Dist. 44, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/44/q/bon-sent-IV-d44-p2-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the existence and place of hell.*
### Question I. *Whether there is a hell.*

First, then, is the question whether an eternal torment is to be posited, which we call hell. And that there is not, it seems.

1. Deuteronomy, chapter twenty-five: *According to the measure of the sin shall be also the measure of the stripes*; but no one sins eternally: therefore no one is tormented eternally.

2. Likewise, Isaiah, chapter twenty-four: *They shall be gathered together into the gathering of one bundle, and after many days they shall be visited*; but the gathering of the wicked is on the day of judgment, according to what is said in Matthew, chapter thirteen: therefore the visitation will be after the judgment. But it will not be for the intensifying of the punishment, therefore it will be for liberation: therefore they will not be tormented eternally.

3. Likewise, this same thing seems [to be shown] through the New Testament, Matthew, chapter seven: *With what measure you have measured, it shall be measured back to you*; it is agreed that this is said with respect to the punishment of sin; but the measure of every sin is finite, since it is [wrought] by a finite power: therefore the punishment of sin is finite: therefore there is no eternal torment.

4. Likewise, James, chapter two: *Mercy exalts itself above judgment*: therefore God is more merciful than just in effect: therefore, if to punish eternally is [an act] of the greatest severity, it is impossible that God should punish eternally.

5. Likewise, this same thing seems [to be shown] by reason: for, in order that a judgment be just, there is required a just order, a just cause, and a just disposition. Now a disposition is called just which punishes not from a lust for vengeance, but for the sake of some good: therefore God does not intend vengeance, but rather correction. If then the divine intention is not frustrated, a man is at some point corrected while he is punished by God; but when he has been corrected, he no longer needs to be punished: therefore it is necessary that the punishment itself be terminated.

6. Likewise, it belongs to one supremely merciful to liberate from the greatest misery; but the greatest of miseries is the punishment owed to the damned: therefore God liberates from it: therefore he torments no one eternally; and so an eternal torment is not to be posited, and through this neither a hell.

**On the contrary:** 1. Isaiah, the last chapter: *Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be extinguished*: therefore they will be tormented eternally, without end: therefore a hell and an eternal torment are to be posited.

2. Likewise, Matthew, chapter twenty-five: *Go, you cursed, into eternal fire*; but eternal fire we call eternal punishment: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it seems by reason: for, if of two contraries it is [possible] to find one of the extremes and a mean, it is necessary to posit the other extreme — for this is the root and the way of establishing contraries among the philosophers — but there is to be posited a perfect beatitude in the fatherland and a middle state on the way, between beatitude and perfect misery: therefore there is to be posited a perfect misery after this life; and this we call hell: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, sin is opposed to the merit of justice; but to merit is owed eternal glory, according to what is said in the second [letter] to the Corinthians, chapter four: therefore to sin also [is owed] an eternal punishment, by *the topic from proportion transposed*, or *by consequence in it*; for, as merit stands to reward, so demerit to punishment; and *again*, « *if the opposite [is] in the opposite, then the proposed [is] in the proposed* »:

5. Likewise, he who sins mortally prefers a changeable good to an eternal and infinite good, therefore he despises and offends the infinite good; but the offense is as great as is he who is offended: therefore, since he is infinite, the offense must be judged infinite. Since therefore the punishment must be proportioned to the offense, it is necessary that for mortal sin an infinite punishment be rendered; but it cannot be rendered infinite in intensity, but in duration: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, as God is supremely merciful, so he is supremely just; as therefore it belongs to one supremely merciful to have mercy supremely and to manifest his mercy supremely, so also it belongs to one supremely just to punish supremely and to manifest his justice through an effect: if therefore infinite justice cannot be manifested except through an infinite effect, it seems that to some sinners an infinite torment must be rendered. But there cannot be an immense [i.e. infinitely intense] torment: therefore it is necessary that there be an eternal torment; and this we call hell: therefore etc.

### Conclusion
> In hell an eternal torment is to be posited.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that some have denied hell to be, on the ground that they said *there is no torment* after this life. — And a manifest reason convicts the error of these men, since the equity of justice and right reason so dictate, that evil ought not to remain unpunished. If then many sin in this life who in this life are not tormented, but rather rejoice and are glad: therefore it is necessary either that they be tormented after this life, or that the order of the universe be destroyed, or that the divine justice be negligent and remiss concerning the punishment of sin.

Others, however, have denied hell to be, on the ground that they denied that the impious are tormented eternally, although after this life some torment remains for them. For they said that the divine mercy cannot bear this, that its own creature, which it does not hate but loves, should be in punishments eternally, since he himself takes no delight in our punishment nor is sated with our torments; nor does anything stand in the way but that he can well liberate from the punishments, without any prejudice, those who are punished. And if at some time Scripture threatens sinners with eternal punishment, this, they say, is not said according to *the truth of the promise*, but according to *the terror of the threat*, by which God intends to liberate the wicked from their sins.

Now this was the error of Origen and of his followers, which is the more monstrous the more merciful and compassionate it seems: on the ground that it blasphemes the divine justice, while it diminishes it, while it grants so much to mercy that it leaves no place for justice. — Secondly, indeed, because it empties out our hope. For if Scripture threatens sinners with punishment not according to truth, but in order to deter, what reason is there why we should not also understand [it] to promise rewards not according to truth, but in order to allure to the work of justice? And through this the whole of Scripture and our faith could be judged empty and frivolous.

And therefore the third position is the reasonable and faithful one, that an eternal torment is to be posited; and this the divine *Scripture* manifestly declares, *faith* confirms, and *right reason* agrees. And that *Scripture declares [it]*, and that *faith consents [to it]*, this is plain from the objections. — That *reason* also *agrees*, this is evident, because [reason] dictates this both by way of *congruity* and of *necessity*. For to posit an eternal torment makes for the *completion of the universe* and the *just judgment of God*. But the first is the reason of congruity, the second of necessity.

For it is congruous that the beauty of the universe be adorned with certain antitheses, so that, as to the good are rendered eternal goods, so also to the wicked eternal punishments. — It is also necessary for the preserving of the order of justice, that to each one be rendered according to his own merits, when it shall have come to the judgment. Now the sinner, when he sins, sins *against the eternal and infinite good*; and from this he is worthy of eternal torment. While he perseveres in sin, he sins *in his eternal*, that is, in an eternal purpose of sinning; and when he shall have died, there is no longer any place for merit, and through this neither for remission of sin, and therefore there is always guilt; and since guilt is ordered unto punishment, it must always be in punishment. Since therefore he sins *against the eternal good*, therefore he is worthy of eternal torment, but because [he sins] *in his eternal*, therefore he attains eternal torment. — And this is one complete reason, which is gathered from Gregory and Augustine. For Gregory says in the fourth [book] of the Dialogues that the sinner is therefore to be tormented eternally, because he sins in his eternal. But Augustine says that he is therefore punished eternally, because he sinned *against the eternal good*. And that this is just, he shows through this example in human judgments and laws, where it is said that one who sins against the commonwealth « by some great crime should die by death, not because the laws should reckon as his punishment the delay in which he is slain, since it is a very brief hour, but because they remove him forever from the society of the living ». — Thus therefore the reasons showing hell to be are to be granted.

1. To that which is objected concerning the commensuration of punishment and guilt; it must be said that in punishment there are two [things], namely *duration* and *intensity*, and the intensity corresponds to the intensity of the lust, but the duration to the duration of the sin. And because sin, although it be finite, nevertheless endures unto infinity; therefore it is punished by a punishment *finite* in harshness, yet *infinite* in duration.

2. To that which is objected concerning the visitation and the gathering, it must be said that there are two ways of speaking of the gathering: either of the gathering *in becoming*, or *in accomplished being*. If *in becoming*, thus they are gathered daily as to their souls; if *in accomplished being*, thus they will be gathered at the judgment as to their souls and bodies. And of the first gathering Isaiah speaks, after which there is a visitation at the judgment for the increase of the punishment; but of the second there is the discourse in Matthew, after which there is no visitation, but eternal damnation.

3. To that which is objected concerning the measure of retribution, it must be said that, according to what Augustine says, this is understood not with respect to « the *commensuration* in *quantity*, but with respect to the *likeness* in *quality*, so that they who did evil should receive evil ». — Or it can be said that this is understood with respect to a comparison of *proportionality*, not with respect to an equality of *proportion*, so that a great punishment corresponds to a great guilt, not that the punishment is precisely as great as the guilt. — Or it must be said, as was said before, that this is understood with respect to *harshness*.

4. To that which is objected, that mercy exalts itself above judgment; it must be said that that is true when it is the time of mercy, as, for instance, in the present, but in the future it will be the time of justice, according to that [word]: *When I shall have taken a time, I will judge justices*. — Otherwise it can be said that it is understood of mercy in merit, through which one merits to escape the severity of the divine justice.

5. To that which is objected, that a just disposition does not punish from love of vengeance; it must be said that God punishes from love of *justice*, not of *vengeance*; and although he does not punish unto correction, he punishes nevertheless unto the manifestation of justice. For the corrigible are to be punished in one way, the incorrigible in another. — If nevertheless it is sometimes read *that God takes vengeance on his enemies* and avenges himself on them; this is not to the prejudice of justice: for, since he himself is justice, *to avenge himself* is nothing other than to preserve justice. Now this does not befall in man, who is not justice, although he be just; therefore he ought not to desire to avenge himself.

6. To that which is objected last, that it belongs to one supremely merciful to have mercy supremely; it must be said that, as God is supremely merciful, so also it is fitting that he be supremely just; and therefore the effect of the supreme mercy does not exclude the effect of justice; and on account of this God has distinguished two times for himself: one, in which he might show the infinity of his mercy, by handing over his only-begotten Son for all his enemies and by sparing all who are willing to return to him; the other, in which he might show the immensity of his justice, and this is the time which is assigned to the eternal torments.