Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/46/q/bon-sent-IV-d46-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the mitigation of the punishment of the wicked.*
### Question I. *Whether through the suffrages of the Church any mitigation is granted to the damned.*

As regards the first, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that through the suffrages of the Church some mitigation is granted to the damned:

1. First, through Augustine in the *Enchiridion*, who says that "those to whom they are of profit, are profited either to this end, that full remission be made, or that their damnation be more tolerable": therefore, if damnation is in the damned, it seems that it can be mitigated.

2. Likewise, Augustine says that the punishment of Arius is not fixed, because it is increased in proportion as those who sin by his error are multiplied; but God is more inclined to have mercy than to condemn: therefore, if in the state in which they are their punishment can be increased, it can also be diminished.

3. Likewise, it is impossible that the prayers of many should not be heard; but the Church prays for all the baptized and the faithful who die, concerning whom it is not established that they go to hell; yet many such are damned: therefore, if the Church does not pray in vain, the point is plain, etc.

4. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: because a punishment which someone bears willingly pleases God disproportionately more than that which someone bears unwillingly; but the damned man bears his punishment unwillingly, while some just man who offers suffrage for him bears it willingly on his behalf: therefore this man pays God more by suffering for that one than that one pays for himself: therefore, if the Lord remits what pleases less on account of what pleases more, the point is plain, etc.

5. Likewise, this man punishes himself out of charity and on behalf of him who is in hell: therefore God accepts this punishment for him; but *He does not punish twice for the same thing*: therefore, etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. Augustine, *On the Care to Be Had for the Dead*, says that "the suffrages of the Church are, for the very good, acts of thanksgiving; for the very wicked they are consolations of some kind for the living": therefore they do not profit the very wicked; but the very wicked are those who are in hell: therefore, etc.

2. Likewise, the authority says that "in hell there is no redemption", and the Church sings this: therefore, if there is no redemption there, it seems that there is no mitigation.

3. Likewise, the Church does not make suffrages for the damned; which is plain, because in the Body of Christ, in which there is especially the suffrage of the dead, as the Master says above in the twelfth distinction, no memorial is made except for the living, and for those who are in purgatory, and for those who are in paradise; but it would do so if it profited the damned: therefore, etc.

4. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: because the damned are not to be loved out of charity; which is plain, because they are not ordered to life: therefore, since charity makes a suffrage acceptable, no suffrage made for them is acceptable to God: therefore neither ought it to be made for them.

5. Likewise, suffrages made for the Blessed do not increase their glory, because they are at their term: therefore, since the damned are likewise at their term, they do not diminish their *punishment*.

6. Likewise, what does not diminish anything of *guilt* does not diminish anything of *punishment* either, because to so great a guilt so great a punishment is owed; but the guilt of the damned cannot be diminished: therefore, etc.

7. Likewise, if it diminishes, it does so either *extensively* or *intensively*. If *intensively*: therefore, since it is not infinite in intensity, the whole could be taken away by suffrages. If therefore *extensively*: but it is infinite in extension, and from the infinite nothing is taken away. *If you say* that it is finite on the side of the *prior*, and that the diminution comes from that, because it is a deferral of punishment: therefore *then* "the disgrace of sin is without the comeliness of justice".

### Conclusion

> *Suffrages do not profit the damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them.*

**I respond:** It must be said that it was the position of some, such as master Praepositivus, that suffrages profit the damned, yet not all of them, because not the very wicked, but the moderately wicked — such, for instance, as had good works, by which they merit to be helped by others. But they differed in the manner of the position.

For some say that they profit toward a remission of punishment as regards *interpolation*; and therefore it is not taken away wholly, but only for a short space of time. — But this position does not seem fitting. For since the disorder of guilt does not admit of intermission, how shall the reordering of punishment admit of it?

Therefore others say that remission is made *simply*, not for a time; yet nevertheless the whole punishment is never taken away, because the removal is made according to *geometrical* proportion, not according to *arithmetical* proportion — that is, when it happens, an aliquot part of the punishment is first remitted; on the second occasion just as much is taken away, not according to *quantity*, but according to *proportion*, so that if at first a hundredth part is taken away, likewise on the second and third occasion a hundredth part of what remains; and therefore something always remains. — But surely this does not solve the difficulty, because subsequent suffrages are not worth less than preceding ones: therefore they cause just as much of the punishment to be remitted according to the quantity of the punishment remitted.

Therefore a third group say that they profit not toward the removal of the whole punishment, nor toward a removal of part of the punishment by diminishing what punishes, but by *strengthening the subject*, so that it may bear it better and more tolerably. — But this opinion does not seem able to stand: because, if it is strengthened, it is either by the strength of *grace* or of *nature*; not of *grace*, this is agreed; not of *nature*, because this strength is not from nature: therefore in no way.

Therefore the opinion of others is more common and more true, namely that suffrages do not profit the damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them.

**To the arguments for the affirmative part:**

1. To that, then, which is first objected to the contrary, that they profit toward a more tolerable damnation; it must be said that he does not understand it of the damnation inflicted in *hell*, where there is no redemption, but in *purgatory*. And he means to say that they profit those in two ways: either by *freeing*, as those who have little that is combustible; or by *mitigating*, as regards those who have much.

2. To the other it must be said that the case is not alike: because remission ought to be founded upon the foundation of charity; and since Arius has an evil will, therefore his punishment can be increased and not remitted.

3. To that which is objected, that the prayers of many are heard; it must be said that where it were established to the Church that a man was damned, it would not pray; but it is not established, therefore it prays, because either it avails, if he is not damned; or, if he is damned, it *returns into her own bosom*.

4. 5. To that which is objected, that a voluntary punishment pleases God more than an involuntary one; it must be said that this is true, whence God rewards the just man for that punishment; but that voluntary punishment cannot be taken up nor accepted on behalf of him who does not have charity. And thus what follows is plain.