Dist. 44, Part 1, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/44/q/bon-sent-IV-d44-p1-dubia
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## DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Dub. I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first it is asked about what he says, that *to those rising again the same stature is not assigned, but age.* For it seems to be badly said: because quantity is twofold, namely *of time* and *of extension*; but those who had a different quantity of mass will rise again in different [quantities]: therefore those who had a different age will rise again in different [ages]. — Likewise, it is impossible that what is past should not be past: therefore it is impossible that someone who had a hundred years should not have had a hundred: therefore it is impossible that he should have only thirty-two years. But Christ rose again at this age: therefore it is impossible for the aged to rise again at this age. — Likewise, if age is reckoned for those rising again, then either from the instant of *birth* or of *resurrection*. If from the instant of *birth*, then there will be more than a hundred years, indeed more than a thousand in some; if from the instant of *resurrection*, then no one will have even one hour, much less thirty years. — Likewise, the Lord will take away nothing from anyone's quantity of *mass*, but will add to those who have less: therefore by parity of reasoning concerning *age*, since *old age is venerable*.

To all these it must be responded that the age of those rising again can be understood in two ways: either by comparison to the *beginning of duration*, as it is assigned to us now according to the reckoning from the beginning of our *being*; and in this way age is not reckoned in those rising again, because they have passed through every age and are outside such a state. In another way age is regarded according to the *disposition and health of the body*; and in this way youthful age is taken. For all such and so great will rise again in a body such as they would have been at the youthful age; and thus *age* does not name *duration*, but *the disposition of the body*. For if God were now to create a man in that condition and state which a man has in his thirtieth year, then he would be said to create at a virile age, not by reason of the reckoning of time, but of the condition of the body. And by these things the objections are made clear.

#### Dub. II.

Likewise it is asked about what he says: *That it might signify the perfection of powers.* For it seems to be badly said; since, if a woman is not a man, neither as to sex nor as to the perfection of powers, because the female sex bears witness to weakness; therefore it seems that a woman does not rise again in any way. — Likewise, as the Philosopher says, «a woman is a misbegotten man»: therefore if misbegotten things do not rise again in nature as regards the elect, neither will women rise again. — Likewise, in the resurrection they will be as the *Angels of God*, and this will be because the body will be conformed to the soul; but in the Angels there is no distinction of sex, nor in souls: therefore etc. — Likewise, the distinction of sex is for the sake of generation; but there there will be no generation: therefore etc.

I respond: It must be said that, as Augustine says in the twenty-second [book] *of the City of God*, some wished to say that the female sex will not rise again on account of the aforesaid authority of the Apostle: *Until we all meet into a perfect man*; but as he himself says, there "man" is said not from *sex*, but from *virtue*, not of the body, but of the mind, in which manner  a woman is made a man, in which manner it is said in the Psalm: *Blessed is the man who has not walked in the counsel* etc.; which can also be understood of a woman. And therefore that authority does not deny the resurrection of women; rather manifest reason confirms it. For since the female sex is natural and formed by God, who formed the male — which is clear, because without it there would not be the perfection of the species — and in our bodies «nature will be preserved, and the defects will be taken away»: just as men will rise again with the male sex, not for the sake of generation, but for the sake of perfection and beauty as regards the elect, so [will] women in the female sex; because then from those members all disgrace and dishonor will be entirely removed, and what excited to lust will excite to the praise of God.

To what is therefore first objected, that he states a defect of powers; it must be said that this is only according to the present state, but there sex will be retained and weakness will be removed.

To what is objected, that a woman is a misbegotten man; it must be said that there is a speaking about the *universal intention of nature*, and thus a woman is [part] of the intention of nature, which intends to preserve the species; and there is a speaking about the *intention of the singular nature*, which desires to make a thing as much better and more perfect as it can, and that it does not do so, this is beside the intention on account of some occurring occasion. And in this way it is here, because nature would make a man from the seed, if it could; but because either there is a defect in the power and heat, or also there is a weak coagulation in the seed, or it is not directly received in the womb; hence it is that a woman is generated and is called a *misbegotten man*. Yet because it is necessary for this occasion to occur, nor can nature be preserved in *being* without it; therefore nature, which intends to be preserved, intends both sexes. And thus that is clear.

To that which is objected, that they will be as *Angels*; it must be said that there is not an entire likeness, but as to this, that they will be immune from the works of the flesh.

To that which is objected, that there will be no generation; it must be said that just as there will be a generative power not for the use of generating, but for the perfection of the man; so also the genital members will be for the perfection of the body.

#### Dub. III.

Likewise it is asked about what he says, that *it is not right to say that in the resurrection magnitude accrues to the body.* For it seems false, because a dwarf neither had nor was going to have sufficient magnitude in this life: therefore good dwarfs, whose bodies are deformed, will be thus in the heavenly fatherland. — Likewise, he who lacks hands was never going to have hands: therefore he will rise again without hands: therefore an addition of functional members can be made, because he will not rise again without hands. But if this, it seems much more strongly [so] on the part of uniform members, as of greater stature.

I respond: It must be said that immediately, from when the human body was generated, it was determined how much it ought to be in *mass*, although we do not perceive it; because the whole is already there in its formal principle (*ratione*); but to be in the formal principle is to be in the *quantity of power*, which is distinguished against the *quantity of mass*; and this is to be according to the potency of the *augmentative power*. Therefore as much as nature can augment this one, who is now a little child, so much he ought to be in his *formal principle*, and so much he will be in *mass*, unless he is impeded by an occasion. — According to this it must be understood that the *quantity of the formal principle* in something can *fall short* of the state befitting the species, or *superabound*, or *suffice*. That it *suffice*, this is of the integrity of nature; and then it is said to *suffice*, when it can produce as much body as befits human nature, which has determinate limits, whether in smallness or in magnitude; among which the stature of Christ is believed to hold the middle as most perfect. And as long as one does not depart from that stature, such that deformity is generated, the augmentative power or *quantity of the formal principle* is called *sufficient*, and each one will rise again according to the stature befitting that quantity. — But if one *departs* so far, such that deformity is generated either in excess or in defect; it must be said that then the *quantity of the formal principle* was *occasioned*, and was not  perfect, but vitiated; and therefore it must then be diminished or added to, not for a *change of nature*, but rather for the *removal of the defect*.

And thus the whole is clear, because Augustine speaks with the integrity and perfection of nature preserved. Hence he gives generally to understand that, as regards the *quantity of the formal principle*, there will be neither addition nor subtraction, unless there has also been a deformity of defect. As regards the *quantity of mass*, there will be *addition* in those in whom it was not brought to the *quantity of the formal principle*; nor is it necessary that the Lord bring matter from elsewhere for perfecting [it], but it is possible that from that one [body] he draw out the whole; just as it is believed that he multiplied five loaves without any adding among five thousand men by infinite power. — Yet it can be that he adds from elsewhere, and perhaps he did so in those loaves, and each was a miracle. Yet another [view] seems more probable.

#### Dub. IV.

Likewise it is asked about that example of Augustine: *But just as, if a statue of any meltable metal* etc. For it seems that this example is not valid: because the artifact is one thing and that statue which was first cast is another, and [another] that which was cast afterward: therefore it seems, if God restores in this way, that the man afterward was other than before.

To this some wish to say that the example of Augustine is perfectly conformable as regards the *mode* and the *identity* of the restoration and of the thing restored: as to the *mode*, because it is not necessary that the individual [parts] return to their own places; as to the *identity*, because, just as in the statue the underlying matter is the same, cast once and again, but the artificial form is other; so in the body of the resurrection the matter is the same, but the form of the flesh and the generated accidents are other; but nevertheless the man is not other, because the ultimately completive form and the primary matter are, according to substance, one and the same. Hence if the statue had a soul, it would say: *I am renewed*, because it would have the same *matter* and the same *ultimate form*, although it would not have the intermediate [ones]. Thus also in the case at hand they say it holds, that the *intermediate* forms repeated are other; yet the man is the same, especially by reason of the *form*, because the whole account of personhood comes from the side of the soul.

But nevertheless this does not suffice, for the reason that the resurrection is said to be of *human bodies* more properly than of *composites*. If therefore the resurrection ought to be of the same [thing], it is necessary that the human body be the *same*; but a body is never the same, unless the *flesh* be the same: therefore it must be that the *flesh*, which is an *intermediate* form, be the same; by parity of reasoning also concerning the other intermediate forms; and if it must be that the *flesh* be the same, it must be that the *functional parts*, such as hand and foot, be the same. — Further, in Job the nineteenth it is expressly said: *In my flesh I shall see God, my Saviour*: therefore the flesh will be the same. Therefore the example of Augustine does not seem correct.

And therefore it must be said to this, that the works of God alone do not find a perfect likeness in our works, especially this one, since it is *above nature* to repeat numerically the same form; therefore it must not be understood that this example is adduced as regards this [point], but only as regards this, that just as a created artificer restores from the matter of the same statue a *similar* statue, in such a way that it is not necessary that the parts return to the same places; so God restores from the matter of your body a body which is not only *like*, but *the same* in substance; nor is it necessary that the individual [parts] return to the individual members, where there is a superabundance which would generate unseemliness, because as regards this Augustine speaks, as is clear in the text.

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