Dist. 44, Part 1, Art. 2, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/44/q/bon-sent-IV-d44-p1-a2-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the matter of each member rises again in its own member, or indifferently in any member.*

Secondly it is asked, as regards the members, what rises again in what — namely, whether the matter of each member [rises again] in its own, or indifferently in any. And [the arguments] that [it does] *not [rise] in its own:*

1. Augustine seems to say, and it is held in the text, that it does not matter whether a part of the matter returns to its own place, as is the case in the casting of a statue.

2. Likewise, there is a *demonstrative reason* for this, because that matter is in perfect obedience with respect to the Creator: therefore if it itself does nothing, and the Creator does no violence, but [wills] only that the whole be repaired and duly so, like a good craftsman; therefore it seems that without difference the matter of one member could rise again in another.

3. Likewise, another reason for this is that the disposition is contracted in the body for rising again from its union with the soul: therefore since any part is united to the whole soul, because the whole soul is in any part, any part has indifference toward the whole.

4. Likewise, if it is necessary that [it rise] in the same [member] — but suppose that someone has too large a head, then it would be necessary to rise again in the same deformity; but this is unfitting.

**On the contrary:**

1. Ezekiel 37: *The bones came together to the bones, each one to its own joint:* therefore if the form of the future resurrection is fittingly signified there, it is clear, etc.

2. Likewise, it appears *by reason:* because the resurrection is of the same [body]; but if a hand were made from the matter of a foot, it would not be of the same; so neither would any other part [be the same], if it were made from another, and thus neither would the whole be the same: therefore since this is unfitting, it is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, the resurrection is unto reward; but it happens that one member is nobler than another, and further, that one merits more by one than by another: therefore if no prejudice ought to be done to anyone, that part of matter ought to rise again in that member which was previously there.

4. Likewise, as the whole body stands to the whole soul, so the eye [stands] to the power of sight, as the Philosopher says; but it is necessary that the matter of the whole body be fitted to this soul, such that [it is] not [fitted] to another: therefore also the matter of the power of sight [be fitted] to this [soul], and not to another; and thus the matter of this member will rise again determinately in this member.

### Conclusion

> *Each member will be reformed from its own proper matter, insofar as it is of its substance, not of its superfluity.*

**I respond:** It must be said that in a member, or in its matter, there is something to consider that is of substance and perfection, [and] something that is of superfluity — just as some members have more of matter than is fitting for the form of the member. If [it be considered] in the first way, then I say that each member will be reformed from its own proper matter; for reformation corresponds to formation. Hence the reformation is of the same and from the same [thing] of which and from which the formation was. — But if [it be considered] as regards superfluity, it must then be said that that [portion] of the matter which is superfluous in one part will be dispersed throughout the whole, so that thus one member may not abound over another, except as much as it ought.

1. And thus Augustine speaks, which is clear; for he speaks of the superabundant growth of those things which ought to rise again.

2. To that which is objected, that that matter is in perfect obedience; it must be said that it is true; yet the Creator does not will to do [anything] except what it is fitting for Him to do; and it is fitting that each member be made from its own matter. — And some render a reason for this from the *diverse appetites* which are in the dust. Whatever, however, may be the case about this, nevertheless this comes from the ordination of the perfect craftsman, that He may repair [it] from the same matter and in the same order.

3. To that which is objected, that any part is united to the whole soul; it must be said that the soul is *perfection* as regards substance, and *mover* as regards its powers; and although the soul is not composite, but rather simple as regards substance, it nevertheless has a multitude of powers, by reason of which it is related to diverse organs. Since therefore the body is ordered to resurrection in both ways — both inasmuch as it regards the soul as *perfection* and as *mover*; and as regards the aspect of mover there is distinction: therefore the matter of the members will rise again distinctly in their own places.

4. To that which is objected last, the response is already clear. For I say that that which is superfluous in some part will be dispersed throughout the whole; nor will it make diversity in the body, but will remove deformity; and this is to be understood as regards the bodies of the elect.

Thus therefore it is clear what rises again in what, according to the words of blessed Augustine, on which one ought rather to rely, especially in this matter, than even on reason. Nevertheless both to the first problem and to the last it could easily be responded, if one is willing to look to the *seminal reasons,* into which the resolution is made, which will be preserved in one part with respect to the whole, if there be a craftsman who can draw [them] out; and therefore, since God works this even above nature, what wonder is it if, however little of the flesh may remain, He should refashion the whole? Nor could it ever be so divided but that a little would suffice for each; this I say according to the operation of God, not according to the operation of nature, as is better shown elsewhere, namely in the second book.

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