Dist. 6, Part 1, Art. 1, Q. 1
by St. Bonaventure
Source text: Public Domain Mark 1.0. English translation/apparatus/encoding: CC BY-NC 4.0, Wroot Press.
https://bonaventure.wrootpress.com/browse/4/d/6/q/bon-sent-IV-d6-p1-a1-q1
----------------------------------------
### SOLE ARTICLE. *On the character.*
### QUESTION I. *What the character is according to its essence.*

Concerning the first [question] one proceeds thus, and it is shown first that the character is a habit:

1. « Because there are three things in the soul, namely *powers*, *passions*, and *habits* »; but the character is not a *power*, since it is not in all [souls]; nor a *passion*, since according to it the soul does not undergo anything: therefore it is a *habit*.

2. Likewise, it is established that the character is some spiritual quality of the soul; but « nothing is in any determinate genus that is not in some species of it »: since therefore a spiritual quality is in the first species of quality, and that is a *habit* or a *disposition*: therefore the character is a *habit* or a *disposition*. But it is not a *disposition*, since it is not easily movable: therefore a *habit*.

3. Likewise, if the character is a *habit*, it is either *natural* or innate, or *acquired*, or *infused*. That it is not innate, this is established: therefore [it is] *acquired* or *infused*; but every such habit, since it is in the soul by way of perfection, is *knowledge* or *virtue*; but the character is none of these: therefore it is not a habit.

**On the contrary:** 1. Augustine, *On the Good of Marriage*: A habit is that by which someone does something; but by the character a man does not do anything: therefore the character is not a habit.

> ### Conclusion.
> The character is a habit taken broadly, namely a certain spiritual quality, not perfecting the soul entirely, but disposing it toward a further perfection.

**I respond:** To this some have said that the imprinting-of-a-character is nothing other than a *consigning*, and the character is the same as a *sign*; and this sign adds nothing over the powers of the soul that would be something absolute, just as neither does the marking on a circle; but it is founded upon the bare powers of the soul and is there according to the institution and act of the one consigning, with no change made; whence it is a pure *relation*, like paternity. And they say that the saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of those things which signify something *absolute*. And they offer the example that the character is in the soul as the consecration in a church, in which consecration of a church no new quality is given, but only an ordination by him who has the power, for celebrating sacred things therein; thus they say that the character is a certain seal of the soul, in which the soul is said to be sanctified, so that God may dwell in it as in a temple. And they say that Dionysius held this

in the book *On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy*, where he says: The character is a holy sign of the knowledge or communication of faith and of sacred ordination, given to one approaching from the hierarch. — But that cannot stand: because the character implies some *assimilation* and configuration to Christ, as the character of the beast [implies configuration] to the devil, concerning which Apocalypse fourteen; but assimilation is founded upon a quality: therefore if [a soul] becomes anew similar to God, and no change is made on the part of the other extreme according to quality; it seems that it is necessary to give to the soul some quality.

Therefore some have said that, although the character implies a *relation*, it nevertheless implies some *quality* upon which it is founded; and that quality is like a disposition for receiving the light and warmth of grace, as dryness in wood for warmth, and transparency in glass for light. And therefore they placed the character in the *second species of quality*. — But that cannot stand, because that [second species] is a natural power, or impotence, which follows upon nature. And besides, dryness and transparency are *impotences* of resisting: therefore the character would be an *impotence*; which is foolish to say.

Therefore others have said that the character is not only for *disposing*, but also for *distinguishing*; and it is like a certain quality adorning and ornamenting the faithful soul, by which it is distinguished from the unfaithful; whence it brings to the spiritual sense a *soothing passion*, and therefore is a *passible quality* and in the *third species* of quality. — But that cannot stand, because that is not called a *passible quality* which brings a passion to the *interior* sense or to the intellect. For since every truth is the object of the intellect, then all things would be in the third species of quality; which is foolish to say: therefore it is likewise concerning the character.

Therefore others have said that the character, as far as concerns its name, implies *configuration* — whence where we have, to the Hebrews chapter one, *the figure of the substance*, another translation says *the character of the substance* — and therefore the character is in the fourth species, which « is *form* and *figure* constant about something ». — And if you object that figure is in quantity and quantity is in body; they say that just as *quantity* is twofold, namely spiritual and corporeal or of mass; so *figure* is twofold. — But that does not seem able to stand, because figure is the enclosure of boundaries, insofar as it is the fourth species. But in spiritual things configuration is not similar to an enclosure of boundaries, but is an impression of likeness or an assimilation. Likewise, if figure be placed in spiritual things, it is only transferredly; therefore just as the quantity of virtue is not placed in the genus of quantity of nature, so neither is figure in the species of figure. And again, in what manner is an enclosure of boundaries said according to the quality of virtue in act? And again, upon what is that enclosure founded? If upon a given or innate virtue, it is necessary to have recourse to another species: therefore since spiritual figure has no agreement with that [fourth species], it seems that the character does not imply figure or configuration in the fourth species.

Therefore others, extending themselves further, say that it is not in any species of quality assigned by the Philosopher, because he does not assign except only the species of quality that is innate or acquired, not infused; and

this too the Philosopher himself intimates, when he says: « Perhaps other modes of quality also will appear ». And they say that the character is contained under another species, namely so that one species of quality be *infused quality*. — But that seems to seek an escape, because we place the theological *virtues* and other virtues, which are infused, in the *first species of quality*; why therefore not likewise the *character*?

And therefore it must be said that the character, since it is in the soul and is a *spiritual quality*, *is a habit* (*quod est habitus*), not a *passion* nor a *power*. — But it must be noted that *habit* is taken in two ways: in one way *properly*, insofar as it is distinguished against *disposition* by the perfect and the imperfect; in another way *commonly*, insofar as it comprehends *both*, namely every quality disposing the soul, whether easily movable or with difficulty, whether perfect or imperfect. And it is taken thus, when it is said: there are three things in the soul: *power*, *passion*, and *habit*; for a disposition is in the soul and is not a *power* nor a *passion*.

It must be said therefore that if habit be taken *broadly*, then the character is a *habit*; but if [taken] *strictly* thus, then, because the character is perpetual, therefore [it is] a *habit*; but because it does not perfect, but disposes toward a further perfection, namely of grace, with respect to this it is a *disposition*. — It is likewise in the bodily eye, because there is there a connatural, inseparable *light*, but insufficient for seeing, unless the visible spirit come from the optic nerve. Likewise in the intellect there is a connatural, inseparable *light*, not sufficient for directing cognition, unless the *habit of knowledge* supervene. — According to the thing, therefore, the character is a certain quality not perfecting the soul entirely, but disposing it toward a further perfection, namely of grace. Whence it can be that it is a certain *spiritual light* half-full and a certain *warmth* freely given; and that light is called the *seal* of the soul or to be *signed* in the soul, according to that which is said in the Psalm: *The light of thy countenance is signed upon us, O Lord*; signed, I say, through *nature*, but more specially through the divine *Sacraments*, most specially through the gratuitous *gifts* of the Holy Spirit.

The two objections, therefore, are resolved, because they are understood of a *perfect* habit, which fully has the account of a habit. For that one enables [the soul] toward some work of itself, and thus either it enables the *cognitive* [power], and is *knowledge*; or the *motive* [power], and is *virtue*; but it is not true of a habit which is *imperfect*, disposing toward something else, as *natural light* [disposes] toward knowledge and the *light of the eye* toward the habit of seeing. So it must be understood in the case of the character: nonetheless it does have some act, as will be evident in the following problem.