Dist. 49, Part 2, Art. 3, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/49/q/bon-sent-IV-d49-p2-s1-a3-q1
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### ARTICLE III. *On the remuneration of the senses.*

Next, as to the third article, inquiry is made concerning the remuneration of the senses. And it being supposed that they will be in the fatherland — since the soul will be one having all its powers, seeing that it loses none, and the body too will be one having all its organs — concerning this two things are asked.

*First* it is asked, whether in the fatherland all the senses have their acts.

*Second*, whether those senses which are in their act know through the reception of a species.

### QUESTION I. *Whether in the fatherland all the senses have their acts.*

As to the first, then, it is shown that *all* the senses will be in their act:

1. Because a power joined to its act is nobler than one not joined; but all the powers will be there in the noblest state: therefore all will be joined to their act: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, as the soul desires to be united to the body, so does sense to its object; but for the soul to be perfectly glorified it is necessary that it be united to the body, so that that appetite may be quieted: therefore in like manner it is necessary that every sense be united to its object. But the union of a sense with its object is by means of an act: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, it is agreed that the body is remunerated because it serves the soul: therefore sense too ought to be remunerated; but every power born to be delighted, if it is perfectly remunerated, is established in perfect delight; for it rests in it, and this rest is delight. And this can be proved *by a parallel* in the damned, since there will be continuous pain in sense there: therefore in the Blessed continuous delight. From this I argue: no power is delighted except in that which it knows; but sense does not know itself, nor its organ, nor what is above itself: therefore, since it knows only its object, it is delighted in its object. But it is not delighted in it except in act: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, the highest delight of a power is in its act: therefore if the senses are delighted there, they are there in their acts. *Moreover*, if it is delighted, it senses; just as it follows that if it grieves, it senses: therefore since it has been proved that delight is in all the senses, it must be that all of them sense.

5. Likewise, *sight* is in its act, which is the most spiritual; whence Job, chapter nineteen: *In my flesh I shall see God*; and Apocalypse, chapter one: *Every eye shall see him*; and Augustine says that « sight will be refreshed in the contemplation of the humanity », in the book *On the Spirit and the Soul*. — There is also there the sense of *touch*; which is clear, because one glorified body will be able to embrace another, and this sense is the most material of all. Wherefore, since there is there the act of a *spiritual* and of a *material* sense: therefore also of all the senses.

**On the contrary:** That *no* sense is there in act seems to follow:

1. Because every finite power can do more upon one thing than when it is dispersed among many; but the soul has a finite power: therefore it would also be moved more intensely if it were moved toward God alone by knowledge and delight: therefore the knowledge and delight of the senses diminishes its motion toward God, and therefore also its glory. But nothing of that kind ought to be there: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, if sense is in act, that act is either *with delight* or *without*. If it is *not with delight*, then it is not in a perfect act. If, however, it *is with delight*; but when something is delighted in one of two opposites, it is saddened in the other; when it is delighted in the mean, it is saddened in the extremes: therefore if it is delighted in perceiving, it is possible for it to be saddened. — *If you say* that nothing is repugnant to it nor corrupts it, on account of its incorruptibility; at least the *absence* of a thing induces *sadness* whose *presence* brought *delight*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, *certain* senses exist on account of need, as is clear of taste, for the restoration of what has been lost; but then all need will be taken away: therefore etc.

### Conclusion

> *The senses of sight and touch, and perhaps also hearing, will be in their acts; the others, however, will not.*

**I respond:** It must be said that *being able to sense* comes from the joining of the power with a well-disposed organ, but *to sense* comes from the joining of that power with an object. Since, therefore, the powers will there be joined to well-disposed organs, all the *powers of sensing* will be there. But since the *objects* of all the senses will not be in glory, but only of certain ones, therefore *certain* senses

will be in *their act*, and *certain* ones *not*. — For the *objects* of *certain* senses are *absolute properties*, which are found in the body to be glorified, such as color for sight and lightness for touch itself; and since the glorious body will rise with luminosity and lightness, the objects of two senses will be there; therefore those senses will be in their acts. But the objects of the *other* senses are not *properties of the body to be glorified* nor *absolute properties*, but *emanations* from bodies, such as odor and sound and savor; and since these will not be in the fatherland, therefore etc.

Another reason as well is drawn from the side of the *medium:* because the medium in *sight* can be everything that has the character of the transparent, while the medium in *touch* is the flesh joined to it; and therefore, since these two media will be in the fatherland, these two senses will also be in their acts, while the *others* will by no means be so, their media failing them — unless perhaps someone should press the case of *hearing*, about which the matter is left in doubt, as it is about *vocal praise* in the fatherland, which to posit there seems neither necessary nor openly false; and therefore here it is permissible to hold an opinion.

**To the arguments for the first side:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that *all* will be in their acts on account of the greater nobility of the powers; it must be said that there is an act *of perfection*, and an act which has *imperfection joined to it*; and since the act of *tasting* has imperfection joined to it by reason of the *state*, and likewise *smell* by reason of its *object*, which is not glorified and has to come about through a medium receptive of an alien impression: therefore etc.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that sense desires to be united; it must be said that the mode of desiring is different; for that appetite of the soul is by reason of the perfection of *natural being*, but this one is only as regards *well-being*; and therefore the former cannot be terminated unless the body be united; the latter can be, if it be placed in such a state that it does not need that object.

*To 3 and 4.* To that which is objected concerning delight, it must be said that delight is in sense in two ways: one by *redundance*, the other by the *presence of the object*. By *redundance*, as when the soul is inwardly full of delight, the powers of sensing too are so inebriated that they in no way seek nor need to be delighted outwardly; and this delight will be the reward of all the senses and in all of them. But this delight they do not have *from themselves* nor from *their own act*, but from the *act of the soul*; and therefore it is not necessary that on its account the senses be in their act. — The other delight is by the *presence of a suitable object*; and since there are only two senses which have glorious objects, therefore it is only in two; and this is not a reward, except a very accidental one, because a sense is not more glorious in that object's presence than in its absence. — The rest is clear.

**To the arguments for the second side:**

*To 1.* To that, however, which is objected, that there is *no* sense, because one act impedes another; it must be said that this is true when the one is not ordered to the other; but it is not so in the present case, for the act of *reason* redounds into sense, and the act of *sense* is ordered to and subserves the act of reason; and therefore the one is invigorated by the other.

*To 2.* To that which is objected, that where there is delight, there is sadness; it must be said that a certain sense is delighted in its object because it is *suitable, perfecting* and *conserving*, as the object is with respect to bodily sense; another, because it is *suitable* and *perfecting*, as the intellect in intelligible truth; another, because it is only *suitable*, as the glorified sense — *not perfecting*, since it is perfected inwardly, *not conserving*, since it is incorruptible; and such a sense is not saddened by its *contrary*, since it is not harmed, nor in its *absence*, since it is not made imperfect. That which is delighted in the first way is saddened in two ways; that which is delighted in the second, in one way.

*To 3.* The last reason must be conceded, namely that those senses which exist *by reason of need* will not remain in their acts. And thus the whole is clear.