Dist. 50, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/50/q/bon-sent-IV-d50-p1-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether by deliberative will the damned would rather not be than be thus.*

Secondly it is asked whether by deliberative will the damned would rather not be than be thus. And that they would, seems the case.

1. Apocalypse nine: *In those days men shall desire to die, and death shall flee from them.*

2. Likewise, Augustine in the book *On the Misery of This World*, speaking of the damned, says: «O death, how sweet you would be to those to whom you were so bitter! You alone are desired by those who vehemently hated you».

3. Likewise, it seems so *by reason*: because the *sorrow from punishment* is greater than the *delight from being* is, since they have little joy and great sorrow: therefore, if the choice of reason prefers the *flight* from what is more harmful to the *desire* of what is less delightful — as is plain in the case of the man who wants to gain silver and yet flees death — it seems that the damned would rather not be punished at all than be.

4. Likewise, if they were to pass into *non-being*, the punishment would be momentary; but the punishment of their torment is eternal: therefore, if a momentary punishment is to be preferred to an eternal one, as a finite evil to an infinite one; it seems etc.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, in the book *On Free Choice*: «Consider how great a good *being* is, which both the blessed and the wretched will; yet it is more to *be* and *to be wretched* than not to be at all, although you would not will to be wretched».

2. Likewise, the *reasoning* of Augustine: pre-election presupposes election; but *not-being* is not eligible, because everything eligible has the appearance of a good, whereas *not-being* itself does not have the appearance of a good, since what appears *good* appears *to be*: therefore etc.

3. Likewise, every ordered appetite is conformed to nature, because «nature always seeks what is better»; but «nature always seeks *to be*, as the Philosopher himself says, and in no way *not-being*»: therefore etc.

4. Likewise, a greater evil is more to be fled; but the greater evil is that which takes away more; but corruption into *non-being* takes away the whole good, whereas punishment does not take away the whole, but rather leaves much: therefore *non-being* is more to be fled than *being punished*.

### Conclusio

> *The damned would rather not be than be damned; and that is more to be sought by the appetite for the advantageous, yet not without qualification.*

**I respond:** To this some say that the damned would rather *not be* than *be thus*; but their appetite is disordered and undiscerning and fantastical, because it seeks what is harmful to itself, as is the appetite of a man in fever, which does not come from nature but from a fantastical imagining, since he judges that what harms him is of benefit to him. So the damned, because they judge that they would have rest if they were not at all, seek *not to be* rather than *to be in punishments*; and this Augustine seems to say. — Yet nevertheless the Wise Man says in Ecclesiastes four: *And I judged him happier than both* etc.; and Wisdom itself, Matthew twenty-six: *It were better for him, if that man had not been born*; and Jerome says: «That it is better not to live than to live badly».

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that *not-being* is in no way to be sought by a *right* appetite; likewise neither *to be damned*, nor *to be unhappy*; and if any of these is sought, it is fantasy, not the ordination of nature; but both of them are *to be fled*. And since they stand to one another as exceeding and exceeded, *each* is *more to be fled* than the other under different considerations.

For because *not-being* takes away the whole good, and *punishment* a part, therefore *this* is more to be fled — speaking, however, *without qualification*. — Because *corruption* into *non-being* exceeds infinitely *intensively*, infinitely, I say, according to *proportion*, whereas *punishment* exceeds *extensively* infinitely according to *truth*; therefore I believe that it would be more to be sought, if it were set before one as a choice, not to be at all rather than *to be tormented eternally* — I speak of the appetite which *flees what is disadvantageous*. For my mind judges this the more bearable, as beheading rather than the long burning of fire. Nevertheless, according to the *appetite for the honourable*, since the torment of a wicked spirit is unto the glory of God, one ought assuredly to prefer to lie under the fires unto the continual praise of God rather than to escape the hand of God through utter corruption.

I concede, therefore, that the damned would rather not be; and every man by reason ought to seek that, the gravity of each punishment being considered; yet I do not say that it is more to be sought *without qualification*, although they themselves without qualification do seek it more. — And the reasons for this are to be conceded.

1. To the reasons for the opposite, however, it must be resolved that Augustine proceeds by that way in which corruption into *non-being* exceeds, namely *intensively*.

2. To that which is objected, that pre-election presupposes election; it must be said that this is true of the election which is by way of *desire*, not of that which is by way of *flight*.

3. To that which is objected, that nature always desires to be; it must be said that this is true, and right reason too; yet nature more flees an eternal punishment than a momentary one.

4. To that which is objected, that the greater evil is that which takes away more; it must be said that *a greater evil* is such in two ways, namely *extensively* and *intensively*, and likewise *to take away more*; and nature more flees always to be in utter misery than to be deprived of every good; as often, concerning a thing we love much, we have preferred not to have it rather than to put on a servile condition on its account.

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