Dist. 49, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 3
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/49/q/bon-sent-IV-d49-p1-a1-q3
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### Question III. *In what subject beatitude resides.*

Thirdly it is asked concerning the subject of beatitude; and it is asked whether man is the subject of beatitude according to the soul, or the whole composite. And that it is *the whole composite*, seems [to follow].

1. Augustine, in the nineteenth book of the City of God: « The highest good, by which man is made blessed, consists of the goods of each thing, namely of soul and of body ».

2. Likewise, *On the Spirit and the Soul* says that « God became man, that he might beatify the whole man, exteriorly through his humanity, interiorly through his Divinity ».

3. Likewise, Anselm, in defining beatitude, says that « it is the sufficiency of all goods »; and he divides those goods into goods of the soul and of the body.

4. Likewise, it seems *by reason*: because the reward corresponds to the merit; but merit belongs to the whole composite, since the soul stripped [of the body] does not merit: therefore [so also] beatitude, that is, the reward.

5. Likewise, beatitude is opposed to misery; but misery belongs not only to the soul, but is also of the whole composite, chiefly by reason of the body: therefore etc.

6. Likewise, if beatitude regarded the soul altogether as its subject, then it would not be necessary that the body rise again; but it is necessary that it rise again: therefore etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Upon that verse of the Psalm: *Blessed is the nation whose Lord is God* etc.; the Gloss: « Man's beatitude is only in his mind, because only the mind of man is capable of it, being able to enjoy it ».

2. Likewise, it seems *by reason*: because beatitude consists in God, since he is the ultimate end, in which one must come to rest; but only the spirit is turned to seeing and loving God: therefore beatitude is in the spirit alone.

3. Likewise, the beatitude of glory corresponds to grace; but grace, since it is a spiritual quality, is in man by reason of the soul alone: therefore beatitude also, because, as far as the disposition to the form extends, so far does the form extend.

4. Likewise, if some attribute is in certain subjects, it is in them according to something common; but beatitude is in an Angel and in a man: therefore it is in them according to something common to Angel and to man. But there is nothing common to Angel and to man except spirit and the spiritual powers: therefore beatitude is only in a spiritual power.

5. Likewise, if any two things share in some nature and cannot agree in that which is superadded to the nature, that superadded thing is not in them according to the nature in which they share; but man shares with the brutes in body and in the powers of sensing, and cannot share [with them] in beatitude: therefore it is not in [him] according to the body.

### Conclusion

> *Beatitude is in the soul alone as in its first subject by inherence, but in the body on account of the conjunction, by a certain redundance.*

**I respond:** It must be said that to this some have said that beatitude is spoken of in two ways: *properly* and *commonly*. *Properly* it is the joy arising from a perfect participation in God through knowledge and love; *commonly*, however, every remuneration excluding all misery is so called. In the first way it comprehends only the *substantial* reward, in the second way the *accidental* one; in the first way it is only in the *soul*, in the second way it is in the *soul and the body* and in the whole composite. — And by this they solve the arguments for the opposite sides.

But that solution does not seem fitting, since, as Augustine says, « to live blessedly is to rejoice in goods true and certain »; but joy and « sorrow, as he says in the fourteenth book On the Trinity, belong to the soul itself »: therefore the joy of beatitude also is in the soul as in a subject, whether it be concerning the uncreated Good, which is God, or concerning the goods of the body.

And therefore others say otherwise, that *accidental joy* also and accidental beatitude is in the soul as in a subject, but the *matter of this joy* is in the body, because the soul rejoices over the goods of the body; and therefore beatitude is not in the body as in a *subject*, but as in *matter* and *object*, yet not a principal one. — But it does not suffice to say this, because likewise the *matter of joy* is in all the creatures remaining after the judgment: therefore it would no more be said on this ground that our body is beatified than the other creatures; which it is not fitting to say. — *If you say* that it is rather on this ground, that it has nobler conditions; this does not hold, because likewise the body of the sun will have the same conditions as our body.

And therefore it must be said otherwise, that beatitude, since it is joy over goods, is in something as in a *first subject by inherence*, and thus I say that it is in the soul alone; and it is in something as in *a composite by a certain redundance*, and thus, because the body is conjoined to the soul, the joy redounds into the body.

Therefore the arguments proving that beatitude is not in the body as in a first subject are to be conceded, but nevertheless it is there on account of the conjunction, by a certain redundance and comparticipation.

1. To that, then, which is objected, that beatitude consists of the goods of each; it must be said that Augustine says that according to the opinion of Tullius.

2. To that which is objected, that he might beatify the whole man; it must be said that there is a certain fittingness there, because even if he had not been incarnate, man would have been blessed, provided nevertheless that he had been redeemed and led through to the vision of God.

3. To that which Anselm says, it must be said that it does indeed contain the goods of the body; but beatitude is not said to be those goods, but the joy over those goods.

4. To that which is objected concerning merit, it must be said that the soul cannot merit outside the body, not on account of a defect of power, but on account of a defect of the state and of the time of meriting.

5. To that which is objected, that misery is on the part of the body; it must be said that misery *subjectively* and *properly* is in the rational nature; but *materially* it can be by reason of the body, as Augustine says in the eighth book of the City of God.

6. To the other the answer is plain, that the body must rise again, so that it may be made blessed by a certain comparticipation and redundance. And there is a like case in grace: because, if grace existing in the soul according to the rational power redounds into the sensitive power, when it is abundant, and calms it, and when the delight is great, likewise, as is said in the Psalm: *My soul has thirsted for thee*; since in glory there is perfect abundance and delight, it is no wonder if it redounds into the body; and no one doubts this except one who is inexperienced.

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