Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/46/q/bon-sent-IV-d46-a1-q2
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### Article I. *On the mitigation of the punishment of the damned.*
### Question II. *Whether mitigation is granted to the damned on account of the tenderness of mercy.*

Secondly it is asked whether mitigation is granted, on account of the tenderness of mercy, in the punishments of the damned. And that it is not, seems [to be the case]:

1. Because it is said in Apocalypse, chapter eighteen: *As much as she glorified herself and lived in delights, so much torment give to her.*

2. Likewise, Isaiah, chapter forty: *She has received of the hand of the Lord double;* which is said of the sinful soul.

3. Likewise, upon that text of the Psalm: *From usuries and iniquity;* the Gloss: « Sins are called usuries, because more evil is found in the punishments than was committed in the faults »: therefore there is no mitigation there.

4. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: because the delight is momentary and slight, but one is punished with an eternal and most bitter punishment; but this latter exceeds the former infinitely: therefore one is punished beyond what is deserved: therefore there is no mitigation there.

**On the contrary:** 1. In the Psalm: *Will God forget to show mercy? or will he in his anger shut up his mercies?* as if he were saying, No: therefore then he relaxes something.

2. Likewise, the sinner, when he sins mortally, offends God, from whom is every good: therefore he deserves to lose every good, and therefore also *being*: therefore, since God reduces no one to *non-being*, he punishes all short of what is deserved.

3. Likewise, the sinner offends God, from whom is all order, therefore he puts himself out of order: therefore if those who sin deserve to be set in order in punishments, they therefore deserve to be punished at once: therefore, since they are not punished at once, it is clear that they are punished short of what is deserved.

4. Likewise, the sinner offends God, who is a good infinite with every infinity, therefore he ought to be punished with an infinite bitterness of punishment; but he is not so punished: therefore he is punished short of what is deserved.

> **Conclusion.** With the divine tenderness intervening, there is some mitigation of the punishment as regards the very assessing and inflicting of it, but not after the same.

**I respond:** It must be said that the mitigation of the punishment of the damned can be understood in two ways: either as regards the *assessing* and the *inflicting* of the punishment; and in this way there is without doubt mitigation there, because the divine justice does not exact the whole, inasmuch as, with his tenderness intervening, it remits some part of the punishment in inflicting it. In another way mitigation can be understood *after the assessing and inflicting of the punishment;* and in this way no mitigation falls from the divine mercy, because from that time on the Lord closes to them the bowels of tenderness.

The reasons, therefore, which show that there is mitigation there all proceed along this way, namely as regards the *infliction;* whence they show a mitigation there as regards the things *in which* a man is punished, as regards the *time* and as regards the *measure*: because God does not *inflict* as much as the man has deserved, Lamentations, chapter three: *It is the mercies of the Lord that we are not consumed;* and again, he *defers the punishment;* and lastly, he *lessens the bitterness*: and therefore those reasons are to be conceded.

To the opposite it can be answered by a single distinction.

*To 1, 2, 3.* To that, therefore, which is objected from Scripture, which says "so much," and "double," and "more"; to all those it must be answered that delight may be compared to punishment according to a twofold comparison: either according to the *intensity of the one* in the genus of *punishment,* and *of the other* in the genus of *delight;* and thus the *punishment* is much greater than the *delight*, nor is there proportion there, but excess. There is, again, a comparing of the one to the other according to the account of *merit* or *demerit;* and thus I say that the *merit* of an inordinate delight exceeds the *punishment*, because he would be worthy to be punished more. Therefore in the punishing *proportionality* is preserved, because upon a great fault a great punishment is inflicted; but not *proportion*, because as regards *intensity* and *duration* the punishment exceeds the fault, but as regards *merit* the fault exceeds the punishment.

*To 4.* And by this the first reason is clear: because, although the delight be momentary, yet because by it an infinite good is offended, it deserves an eternal punishment.

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