Dist. 49, Part 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/49/q/bon-sent-IV-d49-p1-littera
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# DISTINCTION XLIX.

## Part I.

### Chap. I. *On the difference of the mansions in heaven and in hell.*

« But after the resurrection, when the universe has been completed and the judgment fulfilled, the two cities will have their own ends: one of Christ, the other of the devil; one of the good, the other of the wicked — yet each of them made up of Angels and of men. For the one there will be no will, for the other no capacity, of sinning, nor any condition of dying; the one living happily in eternal life, the other enduring unhappily in eternal death without the power of dying, since both are without end; but in beatitude these will abide, one more excellently than another; while in misery those will abide, one more tolerably than another ». — From these things it appears that, just as the good will be glorified differently, some more, some less, so also the wicked will be punished differently in hell. For just as *in the Father's house*, that is, in the heavenly kingdom, *there are many mansions*, that is, differences of rewards, so also in Gehenna there are diverse mansions, that is, differences of punishments. Yet all will suffer an eternal

punishment, just as all the elect will have the same *denarius, which the Householder gave to all who had laboured in the vineyard*. By the name of the denarius is understood something common to all the elect, namely eternal life, God himself, whom all will enjoy, but unequally. For as there will be a differing glorification of bodies, so there will be a differing glory of souls. For *star differs from star*, that is, one elect from another, in the brightness of mind and of body. For some will contemplate the sight of God more closely and more clearly than others, and that very difference of contemplating is called the diversity of the mansions. The house therefore is one, that is, the denarius is one; but there is there a diversity of mansions, that is, a difference of brightness, because the beatitude and life of all is one and the highest good, namely God himself. All the elect will enjoy this good, but some more fully than others. And they will enjoy it by seeing *through the species, not through a mirror in an enigma*. To have life, therefore, is to see life, that is, to know God in his species. Whence Truth says in the Gospel: *This is eternal life, that they may know thee, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent, to be the one and only true God*; this is to have life, to know thee; the knowledge itself is not what thou art, but through knowledge to have the good which thou art, that is, life.

It is also wont to be asked concerning beatitude, whether all will it and know what true beatitude is. On this Augustine, in the thirteenth book *On the Trinity*, discourses thus: « It is a wonder that, since the will for laying hold of and retaining beatitude is one in all, there should arise again so great a diversity of wills concerning that very beatitude — not that anyone does not will it, but that not all know it. For if all knew it, it would not be thought by some to lie in the virtue of the mind, by others in the pleasure of the body, and by others and others elsewhere and elsewhere. How therefore do all love what not all know? Who can love what he does not know, as I disputed above? Why therefore is beatitude loved by all, and yet not known by all? Or do perhaps all know what it is, but not all know where it is, and thence is the contention »? « Or is perhaps that false which we laid down as true, that all men will *to live happily*? For if *to live happily* is, for example, *to live according to the virtue of the mind*, how does he will *to live happily* who does not will this? Shall we not say more truly: this man does not will *to live happily*, because he does not will *to live according to virtue*, which alone is *to live happily*? Not all, therefore, will *to live happily*; rather few will it, if *to live happily* is nothing but *to live according to the virtue of the mind*, which many do not will. Will it then be false, of which not even Cicero himself doubted? For he says: *We certainly all will to be happy*. Far be it that we should say this is false. What then? Is it to be said that, even if *to live happily* is nothing else than *to live according to the virtue of the mind*, nevertheless he too who does not will *this* wills *to live happily*? This indeed seems too absurd. For it is as if we should say: he who does not will to live happily wills happily to live. Who could hear such a contradiction? who could bear it? And yet necessity thrusts us to this. If it is both true that all will *to live happily*, and that not all *will so to live as alone one lives happily* »? « Or will this be able to rescue us from these straits, if we say that *to live happily* is nothing but *to live according to one's own delight*; and that therefore it is not false that all will *to live happily*, since all so will as each is delighted? But this indeed is false. For to will what is not fitting is to be most wretched. Nor is it so wretched *not to obtain* what you will, as *to will to obtain* what is not proper. Who would be so blind as to say that anyone is happy for this reason, that he lives as he wills, when in fact, even if he were wretched, he would be less so if he had been able to have none of those things which he had wrongly willed. For by an evil will alone each one is made wretched, but more wretched when the desire of the evil will is fulfilled. Wherefore, since it is true that all men will to be happy and seek this with the most ardent love, and on account of this all other things, whatever they seek; and since no one can love what he wholly does not know what or of what sort it is, nor can he fail to know what that is which he knows himself to will: it follows that all know the happy life. But all the happy have what they will, although not all who have what they will are forthwith happy. But forthwith wretched are those who either do not have what they will, or have that which they do not rightly will. He therefore is not happy, save he who both has all that he wills and wills nothing evil ». « For he indeed lives happily who lives as he wills, and wills nothing evil ». « Since therefore the happy life consists of these two, though someone good may be among evils, yet he is not happy unless all evils are ended ». « But when he who in these miseries is faithful and good has come from this life to the happy one, then will truly be what now can in no way be, that a man should so live as he wills. For there he will not will to live evilly, nor will he will anything that will be lacking, nor will anything be lacking that he shall have willed. Whatever will be loved will be present, nor will that be desired which is not present. Everything that will be there will be good, and the highest God will be the highest good; and — what is altogether most blessed — it will be certain that it will ever be so ». « But to will themselves to be happy belongs to all men. All see in their heart that they will themselves to be happy, and yet not of all is the faith by which one comes to beatitude ».

### Chap. II. *Whether anything is there known by someone which not all understand.*

It is also wont to be asked whether someone of greater merit, such as Peter, *knows* anything of God which someone of lesser merit, such as Linus, does not know. — To most it seems that all the elect know in common all the things pertaining to beatitude concerning God, but differently. For nothing knowable in God seems greater or more worthy than to understand him as three and one; and this all will then know through the species. Whence it follows that there is nothing pertaining to beatitude unknown to any of the Blessed. All therefore will see all those things whose knowledge serves beatitude, but they will differ in the mode of seeing. For one will shine more than another, and one less than another.

### Chap. III. *On the parity of joy.*

It is also wont to be asked whether they are unequal in *joy*, as they differ in the brightness of knowledge. — On this Augustine says: « There will be *many mansions in one house*, namely various dignities of rewards; but where God *will be all in all*, there will be, even amid unequal brightness, an equal joy, so that what individuals will have may be common to all; because also the glory of the head will belong to all through the bond of charity ». — From these things it is given to understand that all will have an equal joy, even though an unequal brightness of knowledge, because through charity, which in each one will be perfect, « each will rejoice as much over the good of another as he would rejoice if he had it in himself ». But if the joy of all will be equal, it seems that the beatitude of all is equal; which is plainly not at all the case. — To which it can be said that beatitude would be equal if joy were equal in such a way that knowledge also were equal; but since this will not be, the parity of joy will not make a parity of beatitude. — The equal joy can also be taken thus, that the parity be referred not to the intensity of the affection of those rejoicing, but to the universality of the things over which there will be rejoicing; because concerning every thing over which one will rejoice, all will rejoice.

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