Dist. 49, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/49/q/bon-sent-IV-d49-p2-s1-a1-q1
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### Article I. *On the glorification of the body.*

### Question I. *Whether the glory of the body belongs to the substance of beatitude.*

As regards the first, then, one proceeds thus, and it is shown that the glory of the body belongs to the substance of beatitude, or that it increases the glory of the soul:

1. And first through the authority of the Master in the text: "Without scruple," he says, "it must be believed that they will have a greater glory after the judgment than before, because the joy will be greater and the knowledge fuller"; but these things regard the essence of beatitude: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, Bernard, *On Loving God*: "The soul, though stripped, is nevertheless joined to the body, if not by life or sense, still by affection, so that without it the soul can neither be nor be able to be consummated."

3. Likewise, Augustine, in the twelfth book *On Genesis*, says of the stripped soul: "There is in it a certain natural appetite for administering the body, by which it is retarded, lest it be borne with its whole intention into that highest heaven": therefore, if the quantity of the substantial reward consists in adherence to and enjoyment of that highest heaven, it is evident etc.

4. Likewise, perfect beatitude is the rest of all desires: if therefore the soul naturally desires to be united to the body, and this appetite, since it is natural, cannot be terminated except through union; it is impossible that the soul be perfectly beatified until it takes up the body again.

**On the contrary:** 1. The soul now rejoices in God, but after the judgment it will rejoice not only in God, but also in the goods of the body; but God is an infinite good, the good of the body is a finite good; but the finite added upon the infinite adds nothing: therefore the good of the body does not increase the reward: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, there is as much grace in the stripped soul as it is capable of when it is joined [to the body]: therefore the same seems to hold of glory.

3. Likewise, since God offers himself to the soul now in open vision, just as after the judgment, why is the glory not now as perfect as after the judgment? — *If you say* that it is on account of the appetite for administering the body; *on the contrary*: Bernard, *On Loving God*, says of the blessed souls "that they are so inebriated with God that they forget themselves": therefore, if they forget themselves, much more do they forget the body.

4. Likewise, greater motions absorb lesser ones: therefore, since the motion of love toward God is disproportionately greater than that toward the body, therefore it totally absorbs the latter.

5. Likewise, the appetite for administering the body impedes, therefore much more the administering itself: for if the love of something can draw one back from God when it is absent, much more so when it is present.

6. Likewise, the body will never become spirit, although it becomes spiritual: therefore a spirit released from the body is freer than one bound to it: therefore it is better disposed for receiving perfect beatitude.

### Conclusion

> *The glorification of the body makes for a greater joy as regards extension and also as regards intension, inasmuch as an impediment is removed, though the habit is not thereby increased.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *beatitude* is called joy by essence; but joy can be called greater in four ways: either because it is of *a greater object*, or because it is from *a greater habit*, or because it is of *more things*, or because it is *more intense from the same habit*. In the first way a greater joy, namely because of a greater object, is found neither with respect to *the same person* nor with respect to *different persons*, because each one rejoices in the infinite good. — In the second way a greater joy is found with respect to *different persons*, because Peter rejoices with a greater habit than Linus; but it is not found with respect to *the same person* as regards *different times*, because Peter will not have a greater habit after the judgment than he has now. — In the third way greater, namely because more widely and of more things, it is found in *the same person* according to *different times*, because Peter will rejoice in more things after the judgment than now, since he will rejoice in the glory of soul and body and in the glory of all the saved.

But it is not greater in this way with respect to *different persons*, because a small Saint will rejoice in just as many and the same things as the greatest Saint. — In the fourth way greater, namely because more intense, it is found both with respect to *the same person* and with respect to *different persons*: with respect to *different persons*, because one is moved more intensely than another; with respect to *the same person*, because from the same habit the soul will be moved more intensely once the body has been taken up again, since it will have nothing retarding it.

It must therefore be granted that the glorification of the body makes for a greater joy as regards *extension*; it makes for it also as regards *intension*, not by increasing the habit, but by removing the impediment. Hence it does not make for an increase of the essential reward *principally*, but *consequently*. — And the reasons for this are to be granted.

*To 1 and 2.* To that which is objected on the contrary side, that one does not rejoice in a greater [object]; it must be said that the reasoning holds well; but as regards this it is not called *greater*, but *more intense concerning the same*. — Similarly, what he objects in the second place about grace is evident: for grace itself denotes a habit, and the same habit of glory is in the soul stripped and after it has been united; but through it the soul is not moved so intensely, and this because the appetite retards it.

*To 3.* To that which is objected, that it forgets itself; it must be said that this is not understood as though it did not love itself, but that every private love which is not referred to God will be taken away from the soul; and certainly the soul does not desire the body with a private love, but for the glory of God. — Or it must be said that Bernard is speaking of the Blessed after the resumption of the second robe.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that greater motions absorb lesser ones; it must be said that it is true that they absorb them, but not so that they do not *exist*, but so that they do not *appear so intensely*; yet they are and they appear in some way; and therefore, although but little, still in some way the lesser motions diminish the greater ones themselves, even though they are overcome.

*To 5.* To that which is objected, that if the appetite impedes, the presence [of the body] does so still more; it must be said that *appetite* denotes two things, namely the *love* of some thing and the *lack* of it. When therefore it impedes, it does so either by reason of *love* or by reason of *lack*. If by reason of *love*, then the thing present impedes more; if by reason of *lack*, then it does not impede, since the lack is removed by the presence.

*To 6.* To that which is objected, that a released spirit is freer; it must be said that there is a spirit released from the body *in substance and in affection*; and this one is most free. And there is a spirit *bound in affection* and *loosed in substance*; and this one is not free, because it wills something which it does not have. And there is a spirit *bound in substance and in affection*; and then either the body is *disobedient*, and such a spirit is not free, because it cannot do what it wills; or the body is *obedient in all things*, and such a spirit is free with the freedom befitting it, because it wills nothing except what it can, and it has everything that it wills.