Dist. 44, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/44/q/bon-sent-IV-d44-p2-a3-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the fire of hell afflicts the spirit.*

Secondly it is asked whether that fire is afflictive of spirits. And that it is, it seems.

1. Matthew, chapter twenty-five: *Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels;* but demons and angels are incorporeal substances, and that fire was prepared for them only for punishment and affliction: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, Gregory in the fourth book of the Dialogues: «If the devil and his angels, though they are incorporeal, are to be tormented by a corporeal fire, what wonder is it if souls too, before they receive their bodies, can be tortured by a corporeal fire»? as if he were to say: it is no wonder.

3. Likewise, this seems [to follow] from a *reason* drawn *from higher causes*: because divine justice most rightly orders all things in punishment, just as wisdom orders [them] in nature: if therefore sin is the vilest disposition, then a spirit infected with sin, in order that it be duly ordered, ought to be ordered beneath the lowest creature. If therefore the lowest creature is a corporeal substance, and the ordering of sinners is [placed] among punishments: therefore

a spiritual substance ought to be punished or afflicted by a body. If therefore everything that is fitting is possible; and what is possible and fitting ought to be posited concerning the divine work: therefore it must be posited that a spirit is afflicted through a corporeal fire.

4. Likewise, this is shown through lower causes. A soul existing in the body suffers while the body does not suffer, therefore it is passible of its own nature; but the nature of the soul is the same in the body and outside the body: therefore the soul outside the body is passible. *The proof of the major* is manifest in sleepers, who in dreams suffer most grievously while their bodies suffer nothing. — From this therefore I argue further thus: the soul outside the body is passible; but everything that suffers, suffers from something that has a repugnance through an active and repugnant quality; but spiritual things are not of this kind, but corporeal things are: therefore if it suffers, it suffers from a body. — But that spiritual things do not have an acting and suffering contrariety appears expressly through an *example*, because whiteness and blackness in the soul are not contrary. It also appears through *reason*, because things that are abstracted from material *being* are consequently abstracted from contrariety and from mutual action and passion.

**To the opposite** it is argued first on the part of the *agent*, secondly on the part of the *patient*. On the part of the *agent* thus:

1. «Every agent that acts upon something acts through contrariety and contact»; but between fire and the soul there can be neither *contact*, nor is there any *contrariety*: therefore there can be no action either. The first is manifest through the Philosopher, the second is manifest in itself.

2. Likewise, «every agent that acts upon something generates its own likeness in the patient»; whence the hot does not act upon anything unless it makes it hot; but it is impossible that the soul be hot: therefore it is impossible that fire act upon the soul. *If you say* to this that such an action is not *by nature*, but above nature, and that the fire does not act by an innate power, but by a power given to it from above; *it is objected against this* concerning that power: because that power is either *corporeal* or *spiritual*. If *corporeal*, it is still inferior to the soul: therefore it does not act upon it; if *spiritual*; but every spiritual power ought to be founded in a spiritual substance: therefore such a power ought not to *be* in fire nor ought it to be *given* to fire.

3. Likewise, that power is either *nobler* than the fire or *inferior*. If *inferior* to the fire: then it does not act upon the soul, just as neither did the fire; if *superior*: then, since a power ought not to be nobler than [its] substance, it seems that it ought not to be given to fire. *But if you say* that this is true *by nature*; *then it is asked*: why is this power given to the substance of fire rather than to some other, since it could equally well be given to a stone as to fire?

Likewise, this same thing is shown on the part of the *patient*:

4. As Augustine shows in the sixth [book] of the *Music*, it is impossible for the more noble to suffer from the less noble, because «every agent is more excellent than the patient»; but a spiritual substance is nobler than a corporeal one: therefore it does not suffer from it. *If you say to me* that through sin it has been made inferior; *against this* is what Augustine says in the third [book] of *On Free Will*, that «a spiritual substance, however much it sins, is nobler than the noblest body».

5. Likewise, the distance of sin from fire is as great as that of the soul from fire; and sin is spiritual, just as the soul is: therefore, if it is equally distant, never through sin does the soul become nearer or more apt to being acted upon: therefore, if it does not suffer from fire by nature, neither does it [suffer] by fault.

Likewise, this same thing is shown on the part of the *passion*.

6. Nothing is properly afflicted unless pain fall upon it; but upon a separated spirit pain does not fall: therefore it cannot be afflicted: therefore it does not suffer from fire. *The proof of the minor*: «Pain, as the Philosopher says,

is the sense of the division of parts by force»; but a separated spirit lacks parts, lacks division, lacks sense: therefore it lacks pain.

Likewise, this is shown on the part of the *action*.

7. Everything that punishes harms, everything that harms takes away; but from an incorporeal spirit nothing can be taken away through a body: therefore it cannot be harmed, therefore neither afflicted: therefore it does not suffer from fire.

### Conclusion

> The fire of hell afflicts spirits also, by binding them and altering their perception, the will resisting with horror.

**I respond:** For the understanding of the aforesaid it must be noted that concerning the aforesaid question there were three ways.

For some of the philosophers denied *absolutely* that an incorporeal spirit can be tormented, attending to its incorruptibility, on the ground that they held that everything incorruptible is impassible. — But that is a manifest error. For if pain is necessarily generated from *love together with the privation of the loved thing*, as when someone grieves over the death of a father, and from *hatred together with the presence of a displeasing thing*, as when someone grieves over the exaltation of an enemy; since nothing prevents *love* and the other two conditions from falling into the spiritual sense, nothing prevents *pain* from falling [into it]. — Furthermore, if «contraries are naturally apt to come to be about the same thing», and an incorporeal spirit can *rejoice*; why then can it not also *grieve*, since naturally in its mind the four affections can alternate?

And therefore the position of other modern philosophers was that a spiritual substance can grieve and suffer, not through the *action* of anything, but rather through *privation*. For they posited and held that the soul desires the highest Good, of which it can be deprived on account of evil merits in this life, and therefore from the lack of it the greatest sadness is generated in it; and this punishment they said to be after this life, and no other, just as there is no other joy for spirits except in the contemplation of the highest Good. — And this was the position of Algazel, which, although it came nearer to the truth than the aforesaid, nonetheless still falls short. For if to original sin, where there is pure privation of justice, there is owed the punishment of loss and the lack of eternal beatitude; to actual sin, which indeed consists not only in privation but also in disordered delight, there is owed not only the lack of eternal beatitude, but also some afflictive punishment. — *[margin: Conclusion.]* And therefore the Christian faith says that separated spirits are tormented not only through the absence of the highest Good, but also through the presence of an afflictive [thing]. For believing which the authority of Truth suffices, Matthew, chapter twenty-five: *Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire* etc.

*[margin: The mode of this affliction. Opinion 1.]* But understanding requires further how this can be shown by reason. And therefore some have tried to give the understanding of this matter by looking to the order of divine justice, as was touched upon in the opposing arguments. For since order is twofold, namely of *nature* and of *divine justice*, the first of *creation*, the second of *retribution*; and the soul according to nature is superior to fire, yet by the merit of sin it becomes inferior to the body: therefore divine justice both subjects the soul to fire by the merit of sin and sets fire over the soul, making it the instrument of divine justice. — And by this they wish to solve all the objections, because all are taken according to the order of *nature*, looking to the dignity of the soul and the natural power of fire; but this action belongs to fire through a power given to it, through which it is the instrument of divine justice, and the passion belongs to the soul on account of the demerit of sin. —

*[margin: It does not satisfy.]* But this position still does not satisfy the intellect. For we are not asking here what divine justice *can* do, but how this which it does is *consonant with nature*. — Furthermore, if the fire acts through a power given to it, why is it assigned to this action rather than earth? And it seems that earth [rather], because the sinner, since he is the lowest, ought to be subjected to the lowest creature; but earth is the lowest of all the elements and their dregs: therefore if the natural quality of fire does nothing toward acting upon the soul, but only the superadded power; if it were given to earth, it would act equally well, and the order of divine justice would there appear more clearly.

*[margin: Opinion 2.]* And therefore others wish to draw the reason on the part of *the nature of the soul itself*, which mode we can draw from Augustine in the twelfth [book] *On Genesis*, where he shows that the soul can suffer, while the body does not suffer, even the most bitter passions, as he there also proves by examples in dreams and in a certain sickness and in vexations. If therefore the soul draws with it corporeal affections and images, and through them and in them was able to suffer in the body apart from the body, even at the absence of fire; much more, when it is separated, will it be able to suffer in them and through them, with the infernal fire present; because, although there be no *corporeal* passion there, there is nonetheless an *animal* or *spiritual* passion there, which is a true passion and a true affliction, and through this a true punishment. — *[margin: It does not suffice.]* But this too does not suffice for a soul faithful [to belief], because we believe that the angelic spirits, which lack images and affections drawn from a body, are tormented by a corporeal fire. — We believe *also* that that infernal punishment is through a true *action of fire*, not through a fantastical imagination. — *Furthermore*, if a spiritual substance is certain that it cannot be harmed by fire; then the imagination of fire does not generate in it terror or passion, unless something else occur than the nature of the soul itself or a disposition contracted from a body.

And therefore, since a sufficient reason cannot be drawn on the part of *divine justice*, which would quiet our reason, nor on the part of *the soul alone*, which would accord with faith; *[margin: Conclusion 1.]* therefore a reason can be drawn by looking to *both* in this manner. «For pain, as is clear through Augustine in the fourteenth [book] of the *City of God*, is a dissent from those things which happen to us against our will». For this then, that pain be generated in the soul by something, *[margin: The four requisites.]* two things concur on the part of the *soul*, namely *perception* on the part of cognition and *detestation* on the part of affection. Likewise two things are required on the part of the *agent*: one is that it alter the perception of the soul; the other is that it adhere violently and inseparably *against the resistance of the will*. — *[margin: They are determined.]* Of these four, two are according to the order of *nature*, and the other two according to the order of *divine justice*. For that the fire alter the cognition of the soul, and that the soul perceive the action and heat of the fire; this belongs to the natural power of both; and this is clear thus. *[margin: It is explained.]* For when fire acts upon the composite of soul and body, there is a twofold passion there: one *natural*, and this is the *heating of the body*; the other *animal*, and this is the *alteration of sense*. The first passion is a true passion, because it is from the fire as truly acting; the second passion is from the soul moving itself and from the fire offering the occasion, according to what Augustine says in the sixth [book] of the *Music*. As therefore, after the soul is separated, the body can suffer from fire by a natural passion, because it can be heated and set aflame, and this through the natural power of both; so the spirit can suffer by an *animal* passion and be *altered* by the fire present through the natural power of the fire and of the soul.

Two things therefore are there through the order of *nature*, two others through the order of *divine justice*. For that the fire be indissolubly *bound* to the soul, and the soul be enclosed in it as in a prison, belongs to *divine justice*, to which it pertains to enclose a malefactor in prison. That again *the soul shrink from* the heat of the fire, which by nature cannot harm it, and *tremble with fear where there is no fear*, this belongs to *divine justice*, which makes sinners tremble by sending in the terror and horror of that thing over which by nature they are superior. And although that be [a matter] of *divine justice*, this is not *against the order of nature*, whether it be the spirit *trembling* at what is not to be trembled at, or the spirit *being bound* to a body. — And this is what Augustine intimates in the twenty-first [book] of the *City of God*, that just as the soul in the condition of man is joined to a body as giving it life, although the former is spiritual and the latter corporeal, and from that conjunction it vehemently conceives *love* toward the body; so it is bound to the fire as receiving from it *punishment*, and from that conjunction it vehemently conceives *horror* and through this also *pain*, which is true, and is caused both from the true corporeal fire and from the true application of the corporeal fire to the spirit according to the four aforesaid conditions. — These things seen, it is quite easy to reply to the objections.

1. 2. 3. As for what is objected concerning *action*, that it is through contrariety and contact; this is understood of *natural action*, to which corresponds a *natural passion*; and this is toward generating a like species in the patient according to nature; but here it is an *animal* passion, by which indeed a spiritual likeness is generated in the patient. Whence Gregory in the fourth [book] of the Dialogues says that souls burn in that they see the burning; yet he does not intend to say that the vision is the whole cause of the burning, but the perception of the fire

present, together with horror, generates pain, because it is not a cognition of speculation only, but rather of experience. — And through this the reply is clear to the following [objection] and also to the other reasons, because there is no need to posit there that *a created power be given to the fire*, through which it might act upon the soul.

4. 5. To that which is objected on the part of the *patient*, that the soul is nobler than the body; it must be said that just as now the fire is said to act upon the soul *joined to flesh* and there to generate pain, not because the fire is *wholly* the doer, but because through the causation of the fire the soul has the necessary occasion of acting upon itself and suffering from itself, since it is what moves itself, as Augustine says in the sixth [book] of the *Music*; so it must be understood in the *separated* soul; but what here happens by the mediation of the body, there happens immediately. Whence neither in the joined [soul] nor in the separated one does it act *by truly effecting*, but *by offering an occasion*, and yet it is truly said to *afflict* and truly to *punish*, just as it is truly said to *alter*, although the soul rather makes the species in itself than that it be made in it by any body. — Nor does this stand in the way which is objected concerning *sin*: because sin does not so dispose the spirit to passion that it makes it truly material with respect to fire, since it is superior by nature; but it earns before divine justice that, the nature of the soul being preserved, God *bind* it to the fire and by binding imprison it, and by imprisoning send in the horror of its prison, and through this the soul itself, at the presence of the prison, afflict itself with true pain and sadness.

*[margin: To be noted.]* 6. To that which is objected concerning *pain*, that it is the *division of parts*; it must be said that that is not the *general definition*, but only of the pain which belongs to the soul from the flesh; but the one that Augustine assigns [is]: «pain is a *dissent from those things*» etc. For as Augustine shows in the twenty-first [book] of the *City of God*, pain comes rather from the *impediment of the soul's operation* than from the *cutting of the body*, as is clear in paralytics, in whom there is a cutting of the parts without affliction, because the soul in them has no operation which would there be impeded; and since the powers of the soul, which are its parts, can in a certain way be disturbed and impeded in their operations by an occasion taken; hence it is that the spirit can grieve and be afflicted.

*[margin: To be noted.]* 7. To that which is objected last, that *what punishes harms and what harms takes away*; it must be said that just as in the *taking away of sin* something is taken away from the substance or power of the soul, not only from the aptitude for grace and justice; so through the punitive fire that *aptitude* is taken away, according to which the soul is apt for the joy of glory and beatitude; nor is a new [thing] always being taken away, but that taking away is the continuation of the affliction, as was said above concerning the taking away which occurs in the body. — And let these things said suffice.

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