected, that there will be an examination; it must be said that, although the examination be made singly concerning individual [sins], because all things cannot be said at once, nevertheless unto [their] confusion there will be at once a memory of many things. Nor is it a wonder, because the cognitive power is more powerful than the expressive or interpretative [power]; for we understand at once what we cannot express in a long time.

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