Dist. 49, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/49/q/bon-sent-IV-d49-p1-a1-q2
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### Question II. *In what way beatitude is desirable.*

Secondly it is asked, in what way beatitude is desirable; and it is asked whether all men desire *true* beatitude. And that they do, it seems.

1. Boethius: "Implanted in the minds of men is a longing for the true good"; but the true good is that which truly makes us blessed: therefore all desire true beatitude.

2. Likewise, the Philosopher says that "all things long for the good"; therefore they either long for *any whatever* good, or for the good which *suffices*. Not for *any whatever*,

for if for *any whatever*, then there is a process to infinity: it stands, therefore, that it is the good which *suffices*. But no good is sufficient to fill the human soul except true beatitude: therefore all men desire true beatitude.

3. Likewise, that a man should desire beatitude is either *natural* or *of deliberation*. If *of deliberation*: then he can desire the contrary, namely misery, the contrary of which Augustine says in the third book of *On Free Choice*: therefore he desires it with a *natural* desire. But *natural* desire is common to all and perpetual: therefore if the desire of beatitude is such, the conclusion is plain, etc.

4. Likewise, everything perfectible naturally desires its own perfection; but the human soul is born to be perfected by true beatitude: therefore every soul desires true beatitude.

**On the contrary:**

1. "Things unseen we can love, things unknown by no means," as Augustine says; but there are many who do not know what true beatitude is and where it is; which is plain, because they place beatitude in riches and honours: therefore they do not desire true beatitude either.

2. Likewise, "sin is, having despised the unchangeable Good, to cleave to changeable things"; but beatitude is the unchangeable Good: therefore every sinner despises true beatitude, therefore none desires it. — *If you say* that he *despises* it with the *deliberative* desire, but *desires* it with the *natural* one; this is nothing: because "what is natural does not grow accustomed to its contrary": therefore he will never be able by habituation to despise it.

3. Likewise, beatitude is desired either *for its own sake* or *for the sake of something else*. If *for the sake of something else*: then it is not desired as *beatitude*, because that makes blessed in which the end is constituted: it is therefore desired *for its own sake* by everyone by whom it is desired. But there are many who enjoy things to be used and use things to be enjoyed: therefore there are many who do not desire true beatitude for its own sake: therefore neither do they desire it at all.

4. Likewise, if it is desired, it is either under the aspect of the *advantageous* or under the aspect of the *honourable*. If under the aspect of the *advantageous*; since the desire of the advantageous is in brute animals: then the desire of beatitude is too. If under the aspect of the *honourable*; since the love of the honourable is not in the wicked: then it is not desired by the wicked themselves.

### Conclusion.

> *All men naturally desire true beatitude.*

**I respond:** It must be said that there are two things which produce desire, namely *suitability* and *neediness*. Since therefore the rational soul has been created to *the image and likeness of God* and has been made capable of the most sufficient good; and it does not suffice for itself, since it is empty and deficient: therefore I say that it naturally desires true beatitude.

*To 1, 2, 3.* To that, then, which is objected on the contrary, that many are ignorant of true beatitude; some answer that knowledge must precede the *deliberative* desire, but not the *natural* desire. — But this is nothing: because, just as in us there is a twofold love, *natural* and *deliberative*; so likewise there is also a twofold *knowledge*: therefore just as *deliberative* knowledge precedes deliberative love, so *natural* knowledge precedes natural love.

And therefore it must be said that just as there is a twofold *instinct* toward the good, namely in *general* and in *particular*; so also there is a twofold *desire*. And the *judgment of the good* in *general* comes from *natural* knowledge, and as regards this there is no error; but the judgment in *particular*, of this or that, is not wholly from a natural habit, but *by an assumption* made by deliberating reason, and about this there is error. — And the like is to be understood of *desire*. All men therefore have the *desire* of true beatitude in *general* and have *knowledge* of it in *general*. For all believe that beatitude is the good which suffices, and all desire that. But in *particular*, when one *assumes*: this suffices, namely honour or money, knowledge errs and affection turns aside. And it is like the case of one who wishes to buy gold and believes this piece of brass to be gold, and believes the piece of gold to be brass. *If you ask* him in general what he wishes to buy, he answers: gold. *If you ask* which piece he wishes to buy, he will answer: this one, pointing to the brass. — Likewise, if you ask a miser whether he desires true beatitude and wishes to have it, he will answer that he does. *If you ask* what he wishes, whether paradise or

a penny; he will answer: the penny. And the reason of this is that here he believes there is sufficiency, there he does not.

*If you ask:* how did he *know* it in general? I say that that knowledge is innate. *If you ask:* by what? I say that he knows sufficiency through neediness. — *If you object* that privation is not a way of knowing a habit; it must be said that there is a certain neediness *wholly privative*, and a certain one *disposing and inclining*; and this latter is the ground of knowing. Hence if matter necessarily had the power of knowing, it would surely know the form to which it is inclined and disposed; so the soul knows sufficiency through its own neediness. — It could nevertheless be said that the knowledge of beatitude and of many natural things, such as the natural law, is innate in us. And if the soul is said to be created "as a blank tablet"; this is understood only as regards the species and likenesses which it acquires through the senses. — Or let it be said in a third way, as was said in the first book concerning charity, how one who does not have it has come to know it, and yet without the reception of a species from the senses. — Any one of these ways is highly probable. — The other two are plain.

*To 4.* To the last it must be said that beatitude is desired under the aspect of the *advantageous*; but that advantage is proper to *rational* nature, because it alone is capable of God through knowledge and love. Hence even if animals desire the advantageous, they desire *that* to which they are ordered.

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