Dist. 50, Part 2, Art. 1, Q. 2
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/50/q/bon-sent-IV-d50-p2-a1-q2
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### Question II. *Whether the separated soul knows the things that are done about us.*

Secondly there is asked, concerning the knowledge of the separated soul, by comparison with the state of wayfarers; and it is asked whether the separated soul knows the things that are done about us. And that it does, seems [true] at least of *the good*.

1. Gregory: « What is it that they do not see, who see him who sees all things »? But such are the blessed souls: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, this also seems [true] of *the reprobate*: because Gregory relates in the *Dialogue* that a certain wicked man foretold the place of his own burial; and he resolved that this came about by the power of the soul, which was already being drawn away from the body: if therefore it is more to know future things than present ones, and it knows so much the more, the more it is abstracted; it is clear, etc.

3. Likewise, it seems [true] of *both* in common: because both have the power of understanding, which does not need the support of an exterior light, nor is it restricted to any one thing: therefore through that power it can know the things that are done about us.

4. Likewise, the freer a substance is, the more easily and more certainly does it go forth into its own act: therefore since the soul separated from the body is much freer than [the soul] joined to it, if when joined it could know the things that are about us, it will be able to also when separated.

**On the contrary:** 1. That the *blessed* souls do not know [them], seems [true]: because the blessed souls cleave to God more than do some wayfarers; but some wayfarers cleave to God in such a way that they know little or nothing of the things that are done here: therefore etc.

2. Likewise, it seems [true] of *the damned*: because the light of knowledge does not increase in the damned, but rather is darkened; but when the damned were here, they could not know the things that are done among those below: therefore neither now will they be able to know the things that are done among us.

3. Likewise, that neither *these* nor *those* [know], seems [true]: because both these and those have a finite power of knowing; but for something to be known anew, it is necessary that it be presented to the very power that knows: therefore if they are far distant from us and absent, it is clear etc.

4. Likewise, both these and those love us; but he who loves another rejoices with him in good things and is saddened in evil ones: therefore if the evil ought not to know that from which they would rejoice, nor the good that from which they would grieve; it seems that neither these nor those know us. And this is confirmed by that which was said to Josiah, in the fourth [book] of Kings, chapter twenty-two. For the Lord said that he would take him away, lest he should see the evils of his people.

### Conclusion

> *Separated souls, both the good and the evil, can in various ways — especially through the report of others, or through God's revelation — know certain things about wayfarers.*

**I respond:** It must be said that to know something is twofold, namely by *one's own consideration* and by *another's instruction*. Knowledge through *one's own consideration* is twofold: for either it is of a thing as *present* and through certitude; or it is of a thing as *absent* and through a kind of conjecture. Likewise, knowledge through *instruction* is twofold: for either it is through the report *of another*, or through the revelation *of God*.

Since therefore the manner of knowing is fourfold, the *first* is not in separated souls as regards our acts, so long as they are in the places assigned to them; for they are distant from us, unless perhaps by divine permission they come to us. — The *second* however, which is through a kind of conjecture, as we do concerning those whom we know when they are absent from us, can be in *the damned*, not in *the good*, because error and doubt are mixed in with it. — The third, through report, can be in *the good*, to whom the good Angels report, and in *the evil*, to whom the demons report, or the damned themselves. — The fourth however, through illumination and revelation, is only in *the good*. Hence Augustine, in the book *On the Care to Be Had for the Dead*: « The spirits of the dead, he says, can know certain things which are done here, which it is necessary for them to know, not only present things, but also past and future ones, by the Spirit of God revealing them ». And Gregory in the *Dialogue*: « There comes about in the elect something marvellous, that they recognize as good even those whom they never saw or knew here ». Yet they do not know all things, but certain things through revelation.

**To the arguments for the affirmative side:**

*To 1.* To that, then, which is objected, that the good see all things because they see him who sees all things; it must be said that Gregory understands this of those things which are necessary for their salvation.

*To 2.* To that which is objected concerning the man who foresaw the place, it must be said that this could have come about from great solicitude and abstraction of the soul, or also from some revelation made interiorly.

*To 3. 4.* To that which is objected, that they do not need an organ and are most free; it must be said that although they do not need an organ for knowing those things of which they have the species, they do nevertheless need one for receiving anew and for knowing, most of all singulars.

**To the arguments for the negative side:**

*To 1.* To that which is objected to the contrary, that the Saints are abstracted from these things; it must be said that the case is not alike: because, so long as they are in the flesh, they are impeded from the contemplation of God by much consideration of our acts, but now the blessed are not impeded.

*To 2. 3.* To that which is objected, that they do not have a greater light of knowledge; it must be said that just as we now know by revelation, so also do they, and by consideration likewise; but they consider us more certainly than we do ourselves, because they have known us hitherto, but not themselves.

*To 4.* To that which is objected, that the good would grieve; it must be said, as will presently be clear, that neither would there be any sadness for the good nor any joy for the evil from this.

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