Dist. 46
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/46/q/bon-sent-IV-d46-littera
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### DISTINCTION XLVI.

### Chapter I.
#### *Whether a mitigation of punishment is granted to the utterly wicked.*

But it is asked here concerning the utterly wicked, whether they too experience God's mercy in some mitigation of their punishments, so as to be punished less than they have deserved. — Some suppose that they will have no relief of punishment; and they confirm this by the authority of James, who says: *Judgment without mercy to him who has not done mercy.* Augustine also says: « Mercy here, judgment in the future ».

Likewise, distinguishing how all the ways of the Lord are *mercy and truth*, he says: « Toward the Saints all the ways of God are mercy, toward the wicked all are truth; because both in judging He comes to aid, and thus *mercy* is not lacking, and in showing mercy He exhibits what He promised, lest *truth* be lacking. But toward all whom He frees and whom He damns, all the ways are mercy and truth, because, where He does not show mercy, the truth of vengeance is given ». By saying: *where He does not show mercy*, he gives it to be understood that something is done by God where He Himself does not show mercy. — But against these there stands what Cassiodorus says on the fiftieth Psalm, speaking of the mercy and the loving-kindness of God: « These two, he says, are always joined to the judgment of God ». Therefore even in the punishment of the wicked there is no justice without mercy. The same author says of mercy and judgment: « These two are joined to one another in mutual fellowship ». In these he briefly includes all the works of God. Augustine too, answering those who contend that the torments of the reprobate will have an end, so rejects their opinion, asserting that the reprobate are to be punished perpetually, that he does not deny that their torments are to some extent mitigated. « In vain, he says, do some, out of human feeling, pity the eternal punishment of the damned and their unceasing perpetual torments, and thus do not believe that it will be so — not indeed by opposing the divine Scriptures, but by softening, according to their own impulse, whatever is harsh and bending it into a milder judgment, since they think that in those Scriptures such things are said more terribly than truly. *For God will not*, they say, *forget to show mercy, nor will He withhold His mercies in His anger.* This indeed is read in the Psalm, but it is understood of those who are *vessels of mercy*, because they too are freed from misery not according to their own merits but by God's showing mercy. Or if they think that this pertains to all, it is not on that account necessary that they should suppose that the damnation can be ended of those of whom it is said: *These shall go into everlasting punishment*; lest in this way the happiness of those be thought to have an end, of whom on the contrary it is said: *But the just into life everlasting.* But let them suppose, if it pleases them, that the punishments of the damned are at certain times to some extent mitigated. And thus indeed it can be understood that *the anger of God remains* upon them, that is, the *damnation* itself. For this is called *the anger of God*, not a disturbance of the divine mind; so that in His anger, that is, while His anger remains, He does not withhold His compassions — not by giving an end to the eternal torment, but by applying or interposing a relief to the torments; because the Psalm does not say *to end* His anger, or *after* His anger, but *in* His anger. And if this alone were *to be estranged from the kingdom of God, to lack the great multitude of the sweetness of God*; yet so great is the punishment that no torments which we know can be compared to it, if that one be eternal, while this one be long for however many ages ». « There will therefore remain without end the perpetual death of the damned, and it will be common to them all, just as there will remain in common for all the eternal life of the Saints ». — Behold, thus he asserts here that the punishments of the reprobate are not to be ended, which he does not disapprove, if it be said that some relief is applied to their torment. Whence it can not incongruously be said that God, even though He could justly do so, does not punish the wicked in the future altogether as much as they have deserved, but relaxes something of the punishment for them, however wicked they may be.

What therefore has been said — that *judgment without mercy is done to him who has not done mercy* — can be understood thus: that the judgment of damnation will be done to him who has not done mercy, for this reason, that he was without mercy; or judgment will be done to him without a mercy that frees and saves, who nevertheless will experience God's mercy in some alleviation of his punishment. So too, when it is said: mercy here, judgment in the future; it is not denied that in the future there is an effect of mercy both in the elect, who through mercy will be freed from all misery, and in the reprobate, who will be tormented less than they have deserved. But not without cause is it said that *God's mercy is done here*, and *judgment in the future*; because here too God shows mercy in many ways in which He will not show mercy then; for now He calls sinners and justifies them, which then He will not do; and then, rendering to each according to his merits, He will judge *manifestly*, who now judges *secretly*.

### Chapter II.
#### *On the hidden judgment of God.*

Of which « the hidden judgment, as Augustine says, is understood to be the punishment by which each one is either exercised unto purgation, or moved unto conversion, or, if he despises it, blinded unto damnation ». God's hidden judgment is therefore called a *punishment*, because He judges by purging, by converting, by blinding. God's *judgments* are also sometimes called His dispositions concerning all things; whence: *How incomprehensible are His judgments!* and, *His judgments are a great deep.* But the judgment by which He will judge in the future is understood as the sentence, because *the threshing-floor will be winnowed*, that is, the good will be divided from the wicked locally by the ministry of the Angels; and these will be led into life, those sent into punishment, who now are mingled together.

### Chapter III.
#### *On the justice and mercy of God.*

But how did Cassiodorus above call God's justice and loving-kindness, that is His mercy, *two things*, which are always joined to God's judgment? For God's justice and mercy are not *two things*, but *one thing*, that is the divine essence, as has been shown above by many authorities: because for God to be merciful is not other than mercy, nor to be just other than justice, but altogether the same. Nor is it other to be merciful than to be just, or mercy than justice, but wholly the same; because these things are said of God not *denominatively*, but *essentially*. Why then does Scripture say of the works of God that some are of mercy, some of justice? For if God's justice is mercy, then whatever are works of mercy seem to be works of justice, and conversely. — To these it can be answered thus: by those manners of speaking in which distinctions of works of this sort are made, so that some are attributed to mercy, some to justice, some to goodness, no diversity of the *underlying subject*, that is, of the thing signified by these words, is expressed, but a variety of senses and of effects in *creatures* is shown. For when God is called *just* or *justice*, the divine essence is predicated; and also it is given to be understood that He is the distributor and judge of merits. So too, when He is called *merciful*, the divine essence is predicated, and moreover it is given to be understood that He is the liberator of the wretched. Likewise, when He is called *good*, the divine essence is predicated, as when He is called *God*, and moreover He is shown to be the author of all good things. So too, when He is called *God*, the divine essence is predicated, and He is shown to be one to be feared. Hence therefore some are called *works of mercy*, some *of justice*, not as though the divine essence did not work both these and those, and as though both these and those were not works of the divine essence, which is called mercy and justice; but because there are some by which He is shown to be *judge* and *equitable distributor*, and some by which He is shown to be *one who takes pity* — for He is called *merciful* in nature, *one who takes pity* in the showing of it — and in some works the effect is said to be of *mercy*, in some the effect of *justice*, not that God's justice effects one thing and His mercy another, if you refer them to the essence, but because from certain effects He is understood as *judge*, from certain others as *one who takes pity*, or, as it pleases some, *just* and *merciful*.

But according to this a question arises: how is He shown *just* from some works and *merciful* from others, since for Him to be *just* and to be *merciful* is the same? For if He is called *just* and *merciful* according to the same account, then from that work by which He is understood *just*, He is understood *merciful*, and conversely. — But I said above that, when God is called *just* and *merciful*, the same divine essence is thus signified, and according to it the same thing is predicated, yet in such a way that certain diverse things are also understood. For by this we understand Him as *one who takes pity* and as *a just judge*. This Origen evidently shows, saying: « All the things that are God's, Christ is: He is His wisdom, He His strength, justice, holiness, He prudence. But since it is one in the underlying subject, it is named by diverse words according to the variety of senses. For *wisdom* signifies one thing, *justice* another. For when *wisdom* is spoken of, He is understood to instruct you in the disciplines of things divine and human; when *justice*, the distributor and judge of merits is intimated. So too when *prudence* is spoken of, He is understood as the teacher and demonstrator of things good and evil and indifferent ».

### Chapter IV.
#### *Why certain works are called works of justice, and certain works of the mercy or goodness of God.*

That certain works are attributed to *mercy*, certain to *justice*, certain to *goodness*, is easy to find in the Scriptures. And concerning *mercy* indeed and *justice* it is manifest, but concerning *goodness* and *mercy* it lies more hidden. But Augustine teaches that those works properly pertain to *mercy* by which some are freed from misery; but to *goodness* not only those, but also the making and the governance of natural things, saying thus: « To *mercy* it pertains that He cleanses from sins and frees from misery; but to *goodness*, that He created heaven and earth and all things very good, that they might be ». The same: « The heavens do not need mercy, where there is no misery; on earth man's misery abounds, and the Lord's mercy superabounds. Therefore with man's misery and the Lord's *mercy the earth is full*, not the *heavens*, which do not need mercy, though they do need the Lord to rule them. For all things need the Lord, both the wretched and the happy, because without Him the wretched is not raised up, and the happy is not governed ». Likewise elsewhere: « *Mercy* is toward the wretched, *goodness* toward any whatsoever ». — Sometimes, however, *mercy* is taken broadly, as *goodness*.

### Chapter V.
#### *How all the ways of the Lord are called mercy and truth.*

After these things it must be considered in what sense *all the ways of the Lord* are called *mercy and truth*. — This admits of a manifold exposition. For all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth, by which *He comes to us*, as Augustine says on the Psalm; and by them are understood *two advents: the first*, in which He showed us a manifest and manifold mercy; and *the second*, in which, requiring merits, He will show justice. Also all the ways of the Lord, that is, those by which *we ascend to the Lord*, are *justice*, by which we turn away from evil, and *mercy*, by which we do good. For in these two every good merit is included. — But since Cassiodorus said above that in these two all the works of God are included, it can rightly be asked whether in every work of the Lord these two are joined to one another. — It has pleased some that these two do not concur in every work of the Lord — I mean according to *effect*; for according to *essence* mercy is not divided from justice, but is one; yet according to *effect* they say that mercy and justice are not in every work, but in some only *mercy*, in others *justice*, and in others *mercy and justice*. They confess nevertheless that God does all that He does mercifully and justly, referring the ground of this saying to God's *will*, which is justice and mercy, not to the *effects* of mercy and justice, which are in things. — To others, however, it seems that, just as God is said to do all His works justly and mercifully, so it must be conceded that in every work of God there is justice and mercy, that is clemency, according to effect or sign, because there is no work of God in which there is not the effect or sign of equity or of clemency, whether secretly or openly. For sometimes clemency or kindness is manifest, and equity hidden; sometimes conversely.

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