Dist. 46, Dubia
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/46/q/bon-sent-IV-d46-dubia
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### DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TEXT OF THE MASTER.

#### Doubt I.

In this part there are doubts concerning the text, and first concerning what he says, that *without intermission perpetual* etc. For it seems that he speaks badly, because in Job the twenty-fourth chapter it is said: *They shall pass from the waters of snows to excessive heat*: therefore at least it seems that in that passage there is an intermission. — Likewise, upon that text of Isaiah the fourteenth chapter: *But thou art cast out*; the Gloss: « Although all souls shall at some time have rest, thou never »: and so it seems that souls do at some time rest there.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that the punishment of hell will be without any intermission; and this is plain from what is said in the Apocalypse, the fourteenth chapter: *The smoke of their torments ascendeth for ever and ever, and they have no rest day nor night.* For since there is no interruption in the fault, there ought not to be one in the punishment.

To what is objected concerning the passage, it must be said that it can be understood in two ways: either as there is a passage of a subject from one of two immediate contraries into the other, yet in such a way that it is always under one of the two contraries — thus it is understood in the case proposed; or in such a way that no succession is understood, nor even a passage with succession, but a variation together with confusion.

To what is objected concerning the Gloss, it must be said that it speaks not *absolutely*, but *conditionally*, in order to exaggerate the magnitude of that sin.

#### Doubt II.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *Which, if it were the only one, would be to be estranged from the kingdom* etc. For it seems that he speaks badly: because, as Augustine says, this is the *mildest* of all punishments: therefore he now contradicts himself.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that Augustine is speaking of those who suffer the loss and do not advert to it, or who do advert to it yet have no remorse of conscience. — Or it must be said that he compares the eternal lack of the vision of God to a temporal punishment, saying that the former exceeds every temporal one, because there is the privation of an eternal good, but here of a temporal one. But when he says that it is the *mildest*, he is speaking of the eternal punishments.

#### Doubt III.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *however evil they may be, to relax something of the punishment*. For it seems that he speaks badly, because in Ecclesiasticus the fortieth chapter: *From him that sitteth* etc.; the Gloss says: « In hell there will be no mitigation ».

**Respondeo:** It must be said that here he is speaking of a relaxation which takes place *in* the assessing of the punishment, but there of a mitigation *after* the punishment has been assessed. — Some, however, expound it as meaning that there will be no mitigation unto *deliverance*, as the Master expounds certain other authorities in the text; but that exposition seems forced. For it is one thing for a punishment to be *mitigated*, another *to be delivered from the punishment altogether*.

#### Doubt IV.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says: *How incomprehensible are his judgments!* because he seems to speak against what is said in the Psalm: *With my lips I have pronounced all the judgments of thy mouth.* For if he could *pronounce* them: therefore also *comprehend* them.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that *the judgments of God* are spoken of in two ways: in one way, the *judicial precepts* which were in the Law, which are frequently called *judgments* in the Psalm. In another way there are called judgments *the divine disposition* and *the determination of the divine counsel*, and these are inscrutable as regards the knowledge *whether it is*, before they come to be; and as regards the knowledge *on account of what*, once they have been done, unless the Spirit of God reveal it, *who searcheth even the deep things of God*. And thus it is plain that *judgment* is taken in one way here and in another there.

#### Doubt V.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *there are certain things by which he is shown to be merciful and an equitable distributor*. For it seems that he speaks badly: because the works of God do not show mercy and justice except as an effect shows its cause: if therefore mercy and justice are altogether the same cause, as he says in the text, therefore by the same effects by which he is shown to be *just*, he is shown also to be *merciful*.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that *cause* in God, although it does not state a true relation and dependence on the part of *God*, nevertheless does state a relation on the part of *the creature*; and just as on the part of *the creature* there is truth of relation, so also multiplicity; and according to the multiplicity of those relations it is possible to understand and to signify the divine essence in manifold ways. Since therefore an effect which regards *merit* has one mode, and one which regards the *effect* of mercy another; and justice and mercy connote these relations; although the *principal thing signified* is one, nevertheless that *effect* which is attributed to justice neither can nor ought to be attributed to mercy.

#### Doubt VI.

Likewise it is asked concerning what he says, that *wisdom signifies one thing, justice another* etc.; because, since it was said above that no diversity of the thing signified is asserted, it seems that he contradicts himself.

**Respondeo:** It must be said that the former is understood by reason of *what is connoted*; but what was said above is understood by reason of *the principal thing signified*. — Or it must be said that *otherness* is not noted in the thing signified absolutely, but under the manner of understanding, which is one and another, because words are signs of acts of understanding. And thus that is plain.

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