Dist. 49, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/49/q/bon-sent-IV-d49-p1-a1-q1
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### Sole Article. *On beatitude.*
### Question I. *What beatitude is.*

As to the first, then, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that beatitude is a created good:

1. Because beatitude is the perfection of the Blessed; but every perfection of a creature is created, since God is the perfective form of nothing: therefore beatitude is a created good.

2. Likewise, everything created which is not transcendent, as *being* and *one* are, belongs to some determinate genus; but beatitude is a created good, as has been proved, and is not transcendent, seeing that it is found in very few: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that which is of a determinate genus and is in something in such a way that the thing can be without it, is in the genus of accident; but beatitude is of this sort: therefore it is in the genus of accident.

4. Likewise, every good of a determinate genus, according to which a man is denominated as being of such a quality, and which is a perfection of the soul itself, is in the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition; but beatitude is a created good and of a determinate genus, as has been proved, and it perfects nature; this is agreed: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:**

1. That it is not a created good seems so: because beatitude satisfies our appetite; but nothing satisfies the appetite of the human soul except the Trinity alone, since, as the soul is born to receive God, nothing less than God fills it: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, beatitude is the ultimate end, beyond which there is no other end; but the universal end is only the uncreated good, just as it is the first principle: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, that it is not of a determinate genus seems so: because, as Boethius says, « Beatitude is a state made perfect by the gathering together of all goods »: therefore it embraces every good; but every good is determined within several genera, not within one: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, that it is not in the genus of accident seems so: because beatitude is the noblest of all perfections; but an accidental form has less of nobility than a substantial one: therefore it is impossible that beatitude should be in the genus of accident.

5. Likewise, that it is not in quality seems so: because the Philosopher defines happiness by saying that it is « an act perfect according to virtue »; and that it is so is clear: because a habit is perfected through act: if therefore beatitude is the ultimate perfection, it is an act; but act is in the genus of action: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> **Conclusion.** Beatitude, taken for the beatifying object, is an uncreated good; but taken for the form informing the soul, it is a created good.

**I respond:** It must be said that beatitude is the end satisfying our appetite. Now what satisfies our appetite does so in two ways: either as an *object*, or as *informing*. What satisfies our appetite as an *object* is God alone, to the receiving of whom the human soul is ordered. But what satisfies as *informing* is the very inflowing of God into the soul, which is deiformity itself and satiety itself.

According to this, the name *beatitude* is common, by priority and posteriority, to uncreated beatitude, which is the end satisfying as object, and to created beatitude, which is what satisfies as informing; and it is said by priority of uncreated beatitude, by posteriority of created, since the inflowing of the object does not satisfy except on account of the object.

**To the arguments:**

*To 1 and 2.* And from this the first is clear, because Bede and Augustine are speaking of the satisfying object; and likewise of the end which terminates the intention, and not of the end which informs.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it is not of a determinate genus: I say that on the contrary it is. As to the objection that it is a state containing all goods, I say that to embrace all goods can be so in two ways: either according to *truth*, or according to *equivalence*. According to *truth* it is not necessary that it contain the good of every genus; it does, however, contain it according to *equivalence*, because it contains so great a good as suffices and is equivalent, indeed outweighs every good; and such a good cannot be of a determinate genus.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that a substantial perfection is nobler: it must be said that this is true with respect to *first being*, but not with respect to *second being* or *well-being*; on the contrary, an accidental form is the perfection of the composite itself with respect to well-being, as is clear of colour and scent in a rose. — It can also be said otherwise, that accident is twofold. For there is one kind which is caused from the principles of the subject, and such is more ignoble than the substantial form, in that it has its origin from it; and another which is caused by something higher, and such can be nobler, in that it directs and joins. And because beatitude joins the soul to the most high God, where there is the terminus of every appetite, and has its rise from God, not from the soul: therefore that point is clear.

*To 5.* To that which is asked, of what genus it is: it must be said that created beatitude does not name act purely, since it is agreed that a glorious act proceeds from something in habit; nor does it name habit purely, since it names the highest perfection, which is in continuous act: therefore it is necessary that it name *habit as act* or in act, as if one were to say knowledge, which is always in considering. But because it names *habit* and *deiformity* more principally, therefore, even though it names a thing of a twofold genus, nevertheless it is more principally of the genus of *quality*. And there is an example: because *figure* names a disposition of quality in quantity, yet more principally the disposition; hence it names quality in quantity and is in the genus of quality. The same is to be understood in the case at hand.