Dist. 46, Art. 1, Q. 4
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/46/q/bon-sent-IV-d46-a1-q4
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### Article I. *On the mitigation of the punishment of the damned.*
### Question IV. *Whether God acts more justly with one than with another.*

Fourthly it is asked, whether God acts more justly with one than with another. And that he does *so*, it seems:

1. Because, just as it belongs to justice to punish, so it belongs to mercy to spare: therefore since he punishes one more than another, therefore he acts more justly with one than with another.

2. Likewise, by however much mercy is intensified, by so much is the rigor of justice diminished, and conversely: therefore since he acts more mercifully with one than with another, therefore also more justly.

3. Likewise, by however much this man has merited to be rewarded, by so much is it just that he be rewarded; but one has merited more than another: therefore it is more just that the one be rewarded more than the other. But God rewards according to what one has merited: therefore he rewards one more justly than the other.

4. Likewise, two men being pointed out, of whom one sins twice as much as the other, the one who sinned less merited six, the one who sinned more merited twelve; then suppose that the Lord remits two to him who sinned less, I ask: how much does he remit to him who sinned more? If *more than two*: therefore he acts more mercifully with him who sinned more, and thus one gains an advantage from wickedness; which is unfitting. But if he remits *two*, it is argued thus: that man is punished more than double and merited only double: therefore he is more deserving of four than the other is deserving of ten, because he is as deserving of six as that one is of twelve: therefore likewise of four, as that one of eight: therefore if God inflicts four on this one and ten on that one, he acts more justly with him who receives ten.

**On the contrary:** 1. That he does *not* act *more justly*, it seems: because, just as God is best, so also is he most just; but because he is best, he acts in the best way: therefore because he is most just, he acts most justly.

2. Likewise, the more just anyone is, the more he approaches the mean in judging: therefore if he is most just, he approaches the mean in the highest degree: since, therefore, in the highest degree, there is no more and less there.

3. Likewise, just as Peter is worthy of his glory, so also is Linus of his: therefore likewise on the side of punishments: if therefore he considers the worth of merits, therefore he does not act more justly with one than with another.

### Conclusion

> *As regards order in rewarding, God does not act more justly with one than with another, but most justly with all; nevertheless, as regards severity of punishment, he acts more severely with one than with another.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *justice in a work* in one way says *severity*, in another way *order*; just as *to act well* in one way says an *absolute* quality, in another way *order*. If *justice in a work* says *severity*, or an absolute quality, I say that in this way he acts more justly with one than with another, because *more severely*; and thus he makes one thing *better* than another. — In the other way justice says the *order of reward* to merit; and in this way I say that he requites most justly. For just as he orders in the best way the things which he *produces*, so in *rewarding* he orders rewards to merits in the best and most equitable way. — The first two arguments are therefore to be conceded, which show that he acts more justly because *more severely*.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 3.* As for what is objected, that by however much anyone has merited, by so much is it just that he be rewarded; I say that it is to be conceded, and this likewise: it is more just that the one be rewarded than the other, in comparison to the same reward; whence if God were to give as great a reward to Peter as to Linus, I say that he acts more justly with Peter. But he gives a greater reward to Peter and a lesser to Linus, so that Peter is not more worthy of his reward than Linus of his. Since therefore *justice* says an ordering according to the diversity of rewards, corresponding to the diversity of merits; therefore he does *not* act *more justly* with one than with another.

*To 4.* To that which is objected concerning remission, I say that if he remits two to him who merited six, he remits four to him who merited twelve, nor does he remit more *in comparison* to merit or to the diverse quantities, although *absolutely* more. — As for what he says, that one gains an advantage; it must be said that it is false, because he is always punished double. For mercy, when it runs together with justice, *remits more in absolute quantity* where there is greater misery; but nevertheless *equally*, speaking proportionally, because, as to the one, so also to the other.

**To the arguments for the opposite side:** But the arguments for the opposite side proceed concerning justice according as it says *order*; and thus, just as wisdom produces in the best way according to the order of created conditions, so justice rewards most justly according to the order of retributions.

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